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THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS IN THE LAW OF

ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Gregory C. Keating*
ABSTRACT

The theory and practice of enterprise liability are oddly dis
joined. On the one hand, case rhetoric insists that considera
tions of fairness are among the primary justifications for
imposing enterprise liability. On the other hand, normatively in
clined and theoretically ambitious scholarship on enterprise lia
bility is overwhelmingly economic in cast. Economically
inclined scholars have flocked to the field, while other kinds of
tort theorists have shunned it, implicitly or explicitly conceding it
to economic analysis. This paper argues that, contrary to this
consensus, there is a powerful and important fairness case to be
made for enterprise liability. This case fits the rhetoric of the
decisions and the structure of the doctrines, and draws philo
sophical support from Kantian social contract theory. When en
terprises are in a position to spread the costs of nonnegligent
accidents across the class ofthose who benefit from the risks that
inevitably issue in such accidents, enterprise liability is more rea
sonable than negligence liability. Under these circumstances, en
terprise liability reconciles the competing claims of liberty and
security more fairly, and more favorably, than negligence
liability.
I.

In

THE ESTRANGEMENT

OF

TORT THEORY

FROM

TORT LAW

one of his more memorable and arresting aphorisms, Oliver

Wendell Holmes remarked that "[o]ur law of torts comes from the
old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and
the like," whereas "the torts with which our courts are kept busy to
day are mainly the incidents of certain well known businesses. .

.

.
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Caffery, Lewis Sargentich, Michael Shapiro, and Chris Stone for comments, criticism, and
discussion. Rick Cipra, Ryan Naftulin, Alison Sanders, Ed Sato and Charles Sewell provided
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railroads, factories, and the like."1 The movement from a world of
discrete and insular risk to one of generalized and interconnected
perils transformed the impact of tort liability on the distribution of
the costs of accidents. In the days of "isolated, ungeneralized
wrongs," tort damages "might be taken to lie where they fell by
legal judgment."2 In the emerging world of risks incidental to great
industrial enterprises, "liability for [accidents] is estimated, and

sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public."3

Holmes went on to observe that juries were quite sensitive to
the moral significance of the differences between the old and new
worlds, and did not seem to share the sense of justice embodied in
traditional tort doctrine. In the vast majority of cases involving in
dustrial accidents, they considered it fair to impose the costs of
those accidents on the enterprises that engendered them. This
double discrepancy between inherited legal categories and the so
cial world that they assumed on the one hand, and emerging social
realities and juries' sense of justice on the other, led Holmes to sug
gest that the law of torts might need to be wholly rethought.4

In

the century that has passed since Holmes wrote, tort law has

been reconstructed in ways that have reduced - though not erased
- the mismatch that caught his eye. Modem vicarious liability, ab
normally dangerous activity liability, and product liability all show
the influence of an "enterprise" or "activity" conception of strict
liability. That conception holds that the characteristic risks of the
modem world are the inevitable by-products of planned activities
- not the random consequences of discrete acts - and seeks to
make activities - not actors - bear the costs of the accidental in
juries that they occasion.
Yet if the law of torts has been partially reconstructed, our un
derstanding of the sense of justice expressed in that reconstruction
remains incomplete. In fact, our understanding is incomplete pre
cisely because it slights the sense of justice that lies behind enter
prise liability. George Priest's influential history of the rise of
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path ofthe Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
183 (Peter Smith 1952) (1920). Holmes originally delivered the paper as a lecture 100 years
ago, on January 8, 1897, at the dedication of a new hall at the Boston University School of
Law.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 182-84. Although Holmes was, to put it mildly, hardly an uncritical admirer
ofjuries and often argued for limiting their role in tort adjudication, he nonetheless conceded
that juries had a place to play in the formulation of liability rules, as well as in the determina
tion of facts, because they embodied the sense of justice of the community. See O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., Dover 1991) (1881).
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enterprise liability, for example, overlooks that sense of justice en
tirely. Priest argues that modem product liability law burst full
grown upon the legal landscape in the mid-1960s, the precocious
offspring of an academic literature thirty years in the making. In
Priest's telling of the tale, the normative thesis of that literature was
simple: the twin policies of preventing accidents whose costs out
weigh their benefits, and dispersing the costs of those accidents that
are not worth preventing, called for discarding negligence liability
and adopting enterprise liability.s
Whatever its merits as an account of the rationales and concepts
informing modem product liability law,6 Priest's article is a power
ful account of the rationales and concepts at the center of much
contemporary academic writing on the normative basis of enter
prise liability. Largely under the influence of economics, that litera
ture works from and refines the twin policies of deterrence and loss
dispersion. It recasts the former as a matter of preventing those
accidents whose economic costs exceed their economic benefits. It
recasts the latter as a matter of supplying insurance at the correct
level and the cheapest cost for harms not worth preventing.7
5. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462-64 {1985). More

precisely, Priest's thesis is that these policies led to enterprise liability because they coalesced
into three more specific propositions. First, manufacturers had "vastly greater power" with
respect to "all relevant aspects of the product defect problem." Id. at 520. Second, manufac
turers had commensurately superior ability to spread risks. See id. Third, forcing manufac
turers to internalize the costs of all accidents attributable to their products would provide
appropriate incentives for them to take cost-justified precautions; to modulate the level of
their activities correctly; and to engage in desirable levels of safety research, development
and innovation. See id. The policies of accident prevention ("precaution" or "deterrence")
and loss distribution {"loss spreading" or "insurance") coalesced into these propositions
largely because they were linked to empirical assumptions about the characteristics of mod
em consumer markets.
6. For forceful criticism, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the
Rise ofModern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 602, 623-34 (1992).
7. For the most part, normatively inclined and theoretically ambitious scholarship on en
terprise liability is economically oriented. Although there is vigorous disagreement within
that scholarship over the merits of enterprise liability, there is little disagreement that its
merits are to be measured by its success at achieving optimal deterrence and supplying opti
mal insurance. Contemporary academic critics of enterprise liability, including Priest, often
insist that it fails on both fronts, but they are especially hard on such liability as a mechanism
for supplying optimal insurance against accidents that should not be prevented. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 64853 {1985) (arguing that modem products liability law frustrates the tripartite insurance ideals
of limiting moral hazard, ameliorating adverse selection, and diversifying risk); George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1553 (1987)
[hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis] (arguing that first-party insurance is preferable to third
party insurance through tort liability because the former can incorporate copayments,
whereas the latter cannot); George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1, 17 {1987) [hereinafter Priest, Tort Reform] (arguing that product manufacturers are
in a poor position to acquire adequate information about the riskiness of insureds and cannot
charge higher product prices to higher risk purchasers and users); Alan Schwartz, The Case
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Contemporary academic writing has all but ignored a wholly dif
ferent kind of justification for activity liability. That justification
takes enterprise liability to rest "not so much" on policies of acci
dent prevention and loss spreading "as in a deeply rooted sentiment
that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for
accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activi
ties. "8 This justification insists that considerations of fairness - not
efficiency - call for making activities that benefit from the imposi
tion of particular risks bear the costs of accidental injuries issuing
out of those risks. Burdens should be aligned with benefits, and
"the costs of [enterprise-related accidents should therefore] be
borne by those who profit from" the enterprise.9 Tue costs of prod
uct-related accidents, for instance, should be apportioned across
"the manufacturers and distributors who profit from its sale and the
buyers who profit from its use."10 In case law, this "fairness" justifi
cation both competes and cooperates with efficiency justifications.11
Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 819, 820, 832-40 (1992) (arguing that product
defects should be subject to a "market" regime of "free contract" with compulsory disclo
sure, because strict liability forces consumers to purchase excessive amounts of insurance and
ineffi ciently depresses demand by forcing manufacturers to insure for nonpecuniary harm).
Contemporary academic defenders of enterprise liability have presented a head-on chal
lenge to the criticisms voiced by Epstein, Priest, Schwartz, and others. These scholars argue
that third-party insurance is generally more efficient than first-party insurance, especially in
the case of product-related accidents, and especially at sorting insureds into suitably narrow
risk pools. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson. What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1. 109-10 (1991)
[hereinafter Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?] (arguing that enterprise liability is
stimulating the rise of mutual insurance companies, which are constructing more homogene
ous and thus more efficient risk pools); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party
Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 129, 137 (1990) (arguing that first-party insurers fail to adjust premiums according to
consumption choices and that a negligence regime therefore induces manufacturers to make
suboptimal investments in product safety, whereas enterprise liability optimizes manufacture
care and activity levels). Croley and Hanson have also challenged the argument that the
award of nonpecuniary damages is inefficient. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The
Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1787, 1791-93 (1995) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs ofAcci
dents] (arguing that proposals to reform the tort system by reducing compensation are not
efficient from a deterrence perspective and that tort law may show the existence of otherwise
unmet consumer demand for insurance against pain and suffering).
8. Ira S. Bushey /fa Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly,
J.).
9. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982).
10. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547.
11. Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1984), is a nice example of a case in which
fairness and efficiency norms worked cooperatively. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial
Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1570, 1580 n.55 (1991) (discussing Wright). The court invoked both loss
spreading and fairness in support of its ruling. See Wright, 735 F.2d at 1077 ("The seller is
also generally better able to bear and distribute the costs resulting from injury due to a defec
tive product."); Wright, 735 F.2d at 1077 ("[T]hose who reap a profit . . . [should] pay for any
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The absence of this conception of fairness from recent academic
writing on enterprise liability is partially explained by the economic
cast of that scholarship. Policies of deterrence and loss distribution
lend themselves to economic explication whereas principle� of fair
ness generally do not. The ascendence of law and economics, how
ever, is only half of the story. The other half of the story is the
recent renaissance of moral theorizing about tort liability and the
reluctance of these moral theorists to embrace the fairness justifica
tion for enterprise liability. For the most part, recent moral theo
ries of tort have been organized around the idea of corrective
justice, and this orientation has led them to view enterprise liability
with suspicion. The guiding idea of corrective justice theories is
that the proper end of tort law is the restoration of a preexisting
equilibrium between victim and injurer, an equilibrium wrongly dis
rupted by injurer's accidental infliction of harm on the victim.12
Moral theorists gripped by this idea have thought that enterprise
liability violates the institutional integrity of tort law because it rests
either on the ideai of loss spreading, which smacks of distributive
justice, or on the goal of optimal deterrence, which is instrumental
ism incarnate. On a corrective justice conception of tort, neither
criteria of distributive justice, however right, nor instrumentalist
goals, however good, are legitimate grounds for the imposition of
tort liability.
In his influential account of the role of fairness in tort law, for
instance, George Fletcher takes loss spreading to be the principal
justification for enterprise liability, and asserts that this justification
has no place in a fairness conception of tort liability because it "is
an argument of distributive rather than corrective justice. "13 Tort
liability, Fletcher rightly insists, must turn on what people have
done, not on who they are.14 Writing around the same time,
harm caused."). Bushey, 398 F.2d 167, discussed in detail in Part III, is a fine example of case
law involving competition between fairness and efficiency.
12. This claim is a very rough generalization, and it does considerable violence to the
variety of corrective justice theories in the field. The reason why it remains the best brief
summary of such theories is that it captures the essence of Aristotle's conception of correc
tive justice. Contemporary tort theory has appropriated both the concept of corrective jus
tice and the distinction between it and distributive justice from Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE,
N1CHOMACHEAN Ennes bk. V., ch. 4, at 114-17 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1980).
13. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547
n.40 (1972).
14. See id. Fletcher amplifies his objection in GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS
OF LEGAL THOUGHT 87-93 (1996). I agree with Fletcher's claim that tort liability must be
grounded in principles of moral responsibility that connect the actions of injurers to the inju
ries of victims in a defensible way. I disagree with Fletcher, however, in believing that the
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Charles Fried articulated a fairness conception of tort liability simi
lar to Fletcher's in its reliance on social contract ideals of equal
freedom and mutual benefit,15 but that work, too, provided no sup
port for the conception of fairness invoked by enterprise liability
case law. Like Fletcher's work, Fried's account of fairness focused
on the criterion of reciprocal risk imposition. That criterion does
little to justify enterprise liability, and as a consequence Fried's own
arguments only grapple with negligence law.16
Not long after Fletcher and Fried's work, Richard Epstein pro
posed a libertarian theory of strict liability that also claimed the
mantle of corrective justice.17 Epstein's theory assumed a starkly
individualistic vision of the social world within which accidental in
juries arose. Its only reference to a form of enterprise liability oc
curred in the course of a causation discussion. Even that reference
was incidental. Product defects, Epstein explained, are one of the
three most common instances of the "dangerous conditions" para
digm of causation,18 and this, not any distinctive characteristic of
enterprise-related accidents, supports the imposition of strict liabil
ity on them. Ernest Weinrib, another important corrective justice
theorist, has pressed the argument that enterprise liability rests on
instrumentalist ideals of loss spreading and deterrence that are
wholly alien to private law.19 The principle of fairness invoked by
enterprise liability principle of fairness is a principle rooted in what enterprises have done
and not who they are.
15. See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SO
CIAL CHOICE ch. 11 (1970).
16. Unlike Fried, Fletcher explicitly justifies some strict liability doctrines on fairness
grounds, arguing that the risks covered by those doctrines are nonreciprocal. See Fletcher,
supra note 13, at 543-49, 570-71. However, the only enterprise liability doctrine justified by
Fletcher on this ground is the liability of product manufacturers to bystanders injured by the
use of their products.
17. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973)
[hereinafter Epstein, Strict Liability]; see also Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent
Pleas in a System ofStrict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, Inten
tional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and irs Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
18. See Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 17, at 178-79. There is, to be sure, something
starkly individualistic about libertarianism. But the stark individualism of Epstein's theory is
remarkable even in comparison with Robert Nozick's treatment of tort issues in chapter four
of his Anarchy, State and Utopia. Nozick's treatment makes a place for enterprise liability
and the principle of fairness that justifies it. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA 79-81 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 681 (1985) (arguing that insurance or cost-shifting rationales have no place in the justi
fication of liability rules because they do not grow out of the parties' relationship as doer and
sufferer of the same harm); Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 McGILL
L.J. 403 (1989) (arguing that tort adjudication may consider only material that is inherent in
the defendant's doing and the plaintiffs suffering of the same harm and that this forbids the
invocation of insurance and deterrence justifications). Weinrib develops his views in ERNEST
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Friendly as the master principle of vicarious liability, and cited in
cases as a cornerstone of enterprise liability, is an academic
orphan.20
Its orphanage is all the more remarkable in light of the attrac
tiveness of the fairness justification to judges. James Henderson's
careful empirical study of judicial justification in products liability
cases discovered that "[m]easured by what judges say in their pub
lished opinions . . . fairness norms, not efficiency norms,
[predominate]," and their predominance increases when they con
flict with efficiency rationales.21 The prominence of fairness argu
ments alone ought to spark academic interest. That interest seems
all the more warranted in light of Henderson's observation that
judges who relied on fairness rationales apparently "found it com
paratively more difficult [than judges who relied on efficiency did]
to explain why fairness supported a given resolution of a legal is
sue. "22 When judges are confident that certain decisions are correct
because they are fair, but are unable to explain precisely why those
decisions are fair, scholars have their work cut out for them.

J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 36-38, 74-75 (1995). Ultimately, Weinrib's objec

tions are very close to Fletcher's. See Fletcher, supra note 13 and accompanying text;

FLETCHER, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. The treatment of vicarious liability in the latest edition of Richard Epstein's torts
casebook supplies a striking illustration. The first case in the newly reorganized section on
vicarious liability is Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
Bushey is followed by two pages of notes trying to identify its rationale. Nowhere in those
notes is Friendly's principle of fairness even mentioned. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 450-56 (6th ed. 1995). To be sure, the principle has its support
ers, but their voices have not been heard much of late. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING 221, 221 n.21 (1970) (noting that "schemes of nonfault liability are supported by
strong reasons of their own, principles both of justice and economy," and citing "the benefit
principle (of commutative justice) that accidental losses should be borne according to the
degree to which people benefit from an enterprise or form of activity"); ROBERT E. KEETON,
VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 158-62 (1969) (citing the principle as a basis of strict liability
doctrine); Noz1cK, supra note 18, at 80 (advocating placing the costs of airport noise "pollu
tion," and pollution more generally, on "those who benefit from the activity: in our example,
airports, airlines, and ultimately the air passenger. [This], if feasible, seems fairest."). Implic
itly, the principle is embraced by the selection of materials in PAGE KEETON ET AL., TORT
AND ACCIDENT LAW 551-63 (2d ed. 1989); see also HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT
AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS 70-72 (1987) (discussing the principle as one of three
main fairness justifications for tort liability).
21. Henderson, supra note 11, at 1597. Henderson concludes that "[c]ourts explicitly de
veloped and relied upon public policy reasoning in fifteen percent of the products liability
decision[s] . . . ." Id. at 1589. In those cases, "fairness was developed 18% more frequently
than efficiency, and fairness controlled in the decision 24% more frequently." Id. at 1595
n.131. Henderson identifies fairness and efficiency as the two most prominent substantive
policy justifications relied upon in products liability cases. His third category of policy rea
sons, "process" justifications, speaks to questions of institutional role and the sources of legit
imate institutional authority. "Only 12% of the decisions developing policy referred to
policies other than" these three. Id. at 1586 n.90.
22. Id. at 1592.
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this article I propose to develop the "fairness" rationale for

enterprise liability and to explore how its implications differ from
efficiency rationales. I hope to show that the fairness rationale in

voked by the cases is ripe for adoption into a family of principles
embraced by a social contract conception of accident law as a realm

of equal freedom and mutual benefit. When risks are recurrent and
related, enterprise liability distributes the burdens and benefits of

accidental risk imposition more fairly and reconciles the competing

claims of security and liberty more adequately than negligence lia
bility. Enterprise liability thereby establishes more favorable con

ditions for free and equal persons to pursue their conceptions of the
good on mutually beneficial terms. When the enterprise liability

principle of fairness reconciles the competing claims· of liberty and
security more fairly and favorably than negligence liability, social

contract theory calls for its adoption in place of the reciprocity of

risk criterion traditionally embraced by social contract scholars.23

To clear the space for this argument, we must first work our way
through a tangle of problems. For starters, tort scholars disagree

both about the nature of enterprise liability and about its pervasive
ness as a phenomenon in black-letter law. So much controversy

swirls around enterprise liability that there is deep dispute over
where the law draws its boundaries, and what defenses to it are

characteristically recognized. There is equally deep disagreement
about whether product liability law, Priest's preferred example of
the phenomenon, actually incarnates it.24 For our purposes, how

ever, one part of this controversy- the issue of how pervasive en-

23. The social contract theories of Fletcher and Fried take the presence of reciprocity of
risk to justify the imposition of negligence liability, and Fletcher takes the absence of reci
procity to justify the imposition of strict liability. See FRIED, supra note 15; Fletcher, supra
note 13.
24. Priest argues that after Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J.
1960), and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962), the battle
shifted to the details of enterprise liability and the benefits were accepted virtually unani
mously. See Priest, supra note 5, at 511-12. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts expanded strict liability to sellers of all defective and unreasonably dangerous products
without regard to the seller's fault. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966).
By 1976, 41 of 50 jurisdictions had adopted this rule of "strict liability." Priest concludes that
"although the theory [of enterprise liability] developed in most detail in the products liability
field, the presuppositions of enterprise liability have been extended to engulf the larger part
of modem tort law itself." Priest, supra note 5, at 520. By contrast, Gary Schwartz thinks
that products liability law is driven primarily by negligence concepts. See Schwartz, supra
note 6, at 633-34. Similarly, the tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability takes the position that "very substantial [case law] authority supports the proposi
tion that plaintiff must establish a reasonable alternative design in order for a product to be
adjudged defective in design." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 2
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). It thus takes the view that design defect liability is
paradigmatically a kind of negligence liability.
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terprise liability is in our law and just how much its presence is felt
in product liability law - can be disposed of relatively quickly. To
isolate both the forms of doctrine that interest us, and the theoreti
cal issues that those doctrines raise, we shall not take product warn
ing or design defect law as our examples of enterprise liability.
Instead, we shall work with less contested instances of the phenom
enon, namely, the modem expansions of vicarious liability and ab
normally dangerous activity liability, and the law of manufacturing
defects, the strictest form of product liability.
The other part of the doctrinal controversy - the debate over
where the law locates the boundaries of enterprise liability, and
what defenses to it are and generally should be allowed - cannot
be set aside so quickly. In the thicket of the law, the boundary of
enterprise liability is entangled with the justifications for such liabil
ity. The principle of fairness and the policies of optimal deterrence
and optimal insurance draw that boundary in different places. In
order to locate the boundaries of enterprise liability, we must ex
amine, in a preliminary way, the basic contrasts between fairness
and efficiency rationales that shall occupy us throughout this paper.
Part II of this article turns to Judge Friendly's widely admired opin
ion in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States25 to fix these con
trasts and their implications for the scope of enterprise liability.
Part III takes up another preliminary problem - the prevailing
assumption that the black-letter law of enterprise liability is hospi
table to economic conceptions of tort liability, and inhospitable to
noneconomic conceptions. Part III argues that this assumption is
unwarranted. The structure of enterprise liability, like strict liabil
ity more generally, pays scant attention to victim precautions and
frequently fixes the boundaries of injurer liability in ways that seem
only loosely tied to considerations of efficiency. It defines domains
within which victims are free of any responsibility for their own
protection against injury inflicted by injurers, and injurers are re
sponsible for any harm that they inflict.26 The conventional wisdom
notwithstanding, this structure of legal entitlements is troubling
from an efficiency perspective, but heartening from a social con
tract one.

25. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
26. This contrast is the same as the one drawn by Professor Rose-Ackennan. See Susan
Rose-Ackennan, Dikes, Dams and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Tort Law, 18
J. LEGAL Sroo. 25, 26 (1989). Professor Rose-Ackennan finds the structure troubling from
an efficiency perspective.
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Part IV takes up the obstacles put in our path by prior writings
in the social contract tradition. Prior writings have taken
nonreciprocity of risk imposition to be the exclusive ground for the
imposition of strict liability and have generally supposed that strict
liability must recede in the presence of contractual relationships be
tween victims and injurers. Part IV rejects both of these claims.
On the one hand, it argues that the fields of enterprise liability law
are not marked by nonreciprocity of risk, and that reciprocity the
ory thus fails to "fit" the law that it purports to explain and justify.
On the other hand, Part IV argues that social contract theory must
understand tort law as a matter of justice and so cannot counte
nance the wholesale surrender of tort to contract. Risks must be
imposed on reasonable terms, and the contours of reasonableness
cannot be fixed by private contractual agreements.
Principles of justice protect our most fundamental interests and
establish the framework within which we may order our lives as we
choose. On a social contract conception, the interests in liberty and
security that are at stake in questions of accidental injury are mat
ters of justice because they are fundamental to our well-being.
Questions of justice involve the reconciliation of competing claims
of public right, not the balancing of competing private preferences
for personal well-being. They must therefore be settled by the '"pe
culiar compulsion of the better argument,'"27 not by the antecedent
distribution of market power and bargaining strength among the
affected parties.

It follows that the fundamental terms of reasonable risk imposi
tion must be fixed not by market mechanisms or private agree
ments, but by common reason and public argument. Prior writings
notwithstanding, social contract theory cannot simply cede author
ity over the terms of reasonable risk imposition to the institution of
contract law in either its market or its bargaining form. Ceding
these matters to contract law makes matters of justice into ques
tions of preference, and turns matters of right into questions of
power. Because it aspires to reconcile the competing claims of lib
erty and security in accordance with the persuasiveness of the rele
vant reasons, tort must be the institutional mechanism for fixing the
terms of reasonable risk imposition.
Part

V

begins the constructive part of the article. This Part

takes its basic interpretive task to be fixed by two features of activ-

27. RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRmCAL THEORY 72 (1981) (quoting JORGEN
HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien, in WIRKUCHKEIT UND REFLEXION: FETSCHRIFT FOR
WALTER SCHULZ 240 (1973)).
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ity liability: (1) the structure of enterprise liability entitlements,
with its relative indifference to matters of optimal precaution; and
(2) the basic distinction between negligence and strict liability
themselves. Negligence liability is liability for wrongful - that is
unreasonable
risk imposition. Strict liability, by contrast, is lia
bility not for unreasonably imposing a risk, but for unreasonably
-

failing to accept financial responsibility for a harm that issued from a
reasonable risk. Thus, a primary task for an interpretively sound

account of enterprise liability is to show why, under certain condi
tions, it is unfair (that is unreasonable) for enterprises not to accept
financial responsibility for personal injuries issuing from their
activities.
Part V also lays out the basic apparatus of social contract the
ory, and argues that the theory has identified itself too closely with
the idea of reciprocity of risk imposition. That idea specifies the
most reasonable reconciliation of liberty and security when injurers
and victims face each other solely as free and equal persons, per
sons whose relationships with one another are uncluttered by spe
cial relationships and property rights, in a social world where the
costs of nonnegligent accidents must be concentrated on either vic
tims or injurers. Its authority is thus both presumptive of and rela
tive to a particular social world, namely, Holmes's old world of
"isolated, ungeneralized harms."
Part VI examines the elements of the enterprise liability rheto
ric of fairness, and the prima facie case that they make for enter
prise liability, and sets forth the grounds for doubting that it is
either fair or efficient to hold entities liable for the financial costs of
accidents that are neither reasonable nor efficient to prevent.
Part VII contains the heart of the article's constructive argu
ment. It seeks to buttress the prima facie case for the fairness of
enterprise liability, and to quiet doubts about its reasonableness
and rationality. The gist of its argument is that the enterprise liabil
ity principle of fairness reconciles the competing claims of liberty
and security more fairly, and more favorably, than the reciprocity of
risk criterion when risks are the incidental by-products of large and
well-organized activities. Losses of life, limb and property disrupt
the lives of victims even when they issue from risk impositions that
are themselves justified. We therefore have reason to minimize the
financial hardship that they cause, and to distribute their financial
costs as fairly as possible. In Holmes's new world of interrelated
and generalized risks, the imposition of enterprise liability is often
able to effect these ends. When it can do so, it is reasonable for
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enterprises to impose the nonnegligent risks characteristic of their
activities, but unreasonable of them not to accept responsibility for
the financial costs of those risks.
Part VIII explores the boundaries of enterprise liability once its
principal justification is taken to be a particular conception of fair
ness, considers the defenses appropriate to such liability, and exam
ines the tide of sentiment currently running against such liability. It
argues, contra George Priest's influential thesis that enterprise lia
bility tends to become absolute liability, that the fairness account of
enterprise liability fixes the boundaries of such liability at the point
where an enterprise ceases to create risks different from those occa
sioned by the ordinary life of the community. Part VIII also argues
that enterprise liability doctrine's relative indifference to optimal
precaution and insurance concerns is frequently (though not al
ways) justified by the presumptive freedom of persons to lead nor
mal lives and use their property as they see fit. Lastly, Part VIII
asserts that the tide of opinion running against enterprise liability is
unconvincing because it rests on the implicit premise that persons
are always and everywhere obligated to arrange their lives in ways
that maximize overall social wealth.
Finally, Part IX summarizes the interpretive case that social
contract theory makes for the enterprise liability principle of fair
ness. In doing so, this Part argues that the social contract concep
tion "fits and justifies" aspects of enterprise liability law that
perplex the prevailing economic accounts, and vindicates Judge
Friendly's confident assertion that the structure of vicarious liability
law rests ultimately on a sense of fairness, not on policies of optimal
deterrence and insurance.
Let us set out on the long path to this conclusion by unpacking
Friendly's argument.

IL

THE MISADVENTURE OF SEAMAN LANE: OF FAIRNESS,
EFFICIENCY AND DRUNKEN SAILORS

"[A] little after midnight" on March 14, 1963, Seaman Lane re
turned from shore leave "in the condition for which seamen are
famed" to the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Tamaroa.2s The Tamaroa
was undergoing repairs in a floating drydock in Brooklyn.29 Pursu
ant to a provision in the contract between the government and
Bushey (the drydock owner), members of the Tamaroa's crew had
28.

Bushey, 398 F.2d at 169, 168.
29. See 398 F.2d at 168.
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been granted access to her while she was being overhauled.30 As
Lane made his way along a drydock wall, "he took it into his head
. . . to turn each of three large wheels some twenty times," for rea
sons "not apparent to [the court] or very likely to Lane."31 These
wheels controlled "the flooding of the tanks on one side of the dry
dock."32 By turning them Lane flooded the drydock, causing the
ship to list, slide off its blocks, and fall against the wall. "Parts of
the drydock sank, and the ship partially did - fortunately without
loss of life or personal injury."33
Bushey sought, and was awarded, damages in federal district
court on the theory that the government, as Lane's employer, was
vicariously liable for his trespass. When it is clear, as it was here,
that a tortfeasor is an employee of a particular enterprise, vicarious
liability hinges on whether the employee's tortious acts were com
mitted within the "scope" of her employment. The United States
appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that Lane's actions were
beyond the scope of his employment, and staking its appeal on the
"motive test" for determining that scope. As formulated by section
228(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the motive test pro
vides that "[c]onduct of a servant is within the scope of employment
if, but only if ... (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the master . . . ."34 The circuit court conceded that "[i]t would
be going too far to find such a purpose here," but agreed with the
district court that this fact was not dispositive: "In light of the
highly artificial way in which the motive test has been applied, the
district judge believed himself obliged to test the doctrine's continu
ing vitality by referring to the larger purposes respondeat superior is
supposed to serve."35 After examining those purposes, the district
court relied on allocative efficiency grounds to find Lane's conduct
within the scope of his employment.
Judge Friendly affirmed the result but not the rationale. Citing
both Calabresi and Coase, he explained:
It is not at all clear, as the court below suggested, that expansion of
liability ... will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources ....
30. See 398 F.2d at 169 ("[P]rovision shall be made so that personnel assigned shall have
access to the vessel at all times, it being understood that such personnel will not interfere
with the work or the contractor's workmen." (quoting the contract between the government
and Bushey)).
31. 398 F.2d at 169-70.
32. 398 F.2d at 168.
33. 398 F.2d at 168.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958).
35. 398 F.2d at 170.
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[A] more efficient allocation can only be expected if there is some
reason to believe that imposing a particular cost on the enterprise will
lead it to consider whether steps should be taken to prevent a recur
rence of the accident. ...And the suggestion that imposition of liabil
ity here will lead to more intensive screening of employees rests on
highly questionable premises .... It could well be that application of
the traditional rule [finding Lane's conduct to be outside the scope of
his employment] might induce drydock owners, prodded by their in
surance 'companies, to install locks on their valves to avoid similar
incidents in the future, while placing the burden on shipowners is
much less likely to lead to accident prevention.36

Indeed, the record "reveal[ed] that most modem drydocks have au
tomatic locks to guard against unauthorized use of valves."37 Opti
mal precaution concerns thus favored locking valves over screening
sailors, and so supported a restrictive reading of "scope of employ
ment" doctrine.
Friendly gave even shorter shrift to the loss-spreading justification for enterprise liability:
It is true, of course, that in many cases the plaintiff will not be in a
position to insure, and so expansion of liability will, at the very least,
serve respondeat superior's loss spreading function. But the fact that
the defendant is better able to afford damages is not alone sufficient
to justify legal responsibility, and this overarching principle must be
taken into account in deciding whether to expand the reach of respon
deat superior. 38

Turning away from efficiency rationales, Friendly staked his
claim that the deepest ground of vicarious liability was fairness, not
efficiency. Our sense of justice calls for holding business enter
prises liable for "accidents which may fairly be said to be character
istic of [their] activities."39 "Characteristic" accidents are those that
"flow from [an enterprise's] long-run activity in spite of all reason
able precautions on [its] part."40 The proper domain of enterprise
liability consists of both those risks that prudent injurers would pre
vent by taking appropriate precautions, because the benefits exceed
36. 398 F.2d at 170-71 (citations omitted). Friendly cites Calabresi in connection with his
observation that improvements in allocative efficiency will result only if the imposition of
liability induces improved precautions. He cites Coase in connection with his observation
that placing liability on shipowners is much less likely to lead to accident prevention, because
drydock owners are the ones in the position to take the cost-effective precaution, and ship
owners are unlikely to insist upon drydock owners taking that precaution.
37. 398 F.2d at 171 n.6.
38. 398 F.2d at 171 (citations omitted); cf. Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law
of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959) (arguing that loss-spreading concerns almost never
account for the imposition of tort liability and distinguishing such concerns from the fair
apportionment of burdens and benefits).
39. 398 F.2d at 171.
40. 398 F.2d at 171.
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the burdens of so doing, and those risks that are increased over
their background level by an activity, but which are not worth
preventing because the burdens exceed the benefits of so doing.
The harm inflicted by Seaman Lane was "characteristic" of the
Coast Guard's activity in this sense:
[I]t was foreseeable that crew members crossing the drydock might do
damage, negligently or even intentionally, such as pushing a Bushey
employee or kicking property into the water. Moreover, the procliv
ity of seamen to find solace for solitude by copious resort to the bottle
while ashore has been noted in opinions too numerous to warrant ci
tation. Once all this is granted, it is immaterial that Lane's precise
action was not to be foreseen.41

The boundary of this sort of liability is fixed at the point where "the
activities of the 'enterprise' do not . . . create risks different from
those attendant on the activities of the community in general."42
For example:
If Lane had set fire to the bar where he had been imbibing or had
caused an accident on the street while returning to the drydock, the
Government would not be liable .... Here Lane had come within the
closed-off area where his ship lay, to occupy a berth to which the
Government insisted he have access, and while his act is not readily
explicable, at least it was not shown to be due entirely to facets of his
personal life. The risk that seamen going and coming from the
Tamaroa might cause damage to the drydock is enough to make it fair
that the enterprise bear the loss.43

Put otherwise, some accidents caused by drunken sailors are "char
acteristic risks" of the Coast Guard's activity because the Coast
Guard increases the level of drunkenness among its sailors above
the ordinary background level of drunkenness. Some level of
drunkenness is not attributable either to the "long run activity" of
any distinct enterprise or to the negligence of anyone except, per
haps, the drunk. It is the outgrowth of innumerable activities com
mingling, the inevitable side effect of the legal availability of
alcohol itself. This residual level is the background level. The ac
tivity of the bar eclipses the activity of the Coast Guard because the
bar's activity not only increases the level of drunkenness over and
above the background level, but also increases the level of drunken
ness over and above the level characteristic of the Coast Guard's
activity.
41. 398 F.2d at 172.
42. 398 F.2d at 172.
43. 398 F.2d at 172 (citations omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267
(1958)).
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EFFICIENCY AND THE STRUCTURE OF STRICT LIABILITY

The test for vicarious liability that Friendly formulates here, and
the general account of enterprise liability thaJ it implies, instantiate

a pervasive difference between the way that fairness- and efficiency
based theories conceive of enterprise liability. To unpack that dif

ference we need to refine our understanding of Friendly's position.
His claim that policies of efficient deterrence and loss spreading will

not lead to an interpretation of the "scope of employment" rule

that encompasses Seaman Lane's misadventure needs to be inter

preted carefully. That claim should not be mistaken for the claim
that economic analysis cannot justify holding the Coast Guard lia
ble for that misadventure. Economics supplies us with a complex
and indeterminate framework, and it permits a variety of ap

proaches to any particular problem. It is therefore likely that a
credible economic argument can be constructed for the specific re
sult reached by Friendly's opinion.
For instance, one might argue that refusing to recognize a de

fense of contributory negligence to a claim of trespass induces opti
mal investment in private property,44 and that using a criterion of
"enterprise causation" to allocate the costs of those accidents that

occur once all cost-justified precautions have been taken will lead
firms to regulate their activity levels efficiently.45 Taken together,

these arguments yield a perfectly plausible economic case for hold
ing the Coast Guard liable for Seaman Lane's trespass under the
"scope of employment" rule.46

44. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL L. REV. 1 (1990).
45. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563, 572

(1988) (offering definitions of "full" and "partial" "enterprise causation"). Sykes defines par
tial enterprise causation as follows: "An enterprise 'partially causes' the wrong of an em
ployee if the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent unemployment of the employee
would reduce the probability of the wrong but not eliminate it." Id. This definition is very
similar to Friendly's characteristic risk criterion, and Sykes interprets Bushey as "implicitly
resting on notions of enterprise causation." Id. at 589 n.70. Sykes describes the activity level
distortions that will be created by failing to make businesses "bear the full cost of the com
pensable wrongs attendant upon [their] operation." Id. at 567.
46. Other economic arguments are also plausible. One might, for example, agree that the
"scope of employment" rule should be interpreted in the manner that Friendly proposes, but
argue that victim negligence should be recognized as a defense to trespass in order to induce
optimal precautions by property owners. Here, as elsewhere, one cannot tie economics de
finitively to one particular account of the proper outcome and the reasons for it. Economi
cally-oriented scholarship can draw even closer to Friendly's perspective, and to the
perspective of this article, when it accepts the idea that it is often unreasonable to insist on
victim precautions, because doing so is inconsistent with the victim's property rights (e.g., her
right to plant whatever crops she pleases so long as she does not interfere with others' use of
their property) or her right to a normal life off of her property (e.g., her right to stroll the
sidewalks without having to take precautions against stray cricket balls). William Jones

1282

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1266

Friendly's point, however, is both narrower and broader than
the claim that it is inefficient to impose liability on the Coast Guard
for Seaman Lane's trespass. It is narrower in that the precise point
of law at stake is the interpretation of the "scope of the employ
ment" rule. Here Friendly's point is that efficiency considerations
support an interpretation of that rule that excludes Seaman Lane's
trespass from the scope of the Coast Guard's enterprise. Excluding
that trespass gives the cheapest cost avoider (the drydock owner) a
better incentive to take the optimal precaution (installing automatic
locks on its drydock valves) than including that trespass within the
scope of Lane's employment does. Friendly's point is also broader
than the claim that it is inefficient to hold the Coast Guard liable
for Seaman Lane's trespass, in that the clash between efficiency and
fairness that he pinpoints is a clash between two approaches to tort
liability. The efficiency approach takes the task of tort law to be
encouraging the optimal coordination of injurer and victim activity,
whereas the fairness approach takes the task of tort to be the recon
ciliation of conflicting claims of liberty and security on mutually
beneficial terms.
A.

The Structure of Strict Liability

The structure of strict liability doctrine fits uneasily with the
logic of the efficiency norm. Strict liability doctrines fix spheres of
injurer responsibility and victim freedom in ways that seem unlikely
to induce optimal joint precautions, and they pin full responsibility
for accidental harms on one of the acts or activities whose collision
engenders those harms. Prescriptive economic analysis generally
seeks to induce the optimal combination of injurer and victim pre
cautions, and insists that injurers and victims are jointly responsible,
generally speaking, for the accidental harms that acts or activities
occasion.47

adopted this approach. See William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92
CoLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1729, 1757, 1779 (1992). While I am deeply sympathetic to Jones's
position, it marks a sharp, albeit subtle, departure from more traditional economic ap
proaches and a partial embrace of the noneconomic view advanced here. Not surprisingly,
Jones's argument has drawn fire for overlooking the superior efficiency of one critical and
generally applicable victim precaution - first-party insurance against accidental harm. See
Mark Geistfeld, Should Strict Liability Apply to Hazardous Business Enterprises (April,
1996) (unpublished draft, on file with author).

47. Coase forcefully argued that this is the path to efficiency. See R.H. Coase, The Prob·
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN 1, 2 (1960).
.
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Not only do strict liability doctrines, both in their "enterprise"
and "traditional" forms,48 seem indifferent to the pursuit of effi
ciency, but strict liability case law appears to justify its articulation
of duties by appealing directly to arguments about the legitimate
boundaries of victim freedom and the fair reach of injurer responsi
bility. Injurer responsibility is predicated on the belief that it is le
gitimate to hold actors accountable for risks that they impose
voluntarily and for their own benefit. Victim freedom is predicated
on the belief that, within certain domains, persons may do what
they wish with their persons and their property. That freedom in
cludes the freedom

not

to take precautions for the protection of

themselves and their property, even when so doing will prevent an
accident at the lowest possible cost.
For example, the argument that those who choose to impose
certain risks and presumably benefit from their imposition may
fairly be held accountable for harms issuing from such risks is im
plicit in

Bushey

and explicit in other leading cases.

Lubin v. Iowa

City49 invokes this argument to justify imposing strict liability on a
waterworks for accidents arising out of a cost-justified decision to
leave water pipes in place until they break:

It is neither just nor reasonable that [a] city . . . can deliberately and
intentionally plan to leave a watermain underground beyond inspec
tion and maintenance until a break occurs and escape liability. A city
or corporation so operating knows that eventually a break will occur,
water will escape and in all probability flow onto the premises of an
other with resulting damage. . . . The risks from such a method of
operation should be borne by the water supplier who is in a position
to spread the cost among the consumers who are in fact the true bene
ficiaries of this practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and
maintenance costs. When the expected and inevitable occurs, they
should bear the loss and not the unfortunate individual whose prop
erty is damaged . . . .5o
The conviction that people may do as they wish with their per
sons and their property so long as they do not violate the rights of
others is illustrated by Marshall v. Ranne,51 a decision upholding a
plaintiff's right to recover for personal injuries inflicted by his

48. I would classify strict liability for wild animals as a "traditional" form of strict liability
and strict liability for burst waterworks pipes as an "enterprise" form of strict liability. This
distinction, and the grounds for it, need not detain us here. My present point is that both
forms have an entitlement cast to them.
49. 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964).
50. 131 N.W.2d at 770.
51. 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974).
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neighbor's vicious ·hog.s2 Although the plaintiff was aware of the
hog's viciousness and the dangers it presented - indeed, he had
called that viciousness to his neighbor's attention - he took no
steps to prevent the hog's entry onto his property, took no precau
tions to disable it in the event of its entry, and did not curtail his
own activity to minimize the risks of harm to himself. In concluding
that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk of the injury that befel}.
him, the court had this to say:
He had . . . only a choice of evils, both of which were wrongfully
imposed upon him by the defendant. He could remain a prisoner in
side his own house or he could take the risk of reaching his car before
defendant's hog attacked him. Plaintiff could have remained inside
his house, but in doing so, he would have surrendered his legal right
to proceed over his own property to his car so he could return to his
home in Dallas. The latter alternative was forced upon him against
his will and was a choice he was not legally required to accept. . . . The
dilemma which defendant forced upon plaintiff was that of facing the
danger or surrendering his rights with respect to his own real prop
erty, and that was not, as a matter of law the voluntary choice to
which the law entitled him.s3
This reasoning is sharply at odds with the logic of efficiency
analysis, in which victim precautions are an eminently possible and almost surely cost-justified - response to unwelcome intru
sions on one's property by belligerent pigs. One might, for exam
ple, shoot pugnacious pigs. The facts of Marshall underscore the
attractiveness of this solution. Marshall was aware that Ranne's
boar had "gone bad"; he had only refrained from shooting it be
cause "he did not consider that the neighborly thing to do, although
he was an expert with a gun and had two available."S4 Shooting the
hog would certainly seem to have been cost justified: the sort of
severe injury that did in fact happen was to be expected, and that
foreseeable cost exceeded the value of the pig. From an economic
perspective, we might readily say that the plaintiff was responsible
for his own harm by failing to take a cost-justified precaution.ss
52. Susan Rose-Ackennan discusses Marshall and related doctrines with an eye to high
lighting the contrasts between efficiency and entitlement in accident and nuisance law. I am
much indebted to her discussion. See Rose-Ackennan, supra note 26.
53. Marshall, 511 S.W.2d at 260. Marshall is consistent with prevailing doctrine. See RE
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.. PROSSER & KEE·
TON ON TIIE LAW OF TORTS, 490-91 {5th ed. 1984).
54. 511 S.W.2d at 257.
55. The jury took this view of the matter, though perhaps without the economic animus.
It found that Marshall's "failure to shoot the defendant's boar hog prior to the time the hog
bit plaintiff was negligence." 511 S.W.2d at 257. The jury also found that Marshall was con
tributorily negligent because he had "failed to maintain a fence about his premises suffi
ciently close to prevent hogs passing through." 511 S.W.2d at 257.
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The facts of Marshall underscore, but do not exhaust, the force
of efficiency arguments. The attractiveness of victim precautions
against "boars gone bad" does not tum on the prospective victim's
awareness that a particular boar has gone bad. The optimal set of
standing precautions against the risk of any boar turning vicious
and injuring a neighbor may also be bilateral. Suppose that "the
animal owner can either build a wall around his property that
reduces the chance of escape to 5 percent or erect a barbed wire
fence that allows a one-third chance of escape. [It may be] more
cost-effective overall for him to erect a barbed wire fence and for
the potential victim to distribute traps about his pasture."56
The general doctrinal implication of efficiency analysis in this
kind of case is that victim negligence should be recognized as a de
fense.57 Black-letter legal doctrine fails to heed this advice. The
law permits victims to poison or shoot wild or vicious animals that
come onto their property without compensating the owners of such
animals, but does not limit the exercise of that right to circum
stances where the value of the harm that those animals can be ex
pected to cause exceeds the value of the animals themselves.
Conversely, victims may recover fully for any actual damages that
they suffer, even though they could have prevented all of those
damages at lower cost by killing the trespassing animals. The law is
inefficient in both directions: it does not discourage victims from
killing animals that are worth more than the harm that they might

·

56. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at 34.
57. I have elsewhere argued for a noneconomic understanding of negligence, but without
specifically addressing the issue of victim negligence. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonable
ness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1996). Here, I am using an
economic understanding to bring out the conflict between the structure of strict liability doc
trine and the thrust of the norm of efficiency. My use of economics in this regard should not
be read to imply that only a theory that is concerned with the overall maximization of some
value, such as wealth or utility, can justify the recognition of victim negligence as a defense to
ordinary negligence. The history of tort theory suggests otherwise. See, e.g., Francis H.
Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, 53 AM. L. REG. 209, 273,
337 (1905) (arguing that the attainment of benefit-burden proportionality generally requires
a regime of negligence with a defense of contributory negligence). Bohlen explains: "Such
duties [affirmative duties of care] are only imposed upon those who have voluntarily assumed
a position or relation from which a benefit is derived by them." Id. at 273-74. Mutuality of
benefit is thus a necessary and sufficient condition of mutuality of duty (or mutuality of care).
Whether this is the best way to justify victim duties of precaution against the carelessness of
others, either within social contract theory or more generally, is not clear. For a recent,
instructive discussion of the relevant issues and possibilities, see Kenneth W. Simons, Con
tributory Negligence: Conceptual and Normative Issues, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW 461 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). I suggest a slightly different view of the matter in
the text accompanying notes 242-44, infra. For present purposes, however, I shall provision
ally accept Bohlen's position.
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cause, and it allows victims to spare animals even when they will
inflict harm that exceeds the value of the animals themselves.ss
This rejection of efficiency concerns is carried even further by
the defenses qualifying the rights of victims who fail to exercise
their privilege to destroy wild or vicious animals. An owner is
strictly liable for the torts of her wild animals, and her vicious do
mestic ones, unless the victim has waived her right to recover either
by trespassing (and so violating the property entitlement of the
animal's owner), or by voluntarily assuming the risk of injury.s9
Neither of these defenses encourages optimal precautions; neither
invites justification in efficiency terms. The assumption of risk de
fense protects individual freedom; the trespass defense protects
property rights (in particular the right of exclusion). Marshall had
not assumed the risk of injury by Ranne's hog because he was enti
tled to move freely about his own property.60
fu short, the victim's right to kill wild or vicious animals that
enter her property is a privilege, rather than a duty; that privilege
protects a property entitlement to be free from such invasions, and
its existence is not conditioned on its efficient exercise.6l Here, as
·
elsewhere in the law of wild animals, minimizing the costs of acci58. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, §§ 21 & 89, at 642 (discussing the privileges of
defending property and abating a nuisance). These privileges are not unqualified. If the
value of a trespassing animal greatly exceeds the damage that it threatens, if there are effica
cious alternatives to killing it, and if the harm is not imminent, then the property owner may
not be privileged to kill it. The logic here is one of proportionality, with landowners being
forbidden to kill trespassing animals when doing so would create a loss "greatly dispropor
tionate to the threatened harm." Id. at 642; see also id. at 136-37.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 507, 508, 509, 511, 515, 517 (1977). Section
507 imposes strict liability on possessors of wild animals to everyone except trespassers, for
harms caused by the wild and abnormally dangerous properties of the animals, respectively.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 507 (1977). Sections 508 and 517 create partial
exceptions to these rules. Section 508 applies to wild animals that escape and return to a
natural state; the former owner is not liable once the animal returns to the wild. See RE
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 508 (1977). Section 517 applies to animals kept in pursu
ance of a public duty. It provides that "[t]he rules as to strict liability for dangerous animals
do not apply when the possession of the animal is in pursuance of a duty imposed upon the
possessor as a public officer or employee or as a common carrier." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 517 (1977). Section 509 applies the rule of section 507 to possessors of abnor
mally dangerous domestic animals if the owner had reason to know that the animal had
"dangerous propensities abnormal to its class." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509
(1977). Section 515 provides that the plaintiff has no obligation to discover that he is in the
vicinity of a wild or vicious animal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 515 (1977).
Comment c to section 515(2) qualifies this rule: the plaintiff cannot recover if he "intention
ally and unreasonably subjects himself to the risk of harm by the animal." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 515(2) cmt. C (1977).
60. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. For a more general statement of the
pertinent assumption of risk doctrine, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965).
61. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, at § 89 (referring to a plaintifrs "privilege" as
opposed to "duty" of abatement); Marshall, 511 S.W.2d at 261; cf. the doctrines described
supra note 59 (explaining that the right of a victim to recover for injury from a wild animal,
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dents, and maximizing the value extracted from competing uses,

simply do not enter into the law's delineation of rights and duties.
B.

The Structure of Enterprise Liability

Aspects of the law governing liability for wild animals are, no

doubt, idiosyncratic. The general structure of that law, however, is

not. By and large, the law of enterprise liability fails to heed the
implications of efficiency analysis in the same ways that the particu
lar decisions of Bushey and Marshall do: precaution concerns gen
erally receive less emphasis than efficiency suggests that they

should, and victim precautions are particularly de-emphasized.62
The deeper ground of the economic criticism of enterprise liability
doctrine is also the same. The conviction, voiced so powerfully by
Coase,63 that most harm is jointly caused by the collision between

victim and injurer activities, leads economics to insist on the appro

priateness of bilateral precautions when legal doctrine insists on
unilateral responsibility.
Indeed, Friendly's claim in

Bushey

about the boundaries of the

"scope of employment" rule is a general assertion about the charac
ter of enterprise (or modern strict) liability as distinguished from

negligence liability.64 Duty analysis in negligence law has two
stages, although they rarely need to be distinguished. In the first

stage, one must decide

if

the injury occasioned by the defendant's

activity was "reasonably foreseeable." For "reasonable" foresee
ability to be present, the defendant's act or activity must have in
creased the risk of the injury suffered by the plaintiff above the

or a vicious one, is not structured to track efficiency concerns); Rose-Ackerman, supra note
26, at 34 (same).
62. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (addressing the legal doctrines that I
mean this claim to cover).
63. See Cease, supra note 47.
64. Robert Keeton has made essentially the same claim. See KEETON, supra note 20, at
162 ("It may be that most strict liabilities now recognized are illustrations of a single basis of
liability - a principle that each activity is accountable for the distinctive risks it creates.").
Some of Keeton's examples suggest that his "distinctive risk" criterion is slightly narrower
than Friendly's "characteristic risk" criterion. For instance, Keeton goes on to distinguish the
"distinctive risk" criterion of liability from the more economic criterion proposed by Albert
Ehrenzweig. See id. at 163 n.25 (discussing ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGUGENCE WmI
OUT FAULT (1951)). Keeton writes:
[Ehrenzweig proposes] using "typicality" of the loss to the enterprise as a guideline to
scope of liability. It seems likely, however, that "enterprise liability for harm typically
and insurably caused" (p. 32) would be a liability of much broader scope, with much
more overlapping of liabilities among enterprises, than liability based on a principle of
distinctive risk.
Id. Any difference between Keeton and Friendly is, at most, a variation of the same basic
conception of liability, and I shall therefore use "distinctive" and "characteristic" risk inter
changeably throughout this paper.
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level of the mutually imposed background risks that all activities
entail.65 If the requirement of reasonable foreseeability is met, then
a second inquiry must be undertaken. In this second stage, one
must ask if the injury should have been prevented by an appropri
ate precaution, because the benefits of that precaution outweighed
its burdens.66 Friendly's point in Bushey61 is that the imposition of
enterprise liability requires only an affirmative answer to the first
inquiry - only a determination that the accident at issue sprang
from a risk whose incidence was increased above its background
level by the defendant's enterprise. Bushey thus locates the con
ceptual boundaries of enterprise liability in contradistinction to
both "absolute liability"68 and negligence liability.
Conceived in this way, the very essence of enterprise liability
seems to be out of sync with efficiency criteria. The boundary of
such liability is expressly fixed beyond the point at which it is effi
cient for injurers to prevent the accidental harms issuing from their
activities. Moreover, it is fixed at this point without any attention
to the possibility that victims may be able to prevent the relevant
harms efficiently, and without any obvious reliance on the superior
capacity of activities to bear the costs of accidents that they cannot
prevent more efficiently than the victims of those accidents. In
deed, Friendly explicitly dismisses such loss-spreading criteria, stat65. See Keating, supra note 57, at 350-52.
66. Van Skike v. Zussman, 318 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), excerpted in KEETON ET
AL., supra note 20, at 145-48, illustrates these two stages. The plaintiff, a child, had obtained
a toy cigarette lighter from a gumball machine operated by Zussman in the store of Rivera,
another defendant. The child then purchased lighter fluid from Rivera and "set himself on
fire" when he tried to fill the toy lighter with lighter fluid. The trial court dismissed the
complaint against both defendants for failing to state a cause of action.
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal as to both defendants, but on different
grounds. With respect to Zussman, the appellate court found that the accident was not "rea
sonably foreseeable," and so saw no need to investigate whether Zussman should have taken
precautions against it. See 318 N.E.2d at 247. In other words, the court found that selling a
toy lighter in a gumball machine did not increase the risk of children setting fire to them
selves - the relation of the accident to the sale was merely coincidental. With respect to
Rivera, the court implicitly found the accident reasonably foreseeable but the burden of pre
caution too great to be required. See 318 N.E.2d at 247-48.
Under a realm of enterprise liability as Friendly defines it, Rivera, but not Zussman,
would be liable for the injury to the plaintiff.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
68. George Priest argues that enterprise liability is essentially absolute liability. See
Priest, supra note 5, at 527 ("The unfolding of enterprise liability since 1964 might be given a
different interpretation: as a struggle of courts to define some coherent conception of manu
facturers' liability short of absolute liability. . . . But the distance between prevailing stan·
dards and a standard of absolute liability progressively narrows.").
Friendly's criterion of characteristic risk is clearly something other than absolute liability,
just as it is clearly something other than negligence liability. As Friendly himself emphasizes,
that criterion excludes certain risks from the enterprise's domain. See supra text accompany
ing note 43.
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ing that they are "not alone sufficient to justify legal responsibility,
and [that] this overarching principle must be taken into account in
deciding whether to expand the reach of respondeat superior. "69
In Bushey, Friendly implies that the domain of the characteristic
risk principle far exceeds the scope of the employment rule. He
suggests that it underlies modem vicarious liability doctrine, other
versions of modem enterprise liability such as abnormally danger
ous activity liability and the then incipient field of products liability,
and administrative schemes such as workers' compensation law.
While I suspect that Friendly is right about this, I shall settle here
for pointing out that the law of abnormally dangerous activities,
and the liability of product manufacturers for manufacturing de
fects, appear to embody the characteristic risk criterion.
As formulated by section 519(2) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the law of abnormally dangerous activities holds such activi
ties liable for "the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous."70 This criterion is tracked by the
cases: gasoline tanker trailers are strictly liable for harms issuing
from the escape of gasoline, but not for driving decisions that result
in ordinary traffic accidents;n those who handle, transport, or use
dynamite for blasting are strictly liable only for harms issuing from
its explosion or concussion;72 those who employ "field burning" as
an agricultural technique are liable only for injuries attributable to
those aspects of the technique that create "an effectively uncontrol
lable danger of serious harm beyond the ordinary risks associated
with common uses of fire that are readily avoided by due care."73
Plainly, "scope of the risk" liability is broader than negligence
liability. The risks that make an activity abnormally dangerous in
clude both those that should be eliminated by the exercise of due
care, and those that cannot be so eliminated. Such liability is like
wise narrower than "absolute" liability. The risks that make an ab69. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation
omitted).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1977). I shall call this the "scope of the
risk" criterion.
71. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972) (holding the owner of a
gasoline tanker strictly liable); cf. Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969) (hold
ing that the storage of gasoline is an abnormally dangerous activity).
72. See Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 1931); Bedell v.
Goulter, 261 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. 1953); cf. ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF
TORTS 105 (1963).
73. Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1265 (Or. 1982) (Linde, J.). Linde lists "the spark
throwing steam locomotives whose incendiary propensities were a classic cost of industrial
progress" among the forms of fire that are not abnormally dangerous. 652 P.2d at 1265.
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normally dangerous activity abnormally dangerous are a subset of
all the risks that such activities create. For example, the risks of
transporting gasoline by tanker trailer include the risks of causing
ordinary traffic accidents. In that respect, however, the transport of
gasoline by tanker trailer does not "create risks different from those
attendant on the activities of the community in general."74 All
trucks and cars increase the risk of ordinary traffic accidents by
their activity. Thus, under the scope of the risk criterion, abnor
mally dangerous activities are liable for the risks that they create
that are distinct from, and greater than, the background risks that
persons mutually impose on each other in the course of their ordi
nary activity. These are the characteristic, or distinctive, risks of
their activities.
The resemblance between the "scope of the risk" criterion for
the imposition of abnormally dangerous activity liability and
Friendly's criterion of "characteristic risk" is further underscored
by the ultrasensitivity limit on the liability of abnormally dangerous
activities. Section 524A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts pro
vides that "[t]here is no strict liability for harm caused by an abnor
mally dangerous activity if the harm would not have resulted but
for the abnormally sensitive character of the plaintiff's activity."75
Those who engage in blasting, for example, are not liable for the
harm that ensues when the noise and concussion from such bl�sting
frightens mink into killing their young.76
Abnormal sensitivity is a natural boundary of liability for char
acteristic or distinctive risk: the harm suffered by the abnormally
sensitive is distinctive to, or characteristic of, their unusual constitu
tion. Consequently, just as enterprise liability ends when the enter
prise ceases to "create risks different from those attendant on the
activities of the community in general,"77 so, too, enterprise liability
ends when the special sensitivities of the victim render her so sensi
tive to harm from the injurer's activity that she is harmed when an
ordinary victim would not be. In the first case, the increased risks
imposed by an activity blend into the background risks imposed by
the community's activities. In the second case, the increased risks

74. See Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A {1977).
76. See Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942); Foster v. Preston Mill
Co., 268 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1954).
77. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172.
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are eclipsed by the even greater risks created by the abnormal sen
sitivity of the victim.78
The liability of product manufacturers for manufacturing de
fects, the strictest form of product liability, is likewise consistent
with Friendly's characteristic risk criterion. Manufacturers are held
liable for injuries caused by a product's failure to conform to "the
manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical
units of the same product line"79 "even though all possible care was
exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product."80 Acci
dents arising out of manufacturing defects are a "harm likely to
flow from [a firm's] long-run activity in spite of all reasonable pre
cautions on [its] part."81 At least some, and perhaps most, manu
facturing defects exist because it is cheaper to bear the costs of
certain accidents than to prevent them. Thus, they are a "distinc
tive risk" of the manufacturer's activity: a risk deliberately created
by its conscious investments in quality control, material inputs,
human capital, equipment, and so on.82
Finally, the accuracy of Friendly's "characteristic risk" criterion
as a general account of enterprise liability is underscored by the
way that the concept of "cause in fact" applies to such liability.
Cause in fact comes into play in the guise of the "act of God" or
"vis major" doctrine: injurers are not liable for harms involving ab
normally dangerous activities if they can show that the harm "was
due exclusively to an overwhelming agency beyond [the defend
ant's] control and above human restraint."83 Under these circum78. While this limit on liability is a manifestation of the characteristic risk criterion, it is
only fair to limit liability in this way if certain conditions are met. See infra text accompany
ing notes 227-32.
79. Barker v. Lull Engg. Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978).
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2A (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1995).
81. See Bushey, 398 F.2d at 171.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995); KEETON, supra note 20, at 163.
83. See Bratton v. Rudnick, 186 N.E. 669, 671 (Mass. 1933) (holding defendant not liable
for harm caused by the collapse of a dam occasioned by rainfall, even though the defendant
was negligent in its maintenance of the dam, because the rainstorm precipitating the collapse
was "twice as great as any disclosed by easily available records in this part of the country");
see also Golden v. Amory, 109 N.E. 131 (Mass. 1952); City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 435 P.2d
77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). The doctrine finds its original articulation in Nichols v. Marsland, 2
Ex D. 1 (1876) (Court of Appeal, Exchequer Division). In Nichols, "artificial ornamental
lakes" on the defendant's property burst, and the subsequent flood swept away four county
bridges. The defendant was absolved of liability on the ground that the rain and flooding that
precipitated the breakage of the dam were so extraordinary that they could not have been
foreseen. The basis of the "Act of God" doctrine is not as clear as one might hope. On one
interpretation, the defendant had no "duty" with respect to these risks because they were so
abnormal as to be unforeseeable. This sounds suspiciously like a negligence doctrine. On
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stances, the defendant's activity is not a "but for" cause of the
plaintiff ' s injury because the injury would have happened even in
the absence of that activity. This version of cause-in-fact doctrine is
the natural expression of enterprise liability understood as liability
for "characteristic" or "distinctive" risk. When an injury would
have happened even without the defendant's abnormally dangerous
activity, the distinctive risks of that activity have been eclipsed, and
liability for such risks has come to an end. By contrast, negligence
liability does not go so far, and absolute liability - to be absolute
- would have to go further. Here, then, we see that the idea of
fairness fixes the scope of enterprise liability in a distinctive way,
thereby supplying an answer to one of the problems that bedeviled
our inquiry at the outset.84
The defenses to abnormally dangerous activity liability likewise
define zones of freedom and responsibility, rather than duties to
undertake mutually beneficial precautions. For they are the de
fenses to liability for wild animals at large: other than abnormal
sensitivity, the only defenses recognized are those of assumption of
the risk and "knowingly and unreasonably subjecting [one]self to
the risk of harm."85 These defenses are construed in the manner of
another interpretation, the relevant harms did not issue from the distinctive risks created by
the presence of the abnormally dangerous activity. They issued from a natural phenomenon
that eclipsed the risks of that activity by virtue of its enormous magnitude. This sounds more
like a strict liability doctrine and is conceptually preferable to the first interpretation for that
reason.
84. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. To be sure, the answer given here is
preliminary. A complete account of enterprise liability would have to discuss the process of
attributing accidents to activities in more detail. Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein have
shown that the "principle of fairness" that "each person should bear the costs of her activi
ties" admits of both libertarian and liberal interpretations and that the principle can be ap
plied in a defensible way only by making evaluative judgments about the importance of
various liberty and security interests. Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Mis
fortune, 41 McGILL LJ. 91, 94 {1995). I am in complete agreement with the general thrust of
their argument. Space permitting, I would argue that the evaluative process that they and I
believe characteristic of negligence law can be - and, in fact, is - adapted to enterprise
liability. The key is that, to attribute accidents to activities under enterprise liability, we must
evaluate not the importance of various liberty and security interests, but the "character" of
the relevant enterprise. See Ronald Dworkin's discussion of the "character" of chess in
RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGIITS SERIOUSLY 81, 101-05 (1978). For my
view of how the evaluative process works in negligence law, see Keating, supra note 57, at
367-79.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 523, 524, & 524A (1977) (addressing as
sumption of risk, contributory negligence, and abnormal sensitivity, respectively). The con
tributory negligence defense of section 524 is narrower than normal contributory negligence
because it requires that the plaintiff "knowingly and unreasonably" subjected himself to the
risk of harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1977). There is more than a hint of
gross negligence or recklessness here. My discussion here describes the traditional regime of
defenses to strict liability. Of late, comparativization has affected defenses to strict liability
as well as defenses to negligence. See, e.g., Andrade v. Shiers, 564 So. 2d 787 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (combining defense of comparative negligence with strict liability of animal owner). I
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Marshall: the plaintiff's encounter with the risk must be knowing

and free.86 The defenses to manufacturing defect liability are
equally few and equally narrow - misuse of the product, and as
sumption of the risk.87
Ironically, it is modern vicarious liability - the doctrine in
volved in Bushey - that presents the most ambiguous evidence for
this conception of enterprise liability. One source of this ambiguity
is the complexity of vicarious liability doctrine itself. Vicarious lia
bility is a hybrid doctrine; it concerns the liability of principals for
the torts of their agents. The part of the doctrine that concerns us
speaks to the liability of employers (masters) for the torts of their
employees (servants). The "scope of employment" rule for attrib
uting the torts of employees to the employers (enterprises) they
serve embodies a strict (not a negligent) principle of responsibility.
Whether the liability of employers for the torts of their employ
ees is best understood as resting on efficiency or fairness depends
almost entirely on how the "scope of employment" rule is inter
preted. On Friendly's reading of the "scope of the employment"
rule, the vicarious liability of masters for the torts of their servants
is not tailored to the specifications of efficiency: it permits recovery
even when the victim might be the cheaper precaution taker. While
Friendly's claims about the grounds and character of vicarious lia
bility find powerful support in the cases, and have the backing of his
considerable authority, they are contestable. Here, then, I must
claim only that a noneconomic conception may provide the best in
terpretation of vicarious liability - and even that claim requires
further development.
Finally, there is a third leg to the disjunction between efficiency
concerns and the structure of strict liability doctrine. Efficiency is
concerned not only with optimal precaution and deterrence, but
also with optimal compensation (or insurance). The socially opti
mal treatment of risk requires deterring those risks that should not
be imposed, and compensating victims for those accidental injuries
that optimal care will not prevent.88 To induce optimal injurer pre
cautions, damage awards must include the nonpecuniary dimen
sions of accidental injury and death. Even though money damages
assess the appropriateness of a comparative negligence defense in the text accompanying
notes 242-44, infra.
86. See Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1212 {Alaska 1978).
87. See REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. h & n (1977); see also Ellsworth
v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348 (Md. 1984); Treadway v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 766 P.2d
938 {Okla. 1988).
88. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 293 (1987).
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cannot make victims truly whole for losses of limb and life, those
losses are very real, and they must be included,

ex ante,

in damage

awards in order to induce injurers to exercise optimal care. Once

an injury occurs, however, monetary damages should be awarded
only for those injuries that can be redressed by money - the level
of damages that the victim would buy
the injury in question.s9

In

if

she were to insure against

practice, this makes it all but impossible for the law of acci

dents to fix damage awards at the proper level, so long as victims
receive the damages actually awarded by courts. If those damages
are pitched at the level appropriate to the deterrence of wrongful
risk imposition, victims will be overcompensated for their injuries.

If they are pitched at the level appropriate to compensate victims

for their injuries, injurers will be insufficiently deterred. In theory,
however, this is a problem that negligence can solve, but strict lia
bility cannot:

Under a perfectly functioning negligence rule . . . the socially ideal
outcome can be achieved, since under that rule injurers will always
take due care and never be found negligent; hence victims will bear
their losses and can and will optimally insure for amounts less than
what injurers would have to pay were they liable.9°
There is a familiar lesson in all of this: just as optimal accident

prevention requires joint victim and injurer precautions, so, too, op

timal accident compensation requires coordinated victim and in

jurer activity. To achieve optimal accident prevention, injurers
must be liable for the full costs of their carelessness. To achieve
optimal loss spreading, victims must be responsible for insuring
against any losses they might suffer. Even under ideal conditions,

this delicate division of labor between, and coordination among, in-

89. The statement in the text comes close to being a representative position in law and
economics, but it may not represent anyone's views exactly. Professor Shaven, for example,
argues that optimal compensation usually requires that damages be awarded only for pecuni
ary losses, but notes that nonpecuniary damages are desirable when injury increases the mar
ginal utility of money and that injurers need to internalize both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
losses to achieve optimal deterrence. See id. at 23-32. By contrast, Alan Schwartz argues
that the tort system supplies more insurance than is optimal, because it awards compensation
for pain and suffering even though consumers would not purchase insurance against these
"losses" because "dollars cannot erase pain." Schwartz, supra note 7, at 825; see also George
L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform, J.
EcoN. PERSP., Summer 1991, at 31, 44-48. Steven Croley and Jon Hanson argue that the tort
damages may be evidence of unmet market demand for pain-and-suffering insurance and
advocate awarding compensation for all injuries that increase the victim's marginal utility for
money. See Croley & Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents, supra note 7.
90. SHAVELL, supra note 88, at 232 n.4. In practice, of course, findings of negligence do
occur, and thus the "optimal outcome cannot be achieved because victims will in fact receive
awards." Id. Those awards will be too high for insurance purposes.
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jurers and victims is incompatible with the structure of strict liabil
ity doctrine. The basic thrusts of the efficiency norm and the
structure of strict liability entitlements sit uncomfortably with one
another.
short, there is reason to believe that the overall structure of
enterprise liability doctrine, like strict liability generally, does not

In

exhibit the features of an efficiency-driven doctrine. On their face,
enterprise liability doctrines ignore optimal precaution concerns in

both directions - that is, both in their definitions of the boundaries

of liability and in their recognition of defenses. And strict liability

cannot be reconciled, even in theory, with the pursuit of optimal
loss spreading. This triple departure from the implications of effi
ciency, and the overall structure responsible for it, gives us reason
to pause before subscribing to the economic justification of enter
prise liability.

IV.

MORAL THEORY AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

If the reigning economic theory of enterprise liability fails to fit
the legal phenomenon hand and glove, the prevailing moral theo
ries of tort liability fare even more poorly. These theories fit the
structure of enterprise liability law even worse than economic theo

ries do. The reigning version of social contract theory, for example,
has made nonreciprocity of risk the touchstone for the imposition
of strict liability, yet the risks to which such liability applies are

more reciprocal than not.91 So, too, the reciprocity criterion directs
our attention to the distribution of risk between the affected par
ties, whereas the enterprise liability principle of fairness directs our

attention to the distribution of (the financial costs of) harm. While
these disjunctions between theory and doctrine are particular to
Fletcher's version of social contract theory, the disjunction itself is
general. Richard Epstein's corrective justice theory of strict liabil

ity is no more attuned to the logic of enterprise liability law than is
Fletcher's social contract conception.92

91. Although I believe that a detailed examination of the relevant cases and black-letter
law would support this claim, I shall not undertake such an examination here. For present
purposes, it will do to observe that neither George Fletcher nor Charles Fried, the primary
proponents of reciprocity theory in the past thirty years, have argued that enterprise liability
should be imposed in the areas of vicarious liability and manufacturing defects, and in certain
cases involving abnormally dangerous activities, such as Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765,
770 (Iowa 1964), and Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wash. 1972), because those
areas or cases are marked by the nonreciprocity of risk. The only exception to this general
ization is product injuries to bystanders. See FLETCHER, supra note 14; FRIED, supra note 15,
at 194-99.
92. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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The fact that their theories fit enterprise liability doctrine poorly
is not the sole, or perhaps even the primary, reason that moral theo
rists have been unable to exploit the interpretive weaknesses in the
economic account of enterprise liability law. By and large, these
theorists have been disinclined to exploit the opening. They have
believed either that enterprise liability is normatively suspect, or
that special economic principles apply to the domain of activity lia
bility. Ernest Weinrib's work illustrates the suspicion that enter
prise liability is normatively indefensible.93 George Fletcher's
important work in the social contract tradition, and Jules Coleman's
influential work in the rational choice tradition, exemplify the con
viction that noneconomic principles apply to enterprise liability.94
For the most part, I hope to address these doubts by showing
that a powerful idea of fairness underlies enterprise liability law, an
idea that looks to what enterprises have done and might do, not to
who they are. I also hope to show that this conception of fairness,
far from being alien to social contract theory, has a place in the
family of principles that social contract theory takes to govern tort
law. The belief that principles of contract law or economic effi
ciency should govern circumstances when the parties have preexist
ing contractual relationships with one another, even though
fundamentally different principles should control accidents among
strangers must, however, be addressed head on.95 That view is both
widespread and infiuential.96 Taken seriously, it is capable of con93. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
94. Fletcher believes that either bargaining or market relationships make the application
of social contract theory problematic and so conceives of his theory as one applicable to
accidents among strangers. He writes that "the market relationship between the manufac
turer and the consumer [in product accidents] . . . chang[es] the question of fairness posed by
imposing liability." Fletcher, supra note 13, at 544 n.24. Fletcher's specific reason is that this
market relationship makes "loss-shifting in products-liability cases
a mechanism of insur
ance." Id. Later, he says that Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), is
"not entirely apt for my theory. The existence of a bargaining relationship between the de
fendant and the plaintiff poses the market adjustment problems raised in note 24 supra."
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 546 n.38. For his part, Coleman writes: "There seems to me to be
a case for treating products liability on the contract model even if there isn't the same argu
ment for treating all of tort law in that way." JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 41819 (1992).
95. As I have implied in passing, contractual relationships between victims and injurers
might take either of two forms: they might be market relationships or bargaining relation
ships. The relationships between product manufacturers and consumers are market relation
ships; the relationship between the drydock and the Coast Guard, for example, was a
bargaining one. For a succinct economic exposition of the differences between bargaining
and markets, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 1 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). In one
sense, Cooler's whole article is a commentary on this distinction. For a brief, clear statement
of the distinction, however, see id. at 15-20.
96. Prominent proponents of the view, in addition to Coleman and Fletcher, include lib
ertarians and several different kinds of economists. Richard Epstein endorses a regime of
. • .
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suming enterprise liability law.97 Market relationships are present
in one of the core cases of enterprise liability (namely, manufactur
ing defects) and bargaining is a live alternative to tort liability in
innumerable cases of strict liability. Some of those cases, including
Rylands and Bushey, are central to enterprise liability. Kantian so
cial contract theory firmly rejects the idea that contract law can be
charged with fixing basic tort duties, because it takes the matters at
hand to be matters of justice, properly settled not by the coercive
power conferred by bargaining position, but by the " 'peculiar com
pulsion of the better argument.' "98 The position adopted by Kant
ian social contract theory appears poorly understood in the
strict liability for accidents among strangers and no liability (contract) for accidents among
parties in bargaining or market relationships with one another. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 101 (1995); see also id. at 91-111. This is, I believe, a
logical position for a libertarian to take. Robert Nozick's views have a roughly similar struc
ture, although they make more room for the enterprise liability principle of fairness. See
NOZICK, supra note 18; supra note 20 (quoting Nozick). Two different strands of law and
economics endorse contract as an alternative to enterprise liability. One strand, represented
by Alan Schwartz's work in product liability law, embraces contract for reasons rooted in its
views of efficient markets. See Schwartz, supra note 7. Another strand, growing out of
Coase's work on bargaining, embraces contract because it believes that private bargains are
more likely to reach efficient results than governmentally-imposed solutions. See infra note
101 and accompanying text. Even Croley and Hanson, who specifically reject the claim that
product accidents should be handled by a regime of free contract rather than a regime of
enterprise liability, accept the proposition that, absent market failures, contract is generally
more efficient than tort. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution:
The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688-89 (1993) ("Other
things equal, legal economists typically prefer freedom of contract over immutable liability
standards. By most accounts, an immutable liability rule is justified if and only if it prevents
some significant negative externality or other market failure." (citation omitted)). There
may be less to this consensus than meets the eye, however. In another article, Croley and
Hanson point out that advocates of a regime of "free contract" for product-related risks show
explicit "distrust of unregulated product markets" in certain respects, Croley & Hanson, The
Nonpecuniary Costs ofAccidents, supra note 7, at 1808, and that these advocates are quite
selective in their endorsements of disclaimability. See id. at 1807-09.
97. Fletcher lucidly explains how Coase's views led to a powerful assault on enterprise
liability. See FLETCHER, supra note 14. at 162-68.
98. GEuss, supra note 27, at 72 (quoting JORGEN HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien, in W1R
KLICHKEIT UND REFLEXION: FETSCHRIFT FOR WALTER SCHULZ 240 (1973)). The topic that
we are touching on is deep and complicated, and I do not mean to imply that Kantian social
contract theory embraces Habermas's ideal speech situation account of truth for purposes of
practical reasoning. Rawls makes clear the substantial difference between his "political liber
alism" and Habermas's more "metaphysical" doctrine in his Reply to Habermas. John Rawls,
Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132 (1995). My point is simply that Kantian social contract
theory accepts the proposition that something like the "weight of the relevant reasons" deter
mines whether an arrangement is just, and this favors settling questions ofjustice by weighing
the relevant reasons. In the context at hand, this recommends tort law over contract law. The
idea that disagreements should be settled not by the balance of bargaining power, but by the
balance of reasons, is not only recognized by economists, it is accepted by them as the ideal
that should govern scholarly argument. See, e.g., Stephen Figlewski, Remembering Fischer
Black, J. DERIVATIVES, Winter 1995, at 94, 96. Figlewski writes:
Fischer
was not "a political person" . . . and "refused to be swayed by sheer political
power." "Nobody had any bargaining power with Fischer," one person told me. What
he thought was important was to "build the most truthful model you could, even if you
couldn't solve it analytically or accurately." He "reinvigorated your sense that it was
• • .
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contemporary legal academy, even though it is familiar in contem
porary philosophy, and consistent with a long tradition of liberal
political thought and practice, including the practice of modem tort
law.
A.

Why

Not Contract?

Stripped of its subtleties, the argument that different principles
ought to apply to risks embedded in market or bargaining relation
ships among the affected parties is an argument for freedom of con
tract. Proponents of this view agree that the parties to particular
risk impositions ought to be free to choose the terms on which
those risks are imposed. Freedom of contract, pronounced dead
not so very long ago,99 is now very much alive and well. Newly
powerful currents of libertarian and economic thought now con
verge in its support. Libertarians see the market as the institutional
mechanism that builds individual consent into every arrangement.
As buyers, sellers, and bargainers, persons are free to decide what
risks to bear and what obligations to accept. Legal economists see
the market as the best institutional mechanism for the optimization
of welfare. In the absence of transaction costs, participants will
trade with each other until there are no more mutually beneficial
trades to make. There will, then, be no social state that is Pareto
superior to the one achieved through free market exchange. Free
dom and utility, efficiency and consent, both converge on the desir
ability of freedom of contract.100
As this view is articulated in the language and conceptual frame
work of law and economics, it both subordinates tort to contract
important to do the right thing and concentrate on quality even if people around you
sometimes didn't appreciate it."
Id. What economics denies is that this ideal applies to the domain of what Kantians call
"practical reason."
99. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979);
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
100. For a representative statement of the convergence from a libertarian perspective, see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI·
NATION LAWS, 25, 23 (1992) (arguing that, in a regime of freedom of contract, "the consent of
both parties guarantees that the transaction works to their common benefit" and that
"[t]here are powerful functional reasons to believe that the overall social consequences will
be improved as well"). For a representative statement from a mainstream law and economics
perspective, see Robert Cooter, Torts As the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on
Causation, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 523, 544-50 (1987). For a typical invocation of both
grounds in an applied economic analysis of tort rules, see Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Prod·
ucts Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357 (1988) ("The consumer
sovereignty norm may govern cases of both actual and hypothetical consent. In the former
case, well-informed, uncoerced consumers actually consent to particular contract clauses.
The consumer sovereignty norm uncontroversially supports enforcement of these clauses; the
various moral theories to which Americans adhere respect truly consensual arrangements.").

March 1997]

Enterprise Liability

1299

'
and makes tort parasitic on contract. The view subordinates tort to
contract by asserting that, when bargaining is possible, the law
should confine itself to specifying an initial allocation of property
rights and tort duties - an allocation that minimizes transaction
costs - and grant to the affected parties the authority to bargain to
a different final allocation, if they so desire.101 It makes tort para
sitic on contract by asserting that, when transaction costs are high,
the law should impose the solution that the parties would have
agreed upon, had transaction costs been low.
The challenge mounted by this view is clear: Why impose strict
liability in Bushey? Why do so in Rylands? Why not let these
losses fall where they lie, unless the parties themselves agree other
wise? Why not stick with a contractual regime of no liability for
product accidents? Why not, at the very least, permit the affected
parties to alter the relevant liability rule by contractual agreement?
This view raises a host of questions.102 At present, what needs to be
explained is why Kantian social contract theory rejects the liberta101. As Cooter asserts:
The basic idea of the [Coase] theorem is that the structure of the law which assigns
property rights and liability does not matter so long as transaction costs are nil; bargain
ing will result in an efficient outcome no matter who bears the burden of liability. The
conclusion may be drawn that the structure of law should be chosen so that transaction
costs are minimized, because this will conserve resources used up by the bargaining pro
cess and also promote efficient outcomes in the bargaining itself.
Cooter, supra note 95, at 14. In the footnote to this passage, Cooter observes that this is "a
theme in Richard Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977)." Id. at 14 n.11.
Coasean arguments appear to be one source of George Fletcher's hesitation about the exten
sion of social contract arguments to market and bargaining relationships. See supra note 94
and accompanying text. The other source of hesitation appears to be the essentially Aristote
lian belief that when tort law uses market mechanisms to disperse the costs of accidents, it
impermissibly mingles distributive justice with corrective justice. This belief is strongly and
clearly expressed in WEINRIB, supra note 19, at 74-75 ("Expressed in the terms of Aristotle's
analysis, the difficulty is that the introduction of loss-spreading into tort law mixes corrective
and distributive justice. . . . [S]ince coherence consists in having a legal relationship reflect
one of the forms of justice, loss-spreading as a tort doctrine is incoherent.").
102. For one thing, the surface clarity, and apparent simplicity, of these questions con
ceals a deep conceptual puzzle over the proper specification of initial entitlements. The
thought that the decision should be left to the parties to resolve as they see fit does not
explain which initial specification of rights and obligations is correct. Contract is a device for
altering rights and obligations, and it therefore presupposes some initial assignment of entitle
ments - some specification of property rights, liability rules, and contractual norms for their
alteration. Which initial specification of entitlements, if any, is correct? What is the ground
on which it is correct? The efficiency norm seems to require an answer instead of supplying
one. These issues are discussed in Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and
Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980). Their work follows Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943). From a slightly
different angle, these issues are raised by Ronald Dworkin's criticism of Richard Posner's
wealth-maximizing criterion for the assignment of legal entitlement. See RONALD DWORKIN,
Is Wealth a Value?, in A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 237, 251-55 (1985). I am not sure that con
vincing economic answers can be given to the criticisms offered by Kennedy, Michelman, and
Dworkin, but I am not pressing them here.
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rian argument that respect for individual freedom requires freedom
of contract, and endorses nondisclaimable tort duties as the appro
priate institutional expression of such respect.103
Paradoxically, perhaps, Kantian social contract theory under
writes the nondisclaimability of tort duties because it believes that
certain forms of liberty are the preeminent social and political good
for persons concerned with leading their own lives in accordance
with their aspirations. The forms of liberty necessary for each citi
zen of a modem industrial democracy to have reasonably favorable
circumstances for leading her life in accordance with her aspirations
are plural. Perhaps more importantly, these liberties conflict with
one another: just as freedom of contract can conflict with precondi
tions of a free market by restraining trade, so, too, freedom of ex
pression can conflict with privacy, and freedom of action can
conflict with security.104
On a social contract conception, then, a basic task of principles
of justice, and the institutions that they govern, is to reconcile con
flicting liberties in a way that secures, for each person, the most
favorable circumstances for her to realize her conception of the
good over a complete life, consistent with a like freedom for others.
To specify appropriate principles of justice, social contract theory
introduces the idea of a social contract: an agreement among free
and equal citizens governing their basic social and political relation
ships with one another. Because the parties to the social contract
are represented solely as free and equal democratic citizens, they
are uniquely well positioned to agree upon principles of justice that
secure for such citizens the most favorable circumstances for realiz103. I previously offered a different set of reasons in support of nondisclaimability. See
Keating, supra note 57, at 342-46. The issue is approached from a slightly different angle
here, and the reasons offered are commensurately different. The two sets of reasons are,
however, complementary.
104. By enabling some transactions and foreclosing others, contracts both create and de
stroy market freedom. This paradox is the source of the famous "rule of reason" applied to
the first section of the Sherman Antitrust Act. That section states that every contract in
restraint of trade shall be void. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Because virtually all contracts
restrain trade, the courts have construed the provision to forbid only "unreasonable" re
straints of trade. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64-65, 68 (1911). As
Justice Brandeis noted:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to re
strain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.); see also
WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS, III, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: POLICY AND PRAC·
TICE 19 (1992); PmLLIP AREEDA & LoUIS KAPLOW. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 202-03 {1988).
On the conflict between freedom of expression and privacy, see generally Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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ing their conceptions of the good. By contrast, the actual agree
ments and actual consent favored by libertarianism are far too
likely to reflect not the freedom and equality of democratic citizens,
but the vast inequalities of wealth, power and privilege that charac
terize existing institutions. Only a hypothetical agreement can hope
to escape the distorting influence of these inequalities.1os
To be sure, this paper does not attempt to use a device like
Rawls' original position to select appropriate liability rules. It does

not, for example, ask what liability rules the parties to an original

position would adopt at the legislative stage of their delibera
tions.106 The article's aims are "interpretive" in Ronald Dworkin's

sense of the word - it proposes to "fit and justify" most aspects of
existing legal doctrine (and to criticize some aspects of that doctrine

as mistaken).107 It thus uses the apparatus of social contract theory
to guide its interpretive efforts.10s When we bring the ideas ex
plained in the preceding paragraphs to bear on our present con

cerns, the principal lesson that we take from them is that the basic

questions of tort liability are matters of justice, properly settled by

the persuasive force of the relevant reasons of justice.

Kantian social contract theory thus favors tort over contract be

cause questions of justice are at stake. Freedom of action and se

curity are essential liberties, central both to our interests and our

status as free and equal persons. Their protection by concrete legal
duties governing the imposition of risks of physical injury and death
ought to reflect both their central importance to our personhood,
and our fundamental equality as persons. The proper reconciliation
of the conflicting claims of freedom of action and security for a plu

rality of persons is thus a question of justice. It is a question of
what claims free and equal persons, engaged in mutually beneficial,

but risky, activities, may assert against one another.

105. See JoHN RAWLS, The Basic Structure As Subject, in PoLmCAL LIBERALISM 257
(1993); Thomas Scanlon, Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property, in READING NozicK: Es.
SAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 107 (Jeffrey Paul ed., 1981).
106. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE 198 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JusncE) (discussing the legislative stage of the parties' deliberation); RAWLS, The Priority
of Right and Ideas of the Good, in PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 105, at 184.
107. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 139, 230-31, 239, 255, 257, 410-11 (1986) (dis
cussing fit and justification in an interpretive conception of law). For a discussion of
Dworkin's criteria of fit and justification and their connection with the principle of fidelity to
preexisting law, see Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of
Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21-55 (1993).
108. For discussion of this use of Rawls' view, see Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism
and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 619, 659-68
(1994).
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Because the reconciliation of the claims of freedom of action
and security is a question of justice, its proper resolution depends
on the strength of the competing claims of freedom of action and
security as a matter public moral reason, not on the bargaining
strengths of the affected parties, or on the comparative intensity of
their preferences for their own welfare. The deepest wish of
democracy, as Kantian social contract theory understands it, is to
found political authority on the shared reason and public agree
ment of free and equal persons.109 Contract in its bargaining form
makes the balance between freedom of action and security far too
dependent on shrewdness, negotiating skill, and the preexisting dis
tribution of wealth, power, and legal entitlements. Contract in its
market form also allows forms of market power to shape the con
tours of freedom of action and security. Perhaps more importantly,
however, it makes the reconciliation of these two fundamental in
terests tum on the balance of consumers' preferences for their own
welfare. In both forms, contract makes the balance of these liber
ties a private matter. Only tort makes the contours of those liber
ties both tum on the strength of the relevant reasons for or against
their specification in certain ways, and a matter of public right.Ho
B.

Liberty, Security, and Bargains

In its endorsement of tort over contract, Kantian social contract
theory displays its credentials as a distinctively "democratic" form
of social contract theory. Following Rousseau, democratic social
contract theory holds that the basic institutions of civil society including the law of tort, contract and property - must be "part of
the subject matter of the social contract, rather than . . . part of its
background." 111 Those institutions must themselves embody the
109. See Keating, supra note 107, at 55 & 19 n.46.
110. To say the least, tort does not perfectly realize the aim of making the reconciliation
of freedom of action and security a matter of public reason, rather than power or preference.
If nothing else, the requirement of fidelity to imperfectly just preexisting law ensures this.
See Keating, supra note 107, at 21-25. But the issue is not the "absolute" merits of tort, but
the comparative merits of tort - whether tort is to be preferred to contract as a device for
specifying the balance between the competing claims of freedom of action and security.
Speaking comparatively, the critical point is that tort has the correct aspirations, whereas
contract does not. Tort aims to make the contours of freedom of action and security tum on
the strength of the relevant moral reasons. Contract does not.
111. Joshua Cohen, Structure, Choice, and Legitimacy: Locke's Theory of the State, 15
PHIL. & Pun. A.FF. 301, 323 (1986). Locke, by contrast, took the distribution of property
entitlement as part of the background to the social contract. The connection between this
understanding of one of Rousseau's central aims and Rawls' enterprise in A Theory ofJustice
should be clear. The parties in Rawls' original position are represented solely as free and
equal democratic citizens, and they "bargain" about the basic structure of society. My aim in
these remarks is not to assert the rightness of a particular reading of Rousseau, much less to
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freedom and equality of democratic citizens. Because they must,
their terms cannot be fixed by actual, as opposed to hypothetical,
bargains. The outcomes achieved through bargaining depend on
the relative positions of the bargainers outside - independent of
and prior to - the bargain. Outcomes depend, among other things,
on the antecedent distribution of wealth and legal entitlement, and
on the relative skill and shrewdness of the parties. For example, if
the parties in Rylands were to bargain over the liability rule gov
erning their relationship, the initial assignment of the relevant legal
entitlement - the initial choice of the liability rule governing non
negligent flooding of land - would profoundly affect the ultimate
outcome. Permitting parties to bargain over the contours of secur
ity and freedom of action, then, would make the contours of those
basic liberties turn, not on the freedom and equality of the parties
as democratic citizens, but on the preexisting distribution of wealth,
legal entitlement, shrewdness, skill, and so on.
Put differently, the contours of liberties such as freedom of ac
tion and security are not properly settled by bargaining, because the
contours of those liberties should turn on only our best understand
ing of what the freedom and equality of democratic citizens re
quires them to be. The basic duties of care that citizens owe to one
another are matters to be settled by "public deliberation among
equals."112 Rather than being determined by bargains, properly
specified tort rights and duties ought to be one of the things that
democratic citizens bring to the bargaining table. The fair specifica
tion of rights and duties sets the background against which free bar
gaining among equals is legitimate. Within a just framework,
persons are generally free to bargain with each other, so long as
they respect the constraints of justice. The constraints themselves,
however, must be the product of reason, not power. 113
This ·view vindicates the position taken by Judge Friendly in

Bushey against the kinds of criticisms that economists and libertar
ians might press. The precise ruling of Bushey offends freedom of
contract because of the way that it fixes the boundaries of vicarious
liability. Instead of setting the parties free to fix the boundaries of
vicarious liability as they see fit, Bushey fixes those boundaries by
appealing to an idea of fairness. That offense, however, is limited.
argue for that reading. My aim is to explain one aspect of his significance for democratic
social contract theory.
112. Id. at 324 (discussing Rousseau's approach to the features of the social order).
113. For development of the general framework of which these ideas are an extension,
see RAWLS, The Basic Structure as Subject, in PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 105, at 257.
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Bushey allocates the costs of an accident that the parties did not
foresee, and for which they did not expressly provide. In the ab
sence of such agreement, Friendly takes the law to require that fi
nancial responsibility for that accident be allocated fairly. Whether
or not this is the optimal solution from an economic perspective, it
provides a default rule in a circumstance when one must be sup
plied. Bushey 's deep offense to freedom of contract thus lies else
where. Under prevailing tort doctrine, the parties to the accident
are not free to alter the boundaries of vicarious liability - to alter
the default rule - by bargaining among themselves.
Expressed economically, the intuitive force of the case for free
contract is this: drydocks and shipowners subject to the rule of
Bushey have good reason to reallocate the burdens of precaution
against such accidents by agreeing that drydock owners should in
stall automatic locks on the valves that control the flooding of their
docks. Making such agreements lowers their joint precaution costs,
and the parties can pocket the money that they save. Because both
parties stand to benefit from reallocating the burdens of precaution,
economists bridle at the thought that such a deal might be
forbidden.114
If this is the point of the argument, however, the view of nondis
claimable duties that it expresses is mistaken. Neither the law in
general, nor the opinion in Bushey, forbids such a deal. Properly
specified tort rights do not disable all contractual rearrangement of
burdens of precaution. To the contrary, they leave parties pre
sumptively free to reallocate burdens of precaution as they see fit.
Unless we have reason to believe a particular reallocation substan
tively unreasonable, or unfair to third parties, there is no reason to
object to it. No such unreasonableness or unfairness is apparent in
the reallocation that we are now considering. Indeed, the efficiency
advantages of such a reallocation provide a perfectly good reason
for undertaking it.

What the law of accidents does by making its duties nondis
claimable is to disable private parties from reallocating burdens of
precaution by rewriting the law of torts. With certain exceptions not
relevant here, the power to alter tort rights is held by courts and
legislatures, not by private parties. This is hardly tantamount to dis114. See Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV.
481, 495 (1996) ("This is simply an instance of the general proposition that whenever a given

rule would increase the total size of the 'pie' . . . both parties would benefit by adopting that
rule." (citations omitted)). Craswell is discussing a different set of circumstances, of course,
but that only underscores the general applicability of the proposition.
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abling all mutually beneficial reallocations of duties. Although the
parties are disabled from legislatively altering tort duties, they are
free to bargain within the framework, and with the entitlements
conferred upon them by such duties. Shipowners may not waive
their liability for accidents occasioned by their sailors' drunkenness,
but they may pay drydocks to install automatic locks. Rather than
disabling bargains, the nondisclaimable character of tort duties en
ables them by fixing a definite framework within which bargaining
can take place. Beyond that, nondisclaimability makes tort duties
one of the things that determines the balance of bargaining power.
By fixing tort duties fairly, the law distributes one kind of bargain
ing power fairly and acknowledges that considerations of fairness
take priority over those of efficiency.

C. Liberty, Security, and Markets
If contract in its bargaining form fails because it makes tort du
ties wrongly dependent on bargaining skill and power, contract in
its market form fails in a related way. Markets make the contours
of basic liberties depend on critical masses of expressed consumer
taste and on various constraints of efficient production. The con
figurations of consumer preferences responded to by product mar
kets and the constraints of efficient industrial organization, are,
however, irrelevant to the basic liberties of democratic citizens and
should not be allowed to defermine their contours. This is so for at
least three reasons. First, consumers' subjective preferences for
their own welfare are not the proper metric of interpersonal com
parison when the competing claims of freedom of action and secur
ity, for a p lurality of p ersons who hold divers e and
incommensurable conceptions of the good, are at stake. These
competing claims must be reconciled in a way that reflects the ob
jective importance of the interests at stake to the pursuit of concep
tions of the good, not the balance of the affected parties' subjective
preferences for their own welfare.115 Second, consumers' prefer
ences for the safety of the products that they purchase are generally
imperfectly informed. Rarely, if ever, are consumers perfectly ap
prised of the risks of the products that they buy, the precautions
that might reduce those risks, and the costs and benefits of those
precautions. Under a regime of free contract, poor information not
only undermines the freedom with which consumers subject them115. The case for the objective valuation of the interests at stake in accidental risk impo
sition and against the subjective valuation of such interests is developed in Keating, supra
note 57, at 367-73.
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selves to risks, it also undermines the security of others. A regime
of free contract puts the security and freedom of some consumers at
the mercy of other consumers' knowledge of product risks. By
making the freedom and security of some individuals dependent
upon the chance that others will be well informed and rational, a
regime of free contractual allocation of risk makes the protection of
each person's basic interests largely a matter of luck.
The influence of luck cannot always be avoided, and tort law
does not completely avoid it. Under a tort regime for product acci
dents, a particular plaintiff's chance of prevailing will be affected by
the relative skills of the attorneys, the knowledge and preconcep
tions of the judge who hears the case, the luck of the draw in jury
selection, and so on. Nonetheless, the choice of a tort regime over a
contract one can nonetheless diminish the role of luck. By allowing
the information of some consumers to affect the level of product
safety available to others, compared with a tort regime, a regime of
free contract increases the role of luck in the regulation of product
accidents. Moreover, a regime of free contract makes luck a legiti
mate ground for the regulation of product safety. In such a regime,
consumers are free to inform themselves only as much as they
choose, and consumers and producers alike are free to disregard
the effects that some poorly informed consumers may have on
others.
Third, the particular configurations of expressed preferences to
which producers respond are determined by the constraints of effi
cient industrial organization.116 Many of these constraints must be
accepted as limitations on the possibilities open to the common law
in its efforts to control product risks. The law cannot, for example,
simply insist on perfect customization. The particular constraint
stressed above117 - the way in which the expressed preferences of
some consumers affect the level of safety available to other con
sumers - is not, however, unavoidable in this way. That effect is
far more prominent under a contract regime for the allocation of
product risks than it is under a tort regime. A tort regime can em-

116. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110. It is not the case that each consumer's
preferences will affect the level of safety available to others, because it will prove inefficient
to satisfy certain preferences. See Schwartz, supra note 100, at 372 ("Some consumers proba
bly want planes with couches and amphibious cars, and are the victims of unequal bargaining
power in the sense that too few such consumers exist to make serving them in these ways
profitable."). Preferences that are not part of a critical mass of like preferences therefore will
not affect product design.
117. See supra section IV.C.
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body and effect collective judgments about the appropriate level of
product safety.
This is a difference that matters. It is undesirable for some peo
ple's subjective preferences for their own welfare to affect the se
curity or freedom of others, especially if those preferences are
poorly informed and imperfectly rational.118 A regime of free con
tract, however, makes just that connection: if a critical mass of con
sumers is imperfectly informed, or if their preferences for product
safety do not reflect the objective importance of the interests at
stake, or if those consumers are imperfectly rational, actual prod
ucts will not exhibit a level of safety appropriate to the magnitude
and probability of the risks that they create. There is, moreover,
nothing in a regime of free contract that will tend to make consum
ers' subjective preferences conform to the correct objective evalua
tion of the interests at stake. A regime of tort, by contrast, asks
judges and juries to make that very evaluation.

In short, the risks of product accidents are not personal but in
terpersonal; the interests at stake are matters of justice and equal
right; and the proper form of valuation for those interests is objec
tive not subjective. Product accidents must therefore be governed
by tort not contract, and by the principles of fairness or mutual ben
efit applicable to interpersonal risk impositions, not by the princi
ples of individual freedom applicable to the risks that persons
impose on themselves alone.
Put in a slightly different way, the point is that markets are insti
tutions for the maximization of individual welfare. Within markets,
persons may legitimately pursue their own individual welfare as
they conceive it. The problems of product accidents are problems
of freedom and responsibility - freedom to impose risks of injury
and death on others, freedom from the infliction of accidental in
jury by others, and responsibility for accidental harm to other�. The
institutional task presented by the problem of product accidents is
thus not how best to pursue our own welfare, but how to define our
rights against, and responsibilities towards, each other with respect
to risks of personal injury and death. This is a task for - indeed the
task of - tort law.
The time has come to take our legal doctrine, and the rhetoric
that justifies that doctrine, seriously. The time has come not to
challenge them, but to accept the challenge that they present to us
- the challenge of constructing, if we can, a theory that does justice
118. See Keating, supra note 57, at 369-73.
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to the complexity of our practices. To begin that task, we must re
construct the social contract tradition in tort law. And to begin that
reconstruction, we must first pin down the interpretive puzzle we
face, and second explain how social contract theory conceives of
problems of accidental harm.

V.

RECONSTRUCTING S OCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

A.

The Interpretive Challenge

The gravamen of the complaint that I have lodged against the
economic account of enterprise liability is that the thrust of the effi
ciency norm, with its emphasis on optimal coordination of injurer
and victim conduct, sits uneasily with the structure of enterprise lia
bility entitlements. Enterprise liability doctrine is out of step with
optimal precaution concerns both in its definition of the boundaries
of liability, and in its recognition of defenses to liability. It is even
more out of step with optimal loss spreading concerns. For enter
prise liability (or any other form of strict liability) to achieve opti
mal loss spreading, damage awards must be pitched at the
deterrence level for negligently inflicted harms and at the insurance
level for nonnegligently inflicted harms. Doing this, however, con
verts strict liability into an echo of negligence liability.
The structure of enterprise liability doctrine is one of three as
pects of that body of law that frame the interpretive challenge fac
ing Kantian social contract theory. The others are the contrast
between negligence and enterprise liability and the location of en
terprise liability within accident law as a whole. The fundamental
contrast between enterprise and negligence liability is the contrast
between "fault" and "conditional fault": Under enterprise liability,
the payment of damages to those injured by the characteristic risks
of an activity is a condition for the legitimate conduct of an activ
ity.119 Under negligence liability, the payment of damages is a mat119. Legal doctrine and rhetoric often come very close to putting the matter this way.
For example, a leading case on abnormally dangerous activity liability explains that under
strict liability "the question is not whether the activity threatens such harm that it should not
be continued. The question is who shall pay for harm that has been done." Koos v. Roth,
652 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Or. 1982) (footnote omitted). An earlier case explains the basis of
abnormally dangerous activity liability in language that comes even closer to the language of
conditional fault embraced in this article: "The element of fault, if it can be called that, lies in
the deliberate choice by the defendant to inflict a high degree of risk upon his neighbor, even
though utmost care is observed in so doing." Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 317 (Or. 1961).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts observes that
[t]he utility of [the injurer's] conduct may be such that he is socially justified in proceed
ing with his activity, but the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it
be carried on at his peril, rather than at the expense of the innocent person who suffers
harm as a result of it.
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ter of redress for the wrongful infringement of the property and
physical integrity of others.120
Enterprise liability thus attaches to risks whose imposition
should not have been prevented. This is, in fact, the precise point
of Bushey. The Coast Guard did not act wrongfully when it chose
to use the Tamaroa as a berth, or when it granted Seamen Lane the
freedom to go ashore. It acted wrongfully only when it refused to
accept financial responsibility for the harm occasioned by Seaman
Lane's misadventure. Thus the challenge presented by the contrast
between negligence liability and enterprise liability is to explain
why it is:

(1)

fair for certain kinds of actors (enterprises) to

(2)

impose certain kinds of risks (ones "characteristic" of their activi
ties) only

if (3)

they compensate those injured by accidents issuing

from the imposition of those risks, even though (4) the imposition
of those risks is not itself wrongful.
The location of enterprise liability within accident law presents a
different challenge. Here, the challenge is to show that the norma
tive conceptions that justify negligence liability in some circum-

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1977) (discussing abnormally dangerous
activities).
120. This characterization of the essential difference between negligence and enterprise
liability owes much to both Robert Keeton and Jules Coleman. The debt to Keeton is
straightfonvard - I think that enterprise liability is a kind of "conditional fault" in Keeton's
sense of the term. See Keeton, supra note 38. The debt to Coleman is more complex.
Coleman distinguishes "three ways in which the justifiability of an agent's conduct can relate
to his victim's claim to repair." COLEMAN, supra note 94, at 291. The view of negligence
damages taken in the text corresponds to the first of Coleman's "ways," as I understand it.
The view of enterprise liability taken in the text is very close to Coleman's third "way."
Coleman writes:
On [some] occasions, an injurer's conduct is justifiable only if the injurer pays compensa
tion for whatever losses his conduct occasions. In such cases the rendering of compensa
tion is a necessary condition of the justifiability or reasonableness of what the agent
does. In that sense, it helps to right what in its absence would be a wrong.
COLEMAN, supra note 94, at 291. This is my view of strict liability in general and enterprise
liability in particular, and this is my understanding of what Judge Keeton means by "condi
tional fault."
I am not entirely certain, however, that Coleman would agree that my view of enterprise
liability fits into his third category. Coleman's second way in which the justifiability of an
agent's conduct can relate to a victim's right to repair contemplates circumstances when lia
bility protects an independent property right. Coleman takes Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp.
Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), to be a canonical example of this category. See COLEMAN,
supra note 94, at 293. Because I believe that property rights are often among the reasons
why the contours of both strict and enterprise liability take the shape that they do, Coleman
might conclude that my view straddles his second and third categories. · If so, I think that we
disagree more about jurisprudence than about tort law. My views of law and legal reasoning
are essentially Dworkinian, and I therefore think that property rights are often ingredients of
liability rules - reasons whose "weight" tort Jaw must assess. Coleman's jurisprudential
views are essentially positivist, and he may therefore believe that tort deliberations take the
weight of property rights as antecedently given by property law norms. These jurisprudential
subtleties do nol:, I think, substantially muddy the view of enterprise liability taken in the text
and amplified in the first paragraph of this footnote.
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stances also justify enterprise liability in others. Why is it that the
fair allocation of responsibility for accidental harm among free and
equal persons requires negligence liability in some circumstances
and enterprise liability in others?
George Fletcher's famous argument that the doctrinal division
of labor between negligence and strict liability tracks reciprocity of
risk imposition - and rightly so - provides the kind of explana
tion that we need. Fletcher argued that, when risks are reciprocal
once due care is exercised, both tort law and social contract theory
favor negligence liability; when they are not, both tort law and so
cial contract theory favor strict liability. Reciprocity of risk draws
its normative power from the fact that it defines a regime of equal
freedom and mutual benefit. Reciprocity defines a regime of equal
freedom because reciprocity exists when risks are equal in
probability and magnitude. 121 When risks are equal in these re
spects, persons relinquish equal amounts of security and gain equal
amounts of freedom of action.
As long as reciprocal risks are imposed for reasons that are both
good (that is, sufficient to justify the diminutions of security that
they involve) and equally good, reciprocity of risk also defines a
regime of mutual benefit. Each person benefits when these two
conditions are met because, for each person, the loss of security
occasioned by granting to others the right to expose her to risks of a
certain probability and magnitude is more than offset by the free
dom of action that a regime of reciprocal risk imposition grants to
her, namely, the right to impose risks of equal probability and mag
nitude on others. Perfect reciprocity of risk therefore defines a mu
tually beneficial regime of equal freedom. When risks are perfectly
reciprocal, each person's freedom of action is equally benefitted,
each person's security is equally burdened, and each person gains
more in the way of freedom than she loses in the way of security.
When risks are nonreciprocal even if injurers exercise due care,
Fletcher argues that strict liability does and should apply. The
nonreciprocity of these risks prevents them from being mutually
beneficial in the strong sense that the reciprocal risks subject to
negligence liability are mutually beneficial. Those exposed to
nonreciprocal risk impositions are not compensated for that expo
sure by the value of their right to impose equivalent risks. The im
position of such risks is not part of a normal life, and the value of
121. This is my own reconstruction of Fletcher's argument. His account is somewhat dif
ferent. See Keating, supra note 57, at 315. I endorse a version of this idea in the text follow
ing note 132, infra.
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the right to impose such risks is consequently less than the cost of
having to bear exposure to them. The imposition of those risks is
nonetheless justified,122 and by ensuring that those injured by them
are fully compensated for their injuries so far as practicable, strict
liability restores mutuality of benefit so far as practicable. The
damages paid under strict liability are, thus, not redress for wrong
ful infringement of another's security, but a condition for the legiti
mate conduct of activities whose risks are not mutually beneficial
even when due care is exercised.
Fletcher's argument meets all three of the interpretive chal
lenges set forth at the start of this section. First, it shows why the
ideals of equal freedom and mutual benefit sometimes lead to negli
gence liability, and sometimes to strict liability. Negligence is ap
propriate when risks are, on balance, more mutually beneficial than
not, so that the freedom to impose such risks on others more than
compensates for having to bear exposure to equivalent risk imposi
tions by others. Second, it explains why it is, under certain condi
tions, wrong for injurers not to compensate the victims of justified
risk impositions. Strict liability is appropriate when risk impositions
are justified, but not mutually beneficial in the strong sense that the
risks subject to negligence liability are. The payment of compensa
tion for all harms issuing from such risk impositions restores mutu
ality, so far as practicable.
Third, Fletcher's account of strict liability explains why the
boundaries of enterprise liability are properly pitched beyond the
boundaries of negligence liability. The payment of compensation
restores mutuality of benefit so far as practicable only if compensa
tion is paid for all injuries issuing out of the "characteristic" risks of
an activity. Indeed, in Fletcher's view, nonnegligent injuries are the .
paradigmatic case of injuries for which compensation must be paid.
The precise problem that the payment of compensation is meant to
rectify is the absence of mutuality of benefit once all reasonable
precautions are taken.
The ideas of equal freedom and mutual benefit also suggest a
justification for another aspect of strict liability doctrine - its ten
dency not to recognize the defense of victim negligence.123 Reliev
ing victims of the duty to take care for their own protection is
justified by the fact that nonreciprocal risks are not mutually bene122. As far as I can see, Fletcher's argument requires this assumption, although Fletcher
does not explicitly state or justify it. Presumably risks that are not justified ought to be
forbidden.
123. See supra Part III.
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ficial in the strong sense that reciprocal risks are. Reciprocity the'"
ory, and the social contract ideal that it instantiates, grounds the
victim's obligation to exercise care for her own protection in the
mutually beneficial character of the risks subject to negligence lia
bility.124 When risks are not reciprocal even after due care has been
taken, benefit is not mutual, and due care on the part of victims
cannot fairly be demanded.
Within its domain, then, reciprocity theory supplies the kind of
account that we need. It uses the ideals of equal freedom and mu
tual benefit, and it explains the structural features of strict liability
that elude economic accounts. The catch is that the domain of reci
procity theory is not the domain of enterprise liability. If nothing
else, this narrows and sharpens our challenge: we need to show that
social contract theory can make room for a form of liability that is
concerned not with the fair distribution of risk, but with the fair
distribution of the financial costs of harm. To make that room, we
must first set out the defining philosophical features of the social
contract conception of accident law. So doing should allow us both
to detach social contract theory from the reciprocity of risk crite
rion, and to grasp the proper place of that criterion within social
contract theory.
B.

A Fresh Start

Kantian social contract theory is distinctive in that it under
stands the problem of accidental injury to be a problem of mutual
freedom. It conceives of the problem of accidental liarm as a prob
lem of

freedom

because it takes the most important feature of

human (moral) agency to be "the capacity for critically reflective,
rational self-govemance."12s By virtue of this capacity, we have
both the ability to, and a fundamental interest in, shaping our lives
in accordance with some conception of its point. Freedom is the
social condition that is most critical to the realization of this inter
est, and Kantian political morality therefore assigns lexical priority
to those liberties that are essential to the "adequate development

124. This is the thrust of Bohlen's thought. See Bohlen, supra note 57, at 220, 273-74; cf.
Priest, supra note 5, at 467 ("Bohlen made clear [that] the legal implication of [his] benefit
theory is the negligence standard with the contributory negligence and assumption of risk
defenses." (citation omitted)).
125. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., The Significance of Choice, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 149, 174 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1988).
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and full exercise"126 of our power to make our lives answer to our
aspirations for them. Social contract theory conceives of the prob
lem of accidental harm as a problem of mutual freedom because the
doctrines and principles of accident law reconcile the competing
claims of a plurality of persons, whose aims and aspirations conflict.
The liberties at stake in accidental risk impositions are not part
of the equal basic liberties of Rawls's first principle of justice those are liberties against the state - but the liberties protected by
accident law have an analogous priority over our interests in acquir
ing wealth and income. It is natural to think that their priority re
flects the instrumental importance of physical and psychological
integrity to our personhood. Serious bodily harm threatens the dis
integration of our personality as well as, and sometimes more than,
it threatens our physical integrity.127 Speaking instrumentally, we
might say, with John Stuart Mill, that tort law protects our individ
ual security, and to that, "an extraordinarily important and impres
sive kind of utility" attaches. As Mill observed:

[S]ecurity no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend
for all our immunity from evil and for the whole value of all and every
good, beyond the passing moment, since nothing but the gratification
of the instant could be of any worth to us if we could be deprived of
everything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger
than ourselves.128
The priority of tort liberties in Kantian social contract theory
reflects, in part, the force of Mill's point. However, social contract
theory explains the force of Mill's point in ways that are neither
consequentialist, utilitarian, nor instrumentalist. It holds that secur
ity is, along with freedom of action, a precondition of effective ra
tional agency. For Kantian social contract theory, the capacity to
pursue a conception of the good - to act on and from a conception
of what is worthwhile and valuable in life - is the central feature of
human moral agency. A substantial measure of security is a pre
condition of such agency because, without it, persons cannot pursue
the aims and aspirations whose pursuit gives form and meaning to
their lives.

126. RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 105, at 289, 297. This criterion is one of two governing the identification of the list of
equal basic liberties.
127. Cf. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF TiiE
WORLD 35 (1985) ("World, self, and voice are lost, or nearly lost, through the intense pain of
torture
) ; id. at 294-304 (discussing accident law and a tort trial).
128. JoHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 50 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., The Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 1971) (1861).
•

•

•

•"
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One aspect of this break with utilitarian accounts of the urgency
of security is an insistence that the independent value of each indi
vidual human life is at stake in the physical and psychological integ
rity of our persons. Our equal capacity to affirm and pursue
conceptions of the good makes us sources of claims in our own right
- free, equal and purposive beings whose lives and aspirations are
of value in their own right. The interests that ultimately count for
purposes of political morality are the interests of persons.
Mill's ostensibly instrumental and utilitarian account of the im
portance of security fails to capture the independent value of human
life. The value that it assigns to physical and psychological integrity
is dependent upon the exceptional utility of security. By making
individual liberty and integrity parasitic on the general good, Mill's
account leaves open the possibility that someone might rightly be
injured whenever others stand to gain more from her injury than
she stands to lose, taking into account the special urgency of the
utility on her side of the scales. This denies what Kantian political
morality asserts - that persons are sources of value in their own
right. Permitting violations of personal integrity whenever they
promote overall welfare denies our status as independent sources of
value. It asserts that our lives have no value except insofar as they
serve the general good.
The danger here is not primarily that Mill's utilitarianism, or
other forms of instrumentalism or consequentialism, will often
countenance battering or assaulting persons, experimenting on
them without their consent, or invading their privacy and inflicting
emotional distress upon them. The harms here are too vivid, the
conduct too offensive to our sense of justice, for us to acquiesce
quickly in such conclusions. The danger is more subtle: if we con
ceive of our claims to freedom and security as dependent upon the
balance of costs and benefits, we may erode our liberties in a thou
sand small steps.
To avoid such erosion, we must stake our freedoms on firmer
ground. We must rest our claims to liberty, inviolability and pri
mary authority over our lives on our status as free persons with our
own ends and aspirations, as persons whose lives and projects have
value quite apart from our contributions to the general good. It is
our independent value that others must respect; it is that respect that
rights and liberties express; and it is our equal possession of in
dependent value that the equal provision of rights and liberties de
clares. So conceived, tort law's protection of the liberty and
integrity of our persons protects an essential precondition of ra-
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tional agency, expresses the independent value of each human life,
and recognizes that each of us is equally and inalienably endowed
with that independent value.129
The importance of the protections conferred by intentional
torts, such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress to our capacity to determine the course of our own lives is
plain. If others could gratuitously exercise control over our persons
and psyches in the ways that these torts forbid, the scope of our
security would be greatly diminished and our vulnerability would
be commensurately increased. A legal regime that refused to rec
ognize these torts would make each of us gratuitously usable by
others. The significance of these torts for our moral status as beings
of value in our own right is more subtle, but no less important. If
the law granted people the right to invade the psychological and
physical integrity of others at will - publicly denied the inviolabil
ity of persons
everyone 's public moral status would be altered for
-

the worse. Each and every one of us would be disvalued by being
legitimately subjected to gratuitous physical and psychological vio
lations because we would all suffer a diminution in our moral status,
a denial of the value of our lives, and a denigration of the impor
tance of our most urgent interests.130
The relevance of dignity and autonomy interests to accident law
is less evident, but no less important. The law of accidents secures
the preconditions of effective rational agency just so far as it ade
quately reconciles the competing claims of freedom and security.
Sufficient security from accidental injury and death, and sufficient
freedom to impose risk upon others, are both essential if we are to
work our will upon the world. The law of accidents gives voice to
the independent and equal value of our lives just so far as it does
not license the sacrifice of our lives and limbs for the general wel
fare, but subjects us to risks of injury and death only on terms that
we might reasonably accept as free and equal persons.
When we come to understand the problem of accidental harm as
a problem of human freedom, we see that the chief task of its doc
trines and principles is to reconcile two conflicting aspects of indi
vidual freedom. One of these is freedom of action - freedom to
impose risks of accidental injury and death on others. The other is
security - freedom from accidental injury and death. Our capacity

129. See Keating, supra note 57, at 346-49 (contrasting social contract and economic theo
ries based upon their differing views of individual autonomy).
130. See FRANCES M. KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION 12 (1992); THOMAS NAGEL,
EOUALlTY AND PARTIALlTY 148-49 (1991).
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to shape our lives in accordance with our aspirations, and our fun
damental interest in so doing, makes both of these forms of liberty
precious.131
Freedom of action is precious because leading a worthwhile life
requires exposing oneself and others to risks of injury and death.
Without this freedom, we could not, for example, drive to work, fly
airplanes, or buy products that are less than perfectly safe. The less
free we are to impose risks on others, the more fettered we are in
the pursuit of our own aims and aspirations. Security is precious
because accidental death brings life to a premature close, while ac
cidental injury may foreclose the pursuit of certain aspirations, se
verely impair the pursuit of others, and bring crushing financial
burdens that are themselves deeply disruptive. With6ut a reason
able amount of freedom from accidental injury and death, we lack
favorable conditions for working our will upon the world. The first
task of accident law is thus to reconcile freedom of action and se
curity in a way that provides the space we need to lead our lives in
accordance with our aims and aspirations.
So conceived, the problem of accidental harm is a problem of

mutual freedom because it
pose on each other. Social

governs the risks that persons may im

contract theory holds that principles of
mutual freedom must differ from those of individual freedom be
cause it supposes that persons embrace diverse and incommensu
rable aims and aspirations.

These aims and aspirations are in

natural, though not fatal, conflict. In the presence of diverse final
ends, the circumstance when we voluntarily expose ourselves to
risks in the pursuit of our own ends differs fundamentally from the
circumstance when we expose others to risks in the pursuit of our
separate ends. Social contract theory thus distinguishes between
the canons of individual choice - the canons of rationality - and
the canons of interpersonal choice - the canons of reasonableness.
We may rationally expose ourselves to risks that it would be un
reasonable to impose on others. For a single person, the rationality
of imposing a risk on herself depends on the importance that she
assigns to the end advanced by bearing that risk and the efficacy
with which the imposition furthers that end. For a plurality of free
and equal persons, the reasonableness of imposing a risk on others
131. Our sense of justice - our capacity to honor principles that reasonably reconcile the
competing claims of freedom of action and security for a plurality of persons - makes a
regime of mutual freedom possible. By enforcing our duties against one another, law backs
justice with force and gives us an additional reason to honor fair principles of social
cooperation.
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depends on whether that imposition is consistent with the equal
freedom and equal value of others. Reasonable risks are ones that
answer to terms of mutual benefit: the right to impose them recon
ciles the conflicting claims of diverse persons on terms that all of
them might reasonably accept. The canons of reasonableness thus
set the boundaries of our freedom with respect to the risks that we
may impose on each other.

C. Reciprocity and Reasonableness
Within Kantian social contract theory, the concept of reciprocity
blossoms out of the concept of reasonableness. "The reasonable
leads to the idea of reciprocity [which] is a relation between equals
who are acting on a fair principle of social cooperation that all of
them would propose to the others as fair, and are willing to follow
faithfully, provided the others did so as well. "132 Reasonable peo
ple "insist that reciprocity should hold within [their] world so that
each benefits along with others. "133 Given the diversity of our aims
and aspirations, the general justification that we have for bearing
risks imposed by others lies in our reciprocal right to expose others
to equal risks. The right to impose risks on others justifies bearing
equal risk impositions by others because the right to impose risk
secures the freedom of action essential to the pursuit of a concep
tion of the good over the course of a complete life. When mutuality
of benefit is fully realized, no one's life or limb is sacrificed to the
greater good of others, and we each gain more from the right to
impose certain risks than we lose from having to bear exposure to
equivalent risks.
For mutuality of benefit to be fully realized, risks must, first, be
reciprocal in a qualitative (not a quantitative) way: they must be
equal in probability and magnitude, and be imposed for equally
good reason. Equality in these respects, however, is not enough to
ensure that each of us benefits from such a regime. 134 For each of
us to profit from a regime in which risks equal in probability and
magnitude are imposed for equally good reasons, the reasons must
132. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 24 (Nov. 3, 1993) (unpublished manuscript
presented to the Program for the Study of Law, Philosophy & Social Theory, New York
University, on file with author).
133. JoHN RAWLS, Powers of Citizens and Their Representation, in POLITICAL LIBER
ALISM, supra note 105, at 47, 50.
134. Indeed, equality in these respects is formally compatible with having no person gain
from the imposition of the risks licensed by a particular regime. All of the risks might be
imposed for inadequate reasons. Risks equal in magnitude and probability might be imposed
for equally bad reasons.
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also be sufficiently good - good enough to justify the balance that
they strike between the competing claims of freedom of action and
security. The aim of Kantian social contract theory is to secure the
most favorable conditions for persons to pursue their conceptions
of the good over complete lives. For the particular package of risk
impositions licensed by the law of accidents to secure such condi
tions, the gain conferred on our freedom of action by the right to
impose those risks must exceed the loss to our security from having
to bear exposure to such risks. Prima facie, the fullest satisfaction
of this condition requires that each licensed risk imposition benefits
the freedom of action more than it burdens the security of a repre
sentative citizen.13s
Under a regime where risks equal in probability and magnitude
are imposed for sufficient and equally good reasons, we acknowl
edge both the importance of leading our lives in accordance with
our aims and aspirations, and the equal value of the aims, aspira
tions, and lives of others. We acknowledge the former by willingly
exposing ourselves to reasonable risks in pursuit of our aims and
aspirations. We acknowledge the latter by accepting equal risk im
positions by others. The former is central to our status as free per
sons, the latter is central to our status as equal persons. Moreover,
when reciprocity is understood in this way, the logic behind making
reciprocity of risk imposition (once due care has been exercised)
the master criterion for choosing between negligence and strict lia
bility becomes evident. 136 Taking reciprocity to require that risks
be equal in probability and magnitude, and imposed for equally
good and sufficient reasons, makes reciprocity of risk a test of equal
freedom and mutual benefit.
Once reciprocity is understood in this way, it is not so much
mistaken, as it is misleading, to assign reciprocity paramount impor
tance. The first respect in which it is misleading is theoretical: prior
writings in the social contract tradition have implied that reciprocity
of risk stands alone as the master concept of social contract theory.
Within Kantian social contract theory, however, the idea of reci
procity of risk neither stands alone, nor holds a position of preemi
nent importance. It is inseparable from, incomprehensible
independent of, and subordinate in importance to, the concepts of
equal freedom, mutual benefit, and reasonableness. The second re135. In taking the liberties of a representative citizen as the touchstone, I am following
JoHN RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note
105, at 289.
136. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 15; Fletcher, supra note 13.
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spect in which the assignment of paramount importance to reci

procity of risk is misleading is practical: prior writings in the social
contract tradition have made the presence or absence of reciprocity
of risk the master test for the choice between negligence and strict

liability. Properly understood, however, reciprocity of risk should
serve, not as the master test of the appropriate liability rule, but as

an ideal capable of organizing our thoughts about the choice of an
appropriate liability rule. Speaking loosely, reciprocity of risk im

position is a Kantian "idea of reason" - a concept whose role is to
unify the elements of theoretical framework.137 Reciprocity of risk
links the ideals of equal freedom and mutual benefit, specifying a

regime of risk impositions that realizes them perfectly.

The primary aim of a social contract conception of accident law

is to secure the most favorable institutional conditions for free and

equal persons to pursue their conceptions of the good over com

plete lives. This aim assigns theoretical pride of place to the con
cepts of equal freedom, mutual benefit, and reasonableness,

because these concepts provide the framework for thinking both
about risk imposition in general, and the choice between negligence

and strict liability in particular. The choice between negligence and

strict liability turns on the reasonableness of the different reconcili

ations that they effect between the freedom of action of injurers,

and the security of victims. This, in turn, depends on comparing the

absolute and relative burdens that the regimes place on the victim's

security and the injurer's freedom of action. Compared to.strict lia
bility, negligence generally places lesser burdens on the injurer's

freedom of action, but greater burdens on the victim's freedom.
Strict liability reverses these relationships: it places greater burdens
on the actor's freedom, and lesser burdens on the victim's security.

The overarching theoretical unity of social contract theory, then,
is found not in the concept of reciprocity of risk, but in the concepts
of equal freedom, mutual benefit, and reasonableness. Social con

tract theory asks the same question of the choice between negli

gence and strict liability that it asks of the decision to take or to
forego a particular precaution: Which rule (in the case of the
choice between negligence and strict liability) or ruling (in the case
of due care) reconciles the competing claims of freedom of action
and security in the most reasonable way?13s

137. For a discussion of "ideas of reason," see WEINRIB, supra note 19, at 87-92.
138. For application of this criterion to judgments of due care, see Keating, supra note 57,
at 341-82.
·
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If the theoretical significance of reciprocity of risk is less than it
has generally been taken to be, so too is its practical significance.
Reciprocity of risk cannot serve as a master test for the choice be
tween negligence and strict liability. One reason why it cannot is
that perfect reciprocity of risk is an ideal which can only be approxi
mated in the real world. Even the risks of the road - the canonical
case of reciprocal risk imposition139 - are, in fact, imperfectly re
ciprocal. Vehicles vary in size, performance, and riskiness of cargo,
and drivers vary in their native and acquired skills. The reasons
why people drive are likewise not perfectly equivalent in a qualita
tive sense - they, too, vary in their absolute and relative urgency.
The reciprocity found on the road is, thus, a rough and "normal
ized" one. Because the ideal of perfect reciprocity of risk can only
be approximated, we should be wary of using the criterion of reci
procity of risk too facilely, and too mechanically. It is neither pre
cise enough, nor attainable enough, to serve as a master "test" for
the appropriate liability rule.
A second reason why reciprocity of risk cannot serve as the
master test of the appropriate liability rule is more theoretically sig
nificant. Considerations of reciprocity of risk do not capture all of
the relevant grounds of responsibility for accidental harm. The idea
of reciprocity of risk draws its considerable power from the fact that
perfect reciprocity of risk (as I have specified it) defines a perfectly
fair regime of equal freedom, with respect to risks of accidental in
jury and death, between persons conceived solely as free and equal.
The error that social contract tort theory has fallen into here is sub
tle. Kantian social contract theory supposes that a person's stand139. Driving has served as the canonical example of reciprocal risk imposition at least
since Judge Blackburn's opinion in Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 286·87 (1866), raised
it as an example and contrasted it with the circumstances in the case at hand:
Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing
those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so,
those who go on the highway . . . may well be held to do so subject to their taking upon
themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger
But there is no ground for
saying that the plaintiff here took upon himself any risk arising from the uses to which
the defendants should choose to apply their land. He neither knew what these might be,
nor could he in any way control the defendants, or hinder their building what reservoirs
they liked, and storing up in them what water they pleased, so long as the defendants
succeeded in preventing the water which they there brought from interfering with the
plaintiffs property.
Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. at 286-87. Commentators have subsequently invoked the example. See,
e.g., FRIED, supra note 15, at 196-200 (arguing that the risks of driving 50 miles per hour over
a two week period are not reciprocal with the risks of driving 75 m.p.h. one week and 25
m.p.h. the next, because of the greater danger and uncertainty that the latter arrangement
creates); Fletcher, supra note 13, at 543 ("If we all drive, we must suffer the costs of ordinary
driving."); id. at 549 (asserting that driving negligently is reciprocal within the community of
such drivers).
• . . .
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ing as a free and equal individual is her fundamental status as a
democratic citizen. It, therefore, also supposes that status should
be the primary ground determining their basic rights and responsi
bilities, including those specified by the law of accidents. The ideal
of reciprocity of risk is, therefore, profoundly right to take that sta
tus as fundamental for purposes of fixing the terms of which citizens
may and may not expose each other to risks of physical injury and
death.
The mistake lies in believing that persons' status as free and
equal democratic citizens is the

sole

ground of their rights and re

sponsibilities with respect to risks of accidental injury and death.
Social contract theory acknowledges - indeed insists - that per
sons can acquire rights against and duties toward each other by vir
tue of the choices that they make, the property that they acquire,
and the responsibilities that they assume. If securing the institu
tional rights and primary goods that citizens need to be effectively
free and equal is one face of freedom,

respecting the uses

that citi

zens have made of their freedom is the other. By the exercise of
their civil and political freedoms, free and equal citizens take spe
cial risks upon themselves, assume relationships of special trust and
responsibility toward others, and acquire special rights toward and
immunities against others.140 The normative weight of these rights
and responsibilities must be reflected in the specification of tort
duties.

Leroy Fibre, Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway141
nicely illustrates the relevance of property rights to the delineation

Leroy Fibre:
[the plaintiff operated a] factory for the manufacture of tow from flax
straw. Upon its land, adjoining its factory and abutting on the defend
ants' right of way, it stored flax straw in parallel rows of stacks, the
nearest some seventy-five feet, the other eighty-five feet, from the
center. of the right of way. A live cinder was emitted by a negligently
operated engine of the defendant and carried by a high wind, then
prevailing, into contact with the farther row of stacks which, being
highly inflammable, ignited.142

of duties of due care. In

140. In connection with these three categories, think, respectively, of the special duties of
care placed upon experts by the law of negligence, of the special duties of care connected to
special relationships, and of the impact of property rights on the delineation of duties of care.
141. 232 U.S. 340 (1914).
142. 232 U.S. at 342.
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The defendant claimed that the plaintiff itself was negligent, be
cause it "had placed its property of an inflammable character upon
its own premises so near the railroad tracks. "143
The jury found the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent. The
question before the Supreme Court was whether the defendant was
entitled to raise that defense in the first place - whether the de
fendant had a duty to take reasonable protections on its own prop
erty, for its own protection, against the negligence of the railroad.
Over a terse, powerful, and eloquent dissent by Justice Holmes, Jus
tice McKenna's majority opinion held that " [t]he doctrine of con
tributory negligence is entirely out of place" in this setting.144 The
correct rule is one drawn from nuisance law. " [E]very one must use
his property so as not to injure others . . . . "145 This rule does not
condemn the operation of railroads - they are a "legitimate use of
property" - but it specifies a particular division of the labor of
precaution between railroad operators and adjacent owners and oc
cupiers of land.146 Owners and occupiers of land next to railroad
rights of way take the risks inherent in the rightful operation of a
railroad, but not those stemming from its "wrongful" operation.
This is not the place to explore the subtleties of Leroy Fibre,
much less to settle the debate between McKenna and Holmes. For
our purposes, the lesson to be learned is this: the embedding of the
tort issue within a framework of property rights affects the specifi
cation of tort duties. The parties in LeRoy Fibre did not stand in
the same relationship as do drivers on the highway. For the most
part, drivers on the road face one another simply as prospective
injurers and prospective victims. They take risks upon themselves
and impose risks on each other; they benefit from the precautions
of others, and the precautions that they take benefit others. The
terms of their interaction are largely uncluttered by special relation
ships and property rights.
143. 232 U.S. at 342. Leroy Fibre is thus the American counterpart to the case of the
farmer and the railroad that Ronald Coase, following Pigou, made famous in The Problem of
Social Cost, Coase, supra note 47, at 29. Coase used a large number of examples to develop
his argument. All of the examples resemble the farmer and the railroad example in two
ways: (1) the harm is "caused" by both activities; and (2) maximizing the total value of the
two conflicting activities requires bilateral precautions. Nonetheless, the example of the rail
road and the farmer has emerged as one of the more famous illustrations. See, e.g., Cooter,
supra note 95, at 2-9. For a rare recognition by an economically inclined scholar of the signif
icance of property rights in this context, see Jones, supra note 46, at 1729, 1757.
144. Leroy Fibre, Co., 232 U.S. at 350.
145. 232 U.S. at 350.
146. See 232 U.S. at 350.
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By contrast, the property rights of the parties in LeRoy Fibre their equal rights to the legitimate use and enjoyment of their
properties - profoundly affected the terms of their relationship,
and the law of torts must register the presence of those rights. Reg
istering their presence, the definition of reasonable care is influ
enced by the concepts and categories of nuisance law. Put more
generally, property rights alter the "normative field" within which
tort law works. Moreover, the same can be said of "special rela
tionships," such as those of employers and employees, hotels and
their guests, jailers and their prisoners, or schools and their
pupils;147 of the decision to assume certain roles, such as lifeguard,
pilot, or captain of a ship;148 and of voluntary choices to enter into
activities whose intrinsic enjoyment is tied to the imposition of cer
tain risks.149

In the case of "special relationships," the assumption of posi
tions of authority and trust extends the reach of responsibility. In
the case of lifeguards, pilots and captains, the lives, safety, and
property of many people depend on the skill and care of the occu
pants of those positions, thus providing a ground for the imposition
of special duties of care. In the case of primary assumption of risk,
the maintenance of a shared good requires the acceptance of dis
tinctive risks. In all three of these cases, the acceptance of certain
roles entails the acceptance of distinctive responsibilities. Such an
emphasis on institutional roles is hardly surprising. We have good
reason to want the delineation of pilots' duties to be sensitive to the
special risks and possibilities of their roles. For individuals and
communities to flourish, those in positions of special trust and
147. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 821 (1948)
(holding an employer liable for the wrongful death of a missing employee because agents of
the railroad failed to act reasonably in ascertaining his whereabouts); Hutchinson v. Dickie,
162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947) (holding that the defendant owed a duty of care to the decedent
because the decedent was an invited guest on the defendant's cruiser); Pirkle v. Oakdale, 253
P.2d 1 (Cal. 1953) (holding that school officials owed a duty of care in carefully supervising
the physical activities of students); Iglesia v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1982) (holding that
a police officer owed a duty of care to a prisoner that the officer knew to be incapacitated by
alcohol at the time of release). This list is merely illustrative. Cf. KEETON ET AL., TORT AND
AccIDENT LAw, supra note 20, at 236-52 (citing cases).
148. See, e.g., Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351 (1975) (holding the pilot/owner of
private plane liable for its crash on a theory of res ipsa loquitur). Newing's analysis rests
heavily on federal regulations placing responsibility for the safe maintenance and flight of
such aircraft squarely on their pilots and owners.
149. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (holding that ordinary careless
conduct and incidental physical contact are essential to the enjoyment of a sport such as
touch football and that the imposition of ordinary negligence liability on co-participants in
"active sports" would impair their play); Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992) (holding
that an injury received while water-skiing was not actionable unless it resulted from conduct
showing a reckless disregard for safety).
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power must discharge their responsibilities in ways that do justice to
our dependence upon them.

In

all of these cases, liability regimes are not shaped exclusively

by considerations of reciprocity. The majority opinion in

Leroy Fi

bre,

for example, refuses to recognize the defense of contributory
negligence because it takes such reconciliation to be inconsistent
with the fair reconciliation of the parties' property rights. Property
conceptions play two roles in this conclusion. On the one hand,
they flesh out the abstract ideal of reciprocity. The risks of rail
roading and farming are not reciprocal because farmers do not ex
pose railroads to risks comparable to the risks to which railroads
expose farmers. On the other hand, property conceptions alter tort
judgments of reasonableness. One reason why the railroad is enti
tled to impose nonreciprocal risks of fire on "farmers" in the first
place is that the railroad is entitled to the reasonable use of its right
of way. It is not the dangerous use that is "unreasonable."
The unreasonableness of the railroad's use of its property lies in
demanding that farmers, who do not impose comparable risks on
railroads, take precautions against the risk that the railroad's negli
gence will damage their property. Put differently, the railroad's un
reasonableness lay in demanding that the plaintiff forego the use of
some of its property simply because so doing would minimize the
railroad's private liability costs, and, perhaps, total social costs as
well. Farmers are neither under a general duty to act in the best
interests of railroads, nor under a general duty to use their property
in wealth-maximizing ways. Their general duty is to respect the
rights of others, and to act in accordance with fair principles of so
cial cooperation. McKenna's claim is that the fair reconciliation of
these conflicting claims calls for not imposing a duty of victim pre
caution against injurer negligence. Property rights are an

ingredient

in that conclusion. The judgment probably would not have been
the same had property rights not been in play. We take it for
granted that drivers on the public highway owe each other duties of
victim precaution.
Property conceptions figure in a similar way in the best interpre
tation of the ruling and judicial rhetoric of Rylands v. Fletcher. On
the one hand, the normal use of property in the region helped to
specify which risks were reciprocal. One reason why the risks of
reservoir building were not reciprocal was that the area was a min
ing district. Here, the customary use of property fleshed out the
reciprocal risks of owning and occupying land. It poured content
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into the tort norm of reasonableness.150 On the other hand, prop
erty rights played an important role in justifying the construction of
reservoirs in mining country. One reason why people were entitled
to construct reservoirs, and so to impose nonreciprocal risks, was
that people are, at common law, presumptively entitled to use their
property as they see fit, so long as they do not use it in a way that
injures other people.151 Here, a property right does not flesh out a
tort conception - it alters the application of tort conceptions. The
right to use one's own property as one sees fit alters tort law's judg
ment of reasonableness.
The precise points illustrated by primary assumption of risk,
"special relationships," and piloting are somewhat different. In
these areas of the law, prior choices and the distinctive contours of
various roles, rather than property conceptions, are ingredients in
tort law's judgments of reasonableness. The broader point, how
ever, is the same. In all of these areas, considerations of reciprocity

alone

do not determine liability rules and regimes. Property rights,

prior choices, and particular relationships affect the normative field
within which liability rules are constructed. Well-fashioned rules
register the weight of those rights, choices, and relationships.
This puts us, finally, in a position to state the general relevance
of considerations of reciprocity to Kantian social contract theory.
Reciprocity of risk is a master organizing idea, but it is not a master
test of the choice between negligence and strict liability for three
reasons: first, reciprocity of risk is an ideal, and can only be approx
imated; second, reciprocity of risk is abstract, and can be given con
tent only through the introduction of ancillary conceptions that
flesh out the qualitative judgments of magnitude and reasonable
ness on which it depends; and third, its authority is not "all things
considered," but ''prima facie" or "presumptive." Its "all things
considered" impact on the final shape of liability rules depends on
its interaction with other normative materials. Those other materi
als carry their own authority and have their own presumptive impli
cations. Considerations of reciprocity figure in judgments of
reasonableness, but, so too do the prior choices of the parties, their
institutional roles and responsibilities, and the property rights that
they bring with them. Indeed, the list of relevant considerations is
open ended.

150. Custom plays a similar, if perhaps less authoritative, role in general negligence law.
151. See supra note 139 (quoting Judge Blackbum).
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Notwithstanding these limitations, reciprocity of risk can serve
as a master organizing idea, guiding our deliberations about the
choice between negligence and strict liability. Indeed, the best way
to understand the role of reciprocity of risk within traditional social
contract theory is as the master organizing idea. The ideals of equal
freedom and mutual benefit are the central ideals of social contract
theory. The reciprocity of risk criterion articulates their bearing on
problems of accidental injury and death. With respect to risks of
accidental injury and death, perfect reciprocity of risk realizes the
most favorable, and the most fair, conditions for free and equal per
sons to pursue their conceptions of the good over the course of
complete lives.152 Because Kantian social contract theory takes
persons' status as free and equal to be their fundamental political
status, reciprocity of risk can claim preeminence among the norma
tive materials bearing on the choice of liability rules.
Property rights and prior choices have some normative authority
because persons make choices and acquire property through the ex
ercise of their civil freedoms, and in pursuit of their conceptions of
the good. Within the bounds of justice, respecting the freedom of
democratic citizens requires respect for the rights they create, and
the duties they assume, through the exercise of those freedoms.
When, through the exercise of their freedoms, democratic citizens
acquire property, they acquire rights that other democratic citizens
must respect. When, through the exercise of their freedoms, they
assume positions of trust and responsibility, they acquire duties that
they are not free to disclaim. Prima facie, we cannot appropriate
the benefits of an office and shed its burdens.153
If property rights and prior choices have some normative au
thority because they flow from the exercise of the powers and liber
ties that we possess as free and equal democratic citizens, they
generally have less authority than considerations of reciprocity do.
The principle of responsibility embodied in the reciprocity of risk
criterion flows directly from our status as free and equal citizens,
whereas rights rooted in property interests, and the special role re
sponsibilities that we assume, flow more indirectly from our free
dom and equality. Our free and equal status is the ground on which

152. See the discussion in the text supra at notes 135-37. See also Keating, supra note 57,

at 324.

153. Cf. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 106, § 52, at 342-43 (1971) (stating the
"principle of fairness"). This principle is also traced to H.L.A. HART, Are There Any Natural
Rights?, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53, 61-63 (Anthony Quinton ed., 1967).
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our more particular roles are built, and our more particular rights
and interests acquired.
Finally, these are questions to be settled by deliberation, not
bargaining, because they are questions of right and justice, not pref
erence or power. Property interests and prior choices alter the
claims that persons may rightly make against others, and the claims
that others may rightly make against them. They do not free us
from the requirements of justice, and transport us to a realm where
power, shrewdness, negotiating skill, or intensity of desire settle
questions of freedom and responsibility.
We are now in a position to understand the challenge presented
by the enterprise liability principle of fairness. Like the reciprocity
of risk criterion itself, the enterprise liability principle of fairness
appeals directly to our fundamental status as free and equal citi
zens, not to the property interests that we acquire, or to the choices
that we have made, through the exercise of those freedoms. It chal
lenges the reciprocity of risk criterion by taking accidental

harm,

not risk, as the touchstone for thinking about mutuality of benefit.
Because it appeals directly to our status as free and equal individu
als, it challenges the claims of the reciprocity of risk criterion to
primary normative authority. Implicitly, the principle of burden
benefit proportionality claims that the full realization of freedom
and equality requires the fair apportionment, not just of risk, but of
the financial costs of accidental harm as well.
VI.

THE RHETORIC OF FAIRNESS

To justify the enterprise liability principle of fairness within a
Kantian social contract framework, then, we must show why rea
sonableness sometimes requires the fair distribution of the financial
costs of accidental harm between an enterprise and its victims. To
show that this framework makes sense of the pertinent law, we
must connect it with relevant rhetoric and doctrine. The relevant
rhetoric has three elements. The first is the principle of fairness
itself, with its implicit insistence that harm, not risk, is what matters.
The second is the conviction that the shift from a world of "isolated,
ungeneralized wrongs," to a world in which "torts . . . are mainly
the incidents" of large enterprises,154 makes the fair distribution of
harm between enterprises and their victims an issue, thereby chang
ing the question of fairness presented by tort liability. The third is
the claim that there is an intentional aspect to the infliction of "acci-

154. Hou.tEs, supra note 1, at 183.
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dental" harms by large enterprises, and this intentionality provides
a ground for the imposition of liability.155
The argument that I shall develop is lengthy, but its gist is sim
ple. When risks are the incidental by-products of large and well
organized activities, the enterprise liability principle of fairness rec
onciles the competing clailns of liberty and security more fairly, and
more favorably, than the reciprocity of risk criterion does. Losses
of life, limb, and property disrupt the lives of victims even when
they issue from risk impositions that are themselves justified. We
therefore have reason to minimize the financial hardship that losses
cause, and to distribute their financial costs as fairly as possible. In
Holmes's new world of interrelated and generalized risks, the impo
sition of enterprise liability is often able to effect these ends. When
it can do so, it is reasonable for enterprises to impose the nonnegli
gent risks characteristic of their activities but unreasonable of them
not to accept responsibility fo� the financial costs of those risks.

A. Risk and Harm
Both Fried and Fletcher take risk - not harm - to be the com
ponent of, and threat to, human well-being governed by tort law.
The equal freedom that concerns them is equal freedom to impose
risks

on

others, and equal freedom from risk impositions

by

others.

The fairness that concerns them is fairness in the distribution of
risk, not fairness in the distribution of the (financial) burdens and
benefits of accidental harm. On its face, this aspect of their
thoughts is puzzling. They appear to count risk more important
than harm, yet common sense and social contract theory alike sug
gest that risk is only threatening because it may issue in harm. By
itself, risk rarely threatens fundamentally the ability to pursue a
conception of the good over the course of a complete life.156 The
same cannot be said about the actual occurrence of physical injury
and death. Because the avoidance of accidental injury and death,
rather than the avoidance of risk, is fundamental to our well-being,

155. The first and third of these elements of the enterprise liability rhetoric of fairness are
identified as two of the major forms of fairness rhetoric by James Henderson, Jr. in his care
ful study of judicial justification in products liability law. See Henderson, supra note 11, at
1576-77.
156. Exposure to carcinogenic toxins and radiation are exceptions to this rule. In these
cases, risk persists long after exposure ends, and this may count as a harm in itself. See, e.g.,
In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that exposure to radiation beyond a certain
threshold fixed by regulation constitutes a harm regardless of subsequent personal injury).
But these are exceptional, and distinctively modern, cases. Fletcher and Fried clearly have
more typical and traditional cases in mind.
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Fletcher's and Fried's focus on risk instead of harm requires
justification.
Neither Fletcher nor Fried has much to say about the reason
why risk, rather than harm, should be the touchstone of tort theory.
One of Fletcher's brief asides contains the germ of an answer, how
ever. Fletcher remarks that, when risks are reciprocal, holding ac
tors strictly liable for the harms that they cause would merely
"substitute one form of risk for another - the risk of liability for
the risk of personal loss."157 Fletcher's thought, I take it, is this:
strict liability has administrative costs, namely, the expense of using
the judicial system to transfer the costs of an accident from the vic
tim to the injurer. Because reciprocity defines a perfectly fair situa
tion with respect to the distribution of risk, incurring those
administrative costs does not lead to a fairer distribution of the
costs of accidents. It leads to a different - but not fairer - distri
bution of those costs. There is, therefore, no point in imposing
strict liability in cases of reciprocal risk imposition and no point in
focusing on the distribution of harm as opposed to the distribution
of risk.
The fairness argument that I have attributed to Fletcher would
be sound if it were the case that, when risks are reciprocal, neither
the victim nor the injurer could spread the costs of an accident
across those who benefit from the activity that engenders it. Activ
ity liability, however, supposes that the imposition of strict liability
on reciprocal risks does not merely shift the financial costs of acci
dents from victims to injurers, but spreads the costs of accidental
harm across the enterprise that engendered those harms. If enter
prise liability is capable of spreading the costs of accidental harm

across those who benefit from the creation of the relevant risks, then
it may be fair and just - not just efficient or humane - to shift the
costs of accidents arising out of reciprocal risks onto those who im
posed the risks. Aristotle himself saw the proportional alignment
of burdens and benefits as a distinctive form of justice, different
from both distributive and corrective justice.1 58
Although the principle of proportionality is concerned with the

distribution

of the burdens and benefits of accidental risk imposi

tion, it differs from distributive justice as Fletcher, following Aris
totle, understands it. Distributive justice distributes goods on the

157. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 547.
158. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. V, ch. 5, at 117-22 (discussing justice as propor
tionality and distinguishing it from both corrective and distributiye justice).
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basis of status or virtue.159 The principle of burden-benefit propor
tionality

attributes responsibility on the basis of conduct. It assigns
activity responsible for the accident, and so parcels

liability to the

out financial responsibility for harm on the basis of voluntary risk
creation. Although the principle of proportionality is concerned,
like corrective justice, with what has been done, it differs from cor
rective justice as much as it differs from distributive justice. Correc
tive justice seeks to restore a wrongfully disrupted preexisting
equilibrium, whereas the principle of proportionality seeks to cre
ate a new equilibrium in which the burdens and benefits of acciden
tal injury are aligned. The principle of proportionality is, in short,
neither distributive nor corrective, but

commutative. 160

This principle of fairness is not at odds with, but rather is sup
ported by, social contract theory. Social contract theory is, after all,
concerned with the fair reconciliation of two conflicting liberties freedom of action and security. Freedom from harm is more funda
mental to security than freedom from risk, and the fair apportion
ment of the burdens and benefits of accidental harm is therefore
more important than the fair apportionment of the burdens and
benefits of accidental risk creation. Social contract theory thus
counsels us, when possible, to attend to the fair apportionment of
the costs of accidents, rather than to the fair distribution of risk.
When the imposition of strict liability simply shifts a concentrated
harm from victim to injurer, the balance that it strikes between the
competing claims of freedom of action and security is different
from, but no fairer than, the balance struck by negligence law.
When strict liability spreads accidents across those who benefit
from creating the risks that result in those accidents, rather than
simply shifting concentrated harms from victims to injurers, strict
liability strikes a fairer balance than negligence does between the
competing claims of freedom of action and security. Or so I shall
argue.
159. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. V, ch. 3, at 112-13 ("[F]or all men agree that what
is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify
the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of
oligarchy with wealth (or noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence.").
From a Kantian perspective, the principles of tort liability implicate distributive justice, inso
far as they are aspects of a fundamental principle of equal right or equal liberty. For present
purposes, these differences in Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of distributive justice are
beside the point. The point is that the enterprise liability principle of fairness is not "status"
based in an objectionable way. It specifies conditions under which free and equal citizens
will be held responsible for what they have done.
160. My usage of "commutative" follows that of FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 221 n.21.
Feinberg uses "commutative" to describe the "justice as proportionality" that Aristotle dis
tinguishes from both corrective and distributive justice. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12.
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This argument reconciles the apparently competitive concep
tions of fairness expressed by the reciprocity of risk criterion and
the principle of burden-benefit proportionality by granting them
different spheres of application. For this reconciliation to be suc
cessful, we must identify the basic domains within which each of
these principles of fairness applies. Here, the second element of the
enterprise liability principle of fairness comes into play. Bearing in
mind the caveat that each of these principles is a master organizing
idea, not a master test, we can locate the essence of each concep
tion's rightful sphere of operation in Holmes's distinction between
a world of "isolated, ungeneralized wrongs," and a world where cer
tain risks are the regular and routine "incidents of certain well
known businesses." 161 When risks are isolated and ungeneralized,
the reciprocity of risk principle fairly reconciles the competing
claims of freedom of action and security for a plurality of persons.
When risks are systemic and generalized, the principle of burden
benefit proportionality strikes a better balance.
B.

Two Social Worlds

In Holmes's world of "isolated, ungeneralized wrongs" (let us
call this world the "world of acts"), risk impositions are discrete

"one-shot" events. The actors who impose risks are independent of
one another and actuarially small. In this world, nonnegligent
harms are as haphazard and unpredictable as natural disasters. Just
as one might have the bad luck to be struck by lightning, so too one
might have the bad luck to be struck by a man raising a stick high
behind him as he struggles to break up a dogfight. 162 In the world
of acts, the typical actor is an individual or a small firm that creates
risk so infrequently that harm is not likely to materialize from its
actions alone, and the typical accident arises out of the independent
actions of natural persons or small firms engaging in similar activi
ties on an occasional basis. Viewed as a whole, the activities of
these actors are diffuse and disorganized. Even in the aggregate,
the activities of these actors may be actuarially small.
The random dogfight that precipitated Brown v. Kendall nicely
typifies torts in the world of acts. Dog owners were then - and
pretty much are now - a diffuse and unrelated group. The risks of
physical injury and death that each dog owner imposed were too
actuarially small to make the infliction of serious personal injury on
161. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 183.
162. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
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someone else an ordinary and predictable part of individual dog
ownership. Each dog owner is an actuarially small actor, and the
risks imposed by her are independent of, and uncorrelated with, the
risks imposed by other dog owners. Under these circumstances, lia
bility rules shift, but do not spread, the financial costs of accidental
injury.163 In the world of acts, the imposition of strict liability "sub
stitute[s] one form of risk for another - the risk of liability for the
risk of personal loss."164
At the opposite pole from the "world of acts" is the "world of
activities." In the "world of activities" risks are systemic. Systemic
risks arise out of a continuously repeated activity (for example, the
manufacture of coke bottles, the transport of gasoline, the supply
ing of water by a utility) that is actuarially large.

"Accidental"

harm is statistically certain to result from such risks: if you make
enough coke bottles, some are sure to rupture;16s if you transport
enough gasoline, some tankers are sure to explode;166 if you never
inspect water mains and leave them in the ground long enough,
some are sure to break. 161

In the world of activities,

the typical injury arises not out of the
diffuse and disorganized acts of unrelated individuals or small firms,
but out of the organized activities of firms that are either large
themselves, or small parts of relatively well-organized enterprises.
The defendant in Lubin is large in the first sense: a single entity is
responsible for the underground piping of water, for laying and
maintaining those pipes, for charging consumers for the water so
transported, and so on. The transportation of large quantities of
gasoline in tractor trailers on highways is large in the second sense:

163. This claim assumes that adequate liability insurance is unavailable in the world of
acts. This assumption is only partly correct. Although liability insurance was certainly not
widely available in the nineteenth century, contemporary homeowner's insurance usually
covers policyholders for liability arising out of damage that their domestic pets inflict on the
persons and property of others. A standard California policy, for example, includes: "Per
sonal liability protection," which pays for bodily injuries to other people, or damage to their
property if you are liable, resulting from the acts of your pets. See Farmer's Insurance
Group, Homeowner's Package Policy; II. Liability; E. Personal Liability. There is an impor
tant general point here: liability insurance can convert the world of acts into the world of
activities. I discuss this in the text infra at notes 170-78.
164. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 547. While the activity of dog owning itself might have
been actuarially large, the independence of dog owners from each other effectively prevented
insurance mechanisms from stitching these independent and unrelated actors together into a
unified enterprise.
165. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
166. See, e.g., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
167. See, e.g., Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964) (observing that the water
works chose not to inspect underground water mains and decided to replace them only after
they broke).
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the firms that do the transporting may (or may not) be small and
specialized, but they are enmeshed in contractual relationships with

those who manufacture and refine gasoline, those who operate gas
oline stations, those who manufacture tractor trailers, and so on .168
In the world of activities, the financial costs of accidental inju

ries can be spread fairly across the enterprises that engender those
harms. In this world, accidents arise out of circumstances that sat
isfy the basic criteria of insurability. Foremost among these criteria
is the law of large numbers. 169 The more the law of large numbers
is met, the more risks are certain not only to issue in harms, but also

to issue in harms with predictable regularity. When an activity is

large enough, the accidental harm associated with its conduct is pre

dictable, and the cost of that harm can be foreseen and priced into
the activity. In the purest version of the world of activities, actors

(enterprises) themselves satisfy the requirements of the law of large
numbers . When enterprises themselves are actuarially large, they
tend to engender nonnegligent accidents in a regular and calculable

way, and the costs of those accidents can be factored into the costs

of conducting the enterprise. The costs of manufacturing and dis
tributing Coke can include the costs of injuries from exploding

Coke bottles; the costs of supplying water to households and busi

nesses can include the costs of the damage caused by broken water
mains .170

So far I have painted a picture of polar opposite worlds. In one

world, not only are each actor's risk-creating acts infrequent and

statistically small, but the aggregate risks created by all the actors
who impose that risk are also actuarially small. Each dog owner's
involvement with dogfights is rare, and the "enterprise of owning

dogs" is itself an actuarially small one. In the other world, not only
are each actor's risk-creating acts frequent to the point of being sta-

168. This perception is fundamental to the cases. For example, the Siegler court writes:
"the commercial transporter can spread the loss among his customers - who benefit from
this extrahazardous use of the highways. Also, if the defect which caused the substance to
escape was one of manufacture, the owner is in the best position to hold the manufacturer to
account." Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1188.
169. See ROBERT I. MEHR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 32 (8th ed. 1985) (observing
that the system of insurance is predicated on the law of large numbers, a theory under which
the ability to predict collective losses supplants the impossibility of predicting individual
losses).
170. See Esco/a, 150 P.2d at 441 ("The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business."); Lubin, 131 N.W.2d at 770 ("The risks from such a method of operation [i.e.,
leaving water mains in the ground until they rupture] should be borne by the water supplier
who is in a position to spread the cost among the consumers who are in fact the true benefi
ciaries of this practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and maintenance costs.").
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tistically large, the aggregate risks created by all the actors who im
pose that risk are even larger actuarially. Coke alone manufactures
millions of soda bottles, and the enterprise of manufacturing soda
bottles is far more vast than Coke's own contributions to it. The
Coast Guard alone regularly looses innumerable cooped-up sailors
upon the world, and the enterprise of sending sailors on shore leave
is far larger than the Coast Guard's contribution to it.
This picture has its charms, and one of them is a certain broad
brush historical accuracy. As far as the genesis of accidental harm
is concerned, the world of the nineteenth century really does seem
to have differed from the world of the twentieth century in roughly
the way that this picture suggests. But the picture is sweeping, and
the contrast that it paints is crude and overdrawn. For example, the
claim that dogfights were once isolated and rare events, because
dog ownership was itself an actuarially small activity, invites skepti
cism. People have "owned" dogs since the beginning of human his
tory. So long as we are prepared to take a reasonably broad view of
the matter (both temporally and geographically), the nineteenth
century pool of dog owners and dogfights looks large indeed. Con
versely, however vast the mid-twentieth-century shipping industry
may have been, sailing is an ancient endeavor, and sailors on shore
leave have been drinking their way into the "condition for which
[they] are famed" for a very long time indeed.
These misgivings about the accuracy of the sharp contrast be
tween the nineteenth-century "world of acts" and the twentieth
century "world of activities" are well founded. Given a sufficiently
large pool of dog owners, the accidental harms characteristic of dog
ownership should be predictable and therefore insurable. The ex
pected incidence of dogfights should be calculable, and the actual
incidence should tend to converge with the expected incidence.
Problems associated with the organization and administration of in
surance contracts aside,171 it should be possible to write liability in
surance covering the risks of personal injuries attributable to
domesticated dogs. The imposition of strict liability should there
fore be able to spread the costs of dogfights across all dog owners,
thereby aligning the benefits and burdens of dog ownership as far
as the . infliction of accidental injuries on strangers is concerned.
171. There are a range of problems here, and they can be quite fonnidable. The adminis
trative costs of writing separate policies can make the offering of insurance infeasible; the
cost of acquiring adequate infonnation about each insured's riskiness can have the same
effect; the cost of monitoring the behavior of insureds can be prohibitive; moral hazard
problems may prove insuperable; asymmetric infonnation can lead to cross-subsidization,
adverse selection and unraveling, and so on. See infra text accompanying notes 173-81.
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Thus, the picture that we have sketched of differing social worlds
may leave out the most important difference between the social
worlds of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely the fact
that, in the nineteenth century, the institution of liability insurance
was in its infancy.112
The thrust of this objection is correct in two ways: first, the
presence, and relative level of development, of the institution of
liability insurance marks an essential distinction between the world
of acts and the world of activities. Second, these two social worlds
are not polar opposites, but points on a continuum. Indeed, the
institution of liability insurance is important precisely because such
insurance can go a long way towards converting a world of acts into
one of activities. In the purest version of the world of acts, activi
ties as well as actors fail to meet the requirements of the law of
large numbers. Arguably, anyway, this version of the world of acts
is an ideal type that exists nowhere.113 Let us, then, consider a
f:ilightly less pure, but more realistic, version of the world of acts. In
this world, activities are large - large enough to meet the law of
large numbers - but actors are small and independent of each
other.

In this intermediate world, each actor's activity is too infrequent
to satisfy the law of large numbers, and the accidental harm associ
ated with each actor's activity is therefore unlikely to occur with
predictable regularity. In the absence of liability insurance, strict
liability will not spread an activity's characteristic accident costs
across those who benefit from the imposition of its characteristic
risks. The presence of adequate liability insurance may, however,
make a profound difference. If independent insurance firms are
able to supply adequate liability insurance to actuarially small ac
tors, then the imposition of strict liability will spread the costs of

172. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, § 82, at 585.
173. Although this point is arguable, it is far from being obviously true. Judge John J.
Francis describes the characteristics of the nineteenth-century world of accidental harm in
the following way:
The limitations of privity in contracts for the sale of goods developed their place in the
law when marketing conditions were simple, when maker and buyer frequently met face
to face on an equal bargaining plane and when many of the products were relatively
uncomplicated and conducive to inspection by a buyer competent to evaluate their qual
ity. With the advent of mass marketing, the manufacturer became remote from the pur
chaser, sales were accomplished through intermediaries, and the demand for the product
was created by advertising media.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80 (N.J. 1960) (citation omitted). This
description of the world in which privity of contract arose is a description of a craft economy.
In such an economy, products are individualized and produced on a small scale. Acts as well
activities are likely to be small, especially given the individuation of products. This may well
have been the social world of the nineteenth century.

1336

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1266

nonnegligent harms across the class of those who benefit from the
imposition of the relevant risks in the form of insurance premi
ums.174 Tue institution of insurance can thus effect at least a partial
transformation of the world of acts into the world of activities.175
Whether the institution of liability insurance can effect this kind
of partial conversion depends on at least three things: the first is
the extent to which the basic criteria of insurability - a large
number of homogeneous exposures; losses that are each accidental;
losses that are not correlated in the way that, say, property damage
from earthquakes tends to be correlated; and so on - are met.176
Tue second is whether the transaction costs of organizing and main
taining such a market - the costs of acquiring information both
about the riskiness of the activity being insured in general and the
riskiness of particular insureds in particular; the costs of writing and
administering separate liability insurance contracts for each actor;
the costs of monitoring the claims and behavior of insureds and of
adjusting premiums accordingly; and so on - are low enough to
make the offering of insurance profitable. Tue third is whether the
collective action problem of organizing such markets can be over
come in a cost-efficient way.
Tue provision of liability insurance presents a collective action
problem because the extent to which such insurance spreads the
costs of an actuarially large activity composed of actuarially small
actors

across that activity

depends on the extent to which those ac

tors purchase insurance and so participate in the loss-spreading
mechanism.177 This means that liability insurance will spread the
costs of accidents across the activity that generates those costs only

if most or all of the relevant actors are persuaded or compelled to
purchase such insurance.
174. Insurance might spread costs in another way - it might spread them across unre
lated risks. Whatever the merits of such insurance, it would not spread the costs of an activ
ity's accidental harm only across the actors who participate in imposing the activity's
distinctive risks.
175. The transformation is only partial because the availability of liability insurance does
not, in general, establish the kind of relationships among insureds that is created by participa
tion in a shared enterprise. For example, an insurance company does not generally have the
kind of authority over its insureds that the Coast Guard has over its sailors.
176. See MEHR ET AL., supra note 169, at 35 (discussing criteria of insurability).
177. Substantial participation is, moreover, a condition of effective insurance, not only
because it is necessary to construct a sufficiently large pool, but also because it is often neces
sary to overcome problems of adverse selection and cross-subsidization. Effective insurance
depends on the insurer's ability to predict collective losses accurately. Other things being
equal, the larger and more similar the risk pool, the more accurate the prediction of collec
tive losses.
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In general, whether the accidental harm associated with an ac
tivity that is actuarially large but composed of actuarially small ac
tors can, in practice, be spread across the activity will depend not
only on the extent to which basic criteria of insurability can be met,
but also on whether these transaction costs and collective action
problems can be overcome at a cost that is low enough to nurture a
flourishing liability insurance industry. When the number of actors
is high, and each actor is small, these costs will tend to be high.
Just as we might distinguish a slightly less pure and more realis
tic version of the world of acts, so too we might distinguish a slightly
less pure and more realistic version of the world of activities. This
version of the world of activities bears a superficial resemblance to
the world of acts, because it contains actuarially large activities and
nominally small actors. In this world, however, actors are only
nominally small. They are engaged

not in unrelated acts, but in rel

atively well-coordinated aspects of a common enterprise. Separate
firms may, for example, handle different aspects of the refinement,
transportation, and sale of gasoline, but their activities form a rela
tively well-organized whole. When actors are small, but their activi
ties are related and the enterprise in which they participate is large,
the costs of accidents may still be spread across those enterprises
with relative ease. What counts here is not corporate form but eco
nomic substance - not whether activities are formally integrated,
but whether they are functionally integrated.11s
For example, the small size of each individual auto dealer does
not preclude spreading the costs of auto defect-related accidents
across the enterprise of manufacturing and selling automobiles; that
spreading can be achieved simply by forbidding automobile manu
facturers from limiting their liability for such accidents.179 So too,
the ability of firms that transport gasoline by tractor trailer to

178. See, e.g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1211 (3d Cir. 1977) (impos
ing liability on the general contractor for the tort of an underinsured, formally independent
subcontractor because the general contractor, who had "negotiated at length regarding the
insurance coverage" of the subcontractor, was in an "excellent position to assure the proper
degree of financial responsibility"); see also Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Lia
bility, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1261-71 (1984). Sykes analyzes the efficiency of the "control test"
for the imposition of vicarious liability on independent contractors and criticizes some impor
tant lines of cases for paying too much attention to the "pertinent agreements" between the
principals and the "independent" contractors and too little attention to "economically rele
vant factors" such as "the observability of loss-avoidance behavior, [and] the duration of the
agency relation."
179. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83-84 (N.J. 1960) (ar
guing that the societal interest in consumer safety can be achieved by eliminating the require
ment of privity between manufacturer and purchaser, thereby placing the costs of product
related accidents on the manufacturer, the entity in the best position to reduce the danger to
the consumer and spread product-related accident costs).

1338

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1266

spread the accident costs of gasoline explosions across the enter
prise of refining, distributing, selling, and using gasoline depends
not on the size of those firms themselves, but on the size and inte
gration of the enterprise as a whole and on the connections among
the actors who constitute the enterprise.180
These remarks only hint at the complexities of the topic they
discuss. The connections between enterprise liability and insurance
are both fundamental and intricate. Under some circumstances, the
imposition of enterprise liability can further insurability by facilitat
ing the construction of homogeneous risk pools.181 Under other
circumstances, the imposition of enterprise liability can undermine
insurance mechanisms by unraveling homogeneous risk pools.182 In
some circumstances, enterprise liability may destabilize efficient in
surance mechanisms; in others, it may destabilize inefficient insur
ance mechanisms and stimulate the growth of those that are more
efficient. To complicate matters further, it can be extremely diffi
cult to tell whether a particular disruption is efficient or inefficient.
These are precisely the issues at stake in the debate between schol
ars such as Richard Epstein and George Priest on the one hand,
and Steve Croley, Jon Hanson and Kyle Logue on the other, over
the causes of, and policy cures for, the liability insurance crisis of
the mid to late 1980s.183
For our purposes, however, the critical point is not that the ebb
and flow of enterprise liability has been sensitive to the availability,
and perceived efficacy, of liability insurance, though sensitive it has
been. For our purposes, the critical point is that the fairness of im
posing enterprise liability depends on its ability to connect the fi
nancial costs of accidental injury with the characteristic risk. The
enterprise liability principle of fairness therefore makes questions
of insurance fundamental. That insurance is important is not, to be
sure, news. What

is news is that the institution of insurance

affects

the extent of injurers' moral responsibility for the harms that they
accidentally inflict. Morally oriented tort theorists have long as
sumed that,

if responsibility for accidental harm must be predicated

180. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wash. 1972).
181. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?, supra note 7, at 109-10.
182. See, e.g., Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 7, at 1550-63 (arguing that enterprise
liability is causing liability insurance to unravel). Priest and Croley and Hanson are applying
the model of asymmetric information and unraveling developed by George Akerlof. See
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha
nism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 488 (1970) (explaining how asymmetric information might lead the mar
ket for used cars to unravel and showing how strict liability in the guise of compulsory
insurance can stop the unraveling).
183. See supra note 7.
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on what people do, not on who they are, the institution of liability
insurance must be essentially irrelevant to responsibility for acci
dental injury. Just as this principle should forbid holding people
responsible for harm simply because their pockets are deep enough
to pay for it, so too it should forbid holding them responsible just
because they have enough insurance to cover it. The second ele
ment of the enterprise liability conception of fairness surprises us
by showing us that this conviction is too sweeping. Whether or not
it is fair to leave the financial costs of nonnegligent accidents con
centrated on a few unlucky victims depends greatly on whether the
costs of those accidents can be distributed across those who benefit
by creating the risks that harm those unlucky few. The institution
of insurance is intimately involved in the answer to that question.
The surprise triggered by the third element of the enterprise liabil
ity rhetoric of fairness comes from a different direction. Moral crit
icism of the defendant's conduct is often thought to be largely
absent from judgments that the imposition of some form of strict
liability is warranted.184 Judicial opinions stressing the deliberate
quality of the nonnegligent accidents caused by large enterprises
urge that point as a sharp moral condemnation of the enterprise's
conduct.
This insistence on the deliberate character of certain nonnegli
gent harms subject to enterprise liability is a recurring,

if

poorly

articulated, theme of enterprise liability case rhetoric and commen
tary. It is voiced, for instance, in the second tentative draft of the

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.

Commenting on

the rationale for strict liability for manufacturing defects preserved
by its proposed section 2A, the reporters state: "[b]ecause manu
facturers invest in quality control at consciously chosen levels, their
knowledge that a predictable number of flawed products will enter
the marketplace entails an element of deliberation about the

184. For example, a striking concurrence in Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974)
(en bane), argues that the imposition of strict liability on medical mishaps would be prefera
ble to negligence liability because judgments of negligence impose "a stigma of moral blame"
on doctors. 519 P.2d at 984 (Utter, J., concurring). The imposition of strict liability, by con
trast, simply expresses a view about proper loss distribution - the view that "the plaintiff
should not have to bear the risk of loss." 519 P.2d at 984 (Utter, J., concurring). This view of
strict liability distinguishes it sharply from both negligence and intentionally tortious conduct.
The imposition of liability for intentional wrongdoing expresses moral criticism and disap
proval, because it means that the defendant wrongfully invaded a protected interest of the
plaintiff and did so deliberately. The imposition of negligence liability expresses at least a
mild form of moral criticism and disapproval, because it means that the defendant failed to
live up to a standard of care that establishes the level of respect owed to the lives, limbs, and
property of others.
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amount of injury that will result from their activity." 185 Similar re
marks are occasionally found in cases themselves. 186
This emphasis on deliberate action, however, will not bear the
weight that remarks like this place upon it. Construed as a claim
about the culpable self-consciousness with which manufacturing
defect-related harms are inflicted, it is wholly unconvincing. For
starters, the implicit empirical assumption on which the remark
rests is shaky at best. While manufacturers may understand much
more about the incidence and genesis of manufacturing defects
than consumers do, there is no compelling reason to believe that
manufacturers are a uniquely clairvoyant class with respect to this
one narrow class of potentially dangerous product features. The
precise consequences of various safety devices for automobile acci
dent and injury rates may be highly predictable, for example.
When manufacturers fail to install all technologically feasible safety

185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2A, cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995). James A. Henderson, one of the reporters for the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, elaborates on this remark. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 1576 n.33 (observing
that the producer of a defective product is like "an actor who shoots into a crowd; although
the shooter may not know who will be injured, he commits an intentional wrong against the
victim"). Unfortunately, this analogy begs the question it means to answer. We know that, if
anything is wrong, gratuitously shooting a gun into a crowd is wrong. If anything exemplifies
the sort of grave harm that cannot be gratuitously inflicted, this does. What we do not know
is why investing in quality control at a reasonable (nonnegligent) level gives rise to a duty to
compensate someone injured by an unprevented manufacturing defect.
186. To my knowledge, the most explicit case law assertion that the deliberateness with
which a nonnegligent harm is inflicted is itself a basis for the imposition of strict liability
occurs in Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964), a case holding a waterworks
strictly liable for property damage caused by the bursting of one of its underground pipes.
The waterworks had a practice of leaving its pipes in the ground until they broke, and the
court found this practice a ground for the imposition of strict liability. "It is," the court
explained, "neither just nor reasonable that the city engaged in a proprietary activity can
deliberately and intentionally plan to leave a watermain underground beyond inspection and
maintenance until a break occurs and escape liability." 131 N.W.2d at 770; see also Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co. v. Amicon Fruit Co., 269 F. 559 (4th Cir. 1920) (holding a private company
liable for recurring leaks that occurred without negligence because the court found "plainly
untenable" the defendant's implicit claim that it was not liable because it could not keep its
pipeline from leaking). Waterworks are not generally subject to strict liability. See KEETON
ET AL., supra note 53, at 550. When defendants act in ways that are substantially certain to
inflict harm on some (but yet unidentified) person, courts are prepared to find the elements
of battery present. See, e.g., Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 907 (D. Minn. 1990),
vacated in part 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the allegation of battery
presented a triable issue in a pollution case when the defendant disposed of highly toxic
substances into sandy ground directly above a regional aquifer, because there was sufficient
evidence that the defendant "knew that its conduct was substantially certain to cause an
offensive or harmful contact"); Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich.
1986) (adopting the "substantial certainty" test for determining what counts as intentional
wrongdoing that is exempt from the exclusivity provisions of Michigan's worker's compensa
tion statute). Such certain migration of hazardous materials may also establish a trespass.
See Scribner v. Summers, 84 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1996); cf. State Dept. of Envtl. Protection v.
Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (subjecting disposal of hazardous wastes "that seeps
onto the land of others" to strict liability on theory of Rylands v. Fletcher).
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devices, they may therefore do so knowing the toll in life and limb
that their decisions will exact. That fact alone, however, does not
give rise to any special culpability.
Furthermore, even if the incidence of manufacturing defect
related injuries was foreseen with unique clairvoyance by product
manufacturers, there is no reason to believe that such clairvoyance
is, by itself, morally significant. Ignorance of the natural and prob
able consequences of one's actions may be bliss, but it does not
exculpate those blessed with it from responsibility for harms that
the reasonably clairvoyant would have foreseen. Accident law con
cluded long ago that responsibility cannot hinge on the clarity and
self-consciousness with which one appreciates the results of one's
actions.187
Construed as a claim that manufacturing defects are special be
cause defects will persist at any level of investment in safety precau
tions, so that the residual defect rate is deliberately chosen, the
point is equally unpersuasive. Innumerable risks are imposed in
equally deliberate ways. For example, even

if

all reasonable pre

cautions are taken, the transport of large quantities of gasoline by
tractor trailer appears certain to issue in serious harm in the long
run. Surely, the amount of harm in which this practice issues is sen
sitive to the level of precaution. Settling on a reasonable level of
precaution is therefore tantamount to deliberately choosing, in an
abstract and statistical way, to sacrifice a certain number of lives,
and a certain amount of property. Essentially the same observation
might be made about the construction and operation of reservoirs.
These, too, will occasionally rupture, even if all reasonable precau
tions are taken. The frequency with which they rupture is almost
certainly sensitive to the care with which they are constructed and
operated.
In fact, all activities may involve the deliberate imposition of
some risks. Negligence law explicitly contemplates the existence of
a residual level of risk once all reasonable precautions have been
taken and insists that it is more reasonable for victims to bear this
level of risk than to try to reduce it further.188 Unless this argument
is always wrong, the fact that residual risks remain, and are deliber
ately imposed, cannot be enough to justify the imposition of strict
liability.

187. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
188. See Keating, supra note 57, at 350-52.
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Another line of thought shares the Restatement's conviction
that certain kinds of enterprise-related harms are intentionally
wrongful in some way, but it locates their wrongfulness in the statis
tical certainty of the harm associated with large enterprises.189
Large public and private construction projects provide the canoni
cal examples here. When we tunnel under the English channel,
construct a highway, or build a skyscraper, the "cost" in lives lost
and limbs crushed may be foreseeable with considerable actuarial
precision. Decisions to commence and carry through such projects
therefore involve intending the "accidental" injuries and deaths
that the projects inevitably entail. When we will the realization of
an end, we will the means necessary to its attainment. By virtue of
the statistical certainty that accompanies their great size, large en
terprises intend the accidental harms that their actions cause.
The claim that actors are subject to a special kind of culpability
when they set in motion (or sustain) processes that are statistically
certain to cause harm sweeps too broadly. Highway fatalities on
Fourth of July weekends are actuarially predictable with great pre
cision,190 yet no one thinks that we are, as a society, collectively
culpable for failing to forbid driving on Fourth of July weekends.
So too, no one believes either that we collectively "intend" the acci
dents statistically certain to occur in the tunnels leading in and out
of New York City, or that we are collectively responsible for those
189. I have the impression that this kind of example is part of the oral culture of torts
scholarship and that it owes its prominence to economically inclined writers, who use it to
make two kinds of points. The first is that "we" as a society do not assign infinite value to
human life. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1965) ("Our society is not committed to
preserving life at any cost. . . . Ventures are undertaken that, statistically at least, are certain
to cost lives. Thus, we build a tunnel under Mont Blanc because it is essential to the Com·
mon Market and cuts down the traveling time from Rome to Paris, though we know that
about a man per kilometer of tunnel will die."). The second is that our collective rationality
is suspect because "in the uncustomary case of an individual - a known individual rather
than a statistical unknown - in a position of life or death, we are apt to spend very much
more to save him than in any conceivable money sense he is worth." Id. Rescues - for
example, of trapped miners - are the canonical examples of the phenomenon Calabresi has
in mind. Calabresi continues: "[W]hile I do not doubt this is as it should be, it seems odd
that we should refuse to apply the same standards of 'value beyond any price' when we deal
with the same man's life as part of a statistic." Id.
The charge of collective irrationality is rooted in economists' distinctively consequentialist
view of social morality. "The economist's instinct in all such cases is to say that the only
rational strategy is that which maximizes the numbers of lives saved at the least sacrifice of
other ends." FRIED, supra note 15, at 208. My arguments here address only one aspect of the
"problem of statistical lives."
190. The National Safety Council both estimates highway fatalities for major holidays
and keeps actual statistics on the matter. In 1995 the NSC estimated that there would be 636
fatalities on the Fourth of July; there were 631. Telephone Interview between Charles Sewell,
research assistant to Professor Gregory Keating, and Alan Hoskins, manager of the statistics
department at the National Safety Council in Chicago, Illinois (Sept. 15, 1996).

Enterprise Liability

March 1997]

1343

accidents, simply because we choose to operate those tunnels. In
all of these cases, the language of proximate cause - of directness
and intervening acts - is necessary to mark morally relevant dis
tinctions. In all of these cases, when actuarially foreseeable acci
dents issue in actual harm, that harm "will generally have been
preventable, and its occurrence will be much more directly trace
able to the wrongful agency of persons more immediately con
cerned. "191 Attending, as this line of thought does, only to overall
consequences and their statistical foreseeability leads us to ignore
fundamental distinctions that affect both the grounds and the extent
of responsibility for harm.
The language and concepts of proximate cause point us towards
the relevant distinctions. Some instances of enterprise liability are
marked by a distinctive and culpable kind of intentionality. In
these instances, the enterprise's acts or omissions are the

if you prefer,

direct (or

proximate) cause of the plaintiff' s injury. The enter

prise both controls the events causing the accident, and intends the
actions or inactions that lead to the accident. In

Lubin v. Iowa

City, 192 for example, the waterworks had exclusive control over the
maintenance of the pipes that ruptured, and intended the actions leaving the pipes in place until they failed - that led to the plain
tiff' s injury.
The kind of direct responsibility that is present in
ally significant.

Lubin is mor

When enterprises are directly responsible for

harms, their conduct stands in need of justification. This is not a
special principle of enterprise liability, but a general principle of
morality. If we know anything, we know that the gratuitous inflic
tion of injury and death is unacceptable. The knowledge that such
justification is required is a basic part of our moral sensibility, part
of the perceptiveness and discernment that marks competent moral
agents.193 When the harm is inflicted deliberately, and when the

191. Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine ofDoing and
Allowing, 48 Pmr.. REv. 2�, 304 (1989).
192. 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1965).
193. See, e.g., BARBARA HERMAN, The Practice of Moral Judgment, in THE PRACTICE OF
MoRAL JUDGMENT 73, 82 (1993) (citing the knowledge that the infliction of unnecessary hurt

and pain is something that "must (morally) be avoided" as a canonical example of the kind of
moral perception that competent moral agents possess). Herman stresses, I think rightly,
that the acquisition of such knowledge is "the substantive core in a moral upbringing." Id. at
82. This perception is one of the sources of the conviction, expressed by some courts, that
strict liability is presumptively more just than negligence liability. See, e.g., Green v. General
Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928). The Green court wrote:
[T]he rule that injury may exist without liability is, as has been so well stated by another
court, "contrary to the general rule of liability where injury is caused; and since, in a.
sense, it is a preference of the rights of one property owner or user over that of another;
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agent who inflicted the harm is directly responsible for doing so, the
demand for justification is all the stronger.
Because action, not knowledge, is the fundamental ground of
responsibility for accidental harm, mere knowledge of statistically
certain harm, however actuarially precise, does not give rise to this
demand for justification. When such knowledge is joined to action,
in the form of a decision to initiate a large and complex project, the
demand for justification arises, but it is also quite readily met.
Those who initiate massive construction projects are rarely those in
direct control of the circumstances that precipitate the accidents
that their decision makes statistically inevitable.

Primary responsi

bility for avoiding statistically certain accidents must be lodged with
actors closer to the dangers that occasion those accidents.194
The core cases of enterprise liability - including manufacturing
defects - are marked by direct control. Herein lies the force of the
Restatement's observation about the deliberate and predictable
character of manufacturing defects.195 Manufacturers exercise di
rect and essentially exclusive control over the rate of manufacturing
defects. The manufacturer's decisions about materials, production
and inspection determine how often people's expectations for the
products will be disappointed and how often their physical integrity
will be violated.

In Bushey,

the Coast Guard controlled the risk

that one of its sailors would tortiously damage the drydock's prop
erty. The drydock lacked the legal authority to supervise the Coast
Guard's employees. In cases like

Rylands,

legal authority over the

risk is likewise lodged in the hands of the injurer on whose property
the danger is created. Even in a more complex, abnormally danger-

and since the law is a jealous guardian of the right to lawfully use property without
interference or diminution . . . the rule which allows such injury without liability therefor
is an exception which is and should be narrowly limited and carefully confined."
Green, 270 P. at 955 (citation omitted). I am not making as strong a claim for the importance
of this perception.
194. It must be said, however, that the placement of primary responsibility for accident
prevention in the hands of other agents does not absolve those who initiate such projects of
all responsibility for foreseeable harm. Several kinds of "secondary" responsibilities (or du
ties) may arise out of decisions to initiate complex projects when those decisions are made
knowing that harm will probably result. Duties to hire competent personnel and supervise
them adequately, duties to mitigate harms by providing for medical care, and duties to pro
vide various forms of insurance (such as liability, worker's compensation, and disability) are
all examples of secondary duties. While I believe that some forms of enterprise liability
discharge such secondary duties, the proponents of the line of argument that I am consider
ing write as if they think that statistical certainty of harm makes those who set large construc
tion projects in motion primarily responsible for the accidental harm occasioned by those
projects. The discussion in the text accompanying notes 210-215 infra illustrates aspects of
enterprise liability that reflect "secondary duties."
195. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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Siegler,

the injurer is in a position to exert
control over related entities in the overall enterprise.196
The rhetoric of enterprise liability is thus right to insist that in
tentionality matters, at least in some circumstances. The kind of
intentionality that has attracted the attention of courts and com
mentators marks direct control over the circumstances leading up
to an accident, and action that makes a particular kind of accident
all but inevitable. When these circumstances hold, an enterprise
may fairly be said to "intend the accident," and its conduct gives
rise to a demand for justification.
C.

What's Wrong With Efficient Injuries?

The presence of intentionality - and the control that it signals
- only raises another question. Why is it wrong to intend an acci
dent in this way, when everyone agrees that you are under no duty
to take greater precautions to prevent that accident? Even
waterworks in

Lubin

if

the

exercised direct control over the rate of

watermain breakage, and deliberately chose to permit breaks rather
than preventing them, what is wrong with its conduct?
Indeed, from a consequentialist perspective, the waterworks'
conduct looks irreproachable.197 There is good reason to believe
that the practice of leaving pipes in the ground until they rupture
minimizes the combined costs of preventing burst pipes and bearing

196. If the cause of the accident turns out to be defective equipment, "the commercial
transporter . . . is in the best position to hold the manufacturer to account." Siegler v. Kuhl
man, 502 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wash. 1973).
197. By "consequentialist" I mean a view that "the chief point of morality is to make
things go better overall - to increase average or total welfare within the human commu
nity." Quinn, supra note 191, at 312. "Nonconsequentialism," by contrast, takes the chief
point of political morality to define the terms of free association among equal, self-governing
persons. So conceived, the contrast between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism is
simply the contrast between utilitarianism and Kantian social contract theory, expressed in a
vocabulary slightly different from the one I favor. As long as we heed Rawls's caution that
nonconsequentialism does not ignore consequences, this vocabulary should highlight the con
trasts that presently interest me. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 30
("All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging right
ness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy."). One obvious way in which
nonconsequentialism attends to consequences is by examining how various arrangements af
fect the central interests of each person.
The general debate over consequentialism is broader than my focus here. For example,
consequentialism has been taken to task for its inability to recognize and account for the
expressive dimensions of morality. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Conse
quences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 954-66
(1991); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLuM. L. REv. 2121 (1990).
While these expressive concerns are not my primary focus here, Kantian social contract the
ory has an important expressive dimension - it insists that the status of citizens as free,
equal, self-governing persons be publicly affirmed and manifested by democratic political
practices.

1346

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1266

the costs of the accidents occasioned by their bursting. So long as
we are prepared to take wealth as the best general surrogate for
utility or goodness, as law and economics increasingly does, 19s this
practice produces the most good in the world. If consequentialism
is correct in insisting that overall goodness is the ultimate touch
stone of morality, then there is no basis for the

Lubin

court's

indignation.
For the moral indignation expressed in the

Lubin

opinion to be

well founded, the reasons and conclusions of consequentialism must
deny something whose moral significance is substantial. On a Kant
ian view, consequentialism does just that. It denies that persons
have legitimate claims that are neither derived from, nor ordinarily
overridden by, considerations of the general good. Powerful as con
sequentialism is, its basic claim rejects one of our most cherished
convictions. On a consequentialist view, the lives and property of
individual persons have no independent moral significance. Society
may do with them whatever is best for the whole - whatever pro
motes the general good.
Kantian social contract theory thinks otherwise. It takes as fun
damental the conviction that any decent political morality must ac
knowledge our status as self-governing beings, and must grant to
each of us fundamental authority over our own lives. Consequen
tialism turns that authority over to the community at large, and
leases it back to us only to the extent that granting individual rights
and liberties that we need to be the masters of our own destinies
promotes the general good. It regards persons not as sources of
moral claims that constrain the pursuit of general welfare, but as
sources of the welfare that is to be maximized, and as lines along
which it is to be parceled out.
The very consequentialism naturally invoked to justify leaving
pipes in the ground until they rupture is therefore ground for moral

198. Cost-benefit analysis as customarily practiced by legal economists generally takes
wealth as a surrogate for utility. See Keating, supra note 57, at 334-36. The familiar argu
ment that every legal institution other than the tax system should aim at efficiency, while the
tax system addresses distributive concerns because redistribution is accomplished most
cheaply via the tax system, has likewise seemed to rest implicitly on a utilitarian framework.
Louis Kaplow, one of the principal proponents of this argument, recently made his utilitari
anism explicit. Standard instances of the argument include, inter alia, A. MITCHELL
POUNSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-10, 113 (2d ed. 1989); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System ls Less Efficient Than the Income Tax Sys
tem in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994); Steven Shaven, A Note on
Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Mat
ter Given Optimal Income Taxation, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. 414, 417 (1981). Kaplow's utilitari
anism is laid bare in Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call
for Utilitarianism, 48 NATI.. TAX J. 497 (1995).
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indignation. By asserting that the plaintiff has no claim for redress
because the damage to the plaintiff's property maximizes the gain
to society as a whole, the consequentialist justification of the water
works' practice denies that the property really belongs to the plain
tiff. By asserting that his physical integrity might be sacrificed on
the same ground, consequentialism also denies that the plaintiff's
life is really his. If the plaintiff's physical integrity may be sacrificed
whenever so doing maximizes the gain to society as a whole, then
the plaintiff holds his life and property in trust for the general good,
and may assert only those claims on his own behalf that promote
the general good.

If we think that people are free and equal - beings with pur
poses of their own to pursue and lives of their own to lead, and
equally so - then we will believe that their legitimate claims do not
derive exclusively from considerations of the general good. We will
think that their most fundamental claims flow from, and express,
their freedom and equality. We will regard the waterworks' prac
tice as suspect, and we will view the consequentialist justification
for that behavior as unacceptable.
D.

What's Unreasonable About Reasonable Injuries?

The rejection of consequentialism sets the stage for the defense
of Lubin's conclusion that the intentional, albeit nonnegligent, tak
ing of the plaintiff's property is wrong, but it does not make out that
defense. Even if we grant that considerations of fairness take prior
ity over those of efficiency, and even if we grant that settling the
question of a practice's social rationality does not settle the ques
tion of its reasonableness, we still have work to do. The problem is
this: the conduct of the waterworks may be as reasonable as it is
rational. When we turn our attention away from questions of effi
ciency and rationality, and towards questions of freedom and rea
sonableness, we confront a powerful argument that the waterworks
acted in a reasonable manner.
The reasonableness of requiring a precaution to be taken turns
on the balance between the benefit that the precaution bestows on
the security of prospective victims, and the burden that it imposes
on the freedom of action of prospective injurers. Reasonable pre
cautions enhance the security of victims more than they impair the
freedom of action of injurers. By so doing, they help to reconcile
the competing claims of freedom of action and security in a way
that provides the most favorable terms for persons to pursue their
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conceptions of the good over complete lives.199 Judged by this stan
dard, the practice of the waterworks may well be eminently
reasonable.

In

order to reduce the risks of pipe rupture below their present

level, the waterworks would either have to dig up and inspect its
pipes, or replace them, at short and regular intervals. Pipe ruptures
are relatively infrequent, and the harm that they inflict is relatively
modest. The cost of unearthing and inspecting them regularly, by
contrast, is likely to prove substantial, and not only financially. The
disruption of daily life created by digging in densely populated
areas is not likely to prove trivial. Because the benefits to the se
curity of prospective victims are relatively modest, and the burdens
to prospective injurers are substantial, it is probably unreasonable
to insist on regular inspection of the pipes.
The relative burdens and benefits of regular replacement are a
closer call. If deterioration - as opposed to latent defects or
changed subsoil conditions - is the primary cause of rupture, and if
the rate of deterioration is predictable, this precaution may be quite
effective. If replacement can be done less frequently than regular
inspection, the cost and disruption of this precaution may be signifi
cantly less than the cost and disruption of regular inspection. Even
so, regular replacement still may not be warranted in light of the
relatively infrequent and modest harm that water pipes inflict when
they rupture. The balance of considerations is close, and the judg
ment of reasonableness is hard to make. Equally significant, the
information necessary to make that judgment - information about
the causes of rupture, the effectiveness of regular replacement, the
appropriate interval, and so on - is not easy to come by. In light
of the even balance of the relevant considerations, and our igno
rance of the exact facts on which the judgment of due care turns, we
cannot confidently claim that the waterworks ' practice is
unreasonable.
Because the waterworks' practice of leaving pipes in place until
they rupture seems to be both socially rational and reasonable, the
facts of Lubin vividly illustrate the principal challenge involved in
justifying enterprise liability. Negligence law leaves the financial
costs of nonnegligent accidents on victims, unless those accidents
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. En
terprise liability shifts the costs of nonnegligent accidents to the ac
tivities that engender them. Even more strikingly, enterprise

199. See Keating, supra note 57, at 349-60.
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liability shifts those costs in circumstances when the benefits of the
underlying risks are not asymmetrical in the way that they are when
those risks are nonreciprocal.200 Why is it reasonable to require
that the costs of some nonreciprocal risk impositions be shifted in
this way?
VII.

THE REASONABLENESS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

From a Kantian perspective, the basic task of tort law is to rec

oncile liberty and security on fair (or reasonable) terms. Fair terms
are mutually beneficial because they reconcile liberty and security

in ways that supply each citizen with favorable circumstances for
realizing her conception of the good. In accident law, the fairest or most reasonable - terms reconcile the competing claims of free
dom and security in a way that secures for citizens the most
favorable conditions for the sustained pursuit of their conceptions

of the good.201 Such terms can rightly claim the allegiance of our

sense of justice. They further the good of each of us on terms that

acknowledge our equal freedom and value as citizens.

In

choosing between enterprise and negligence liability, there

fore, we must ask: Which liability regime reconciles more fairly the
liberty of injurers and the security of victims? Which liability re

gime secures more favorable terms for persons to pursue their con
ceptions of the good over complete lives?

In answering these questions, we must recall the constraints im

posed by the interpretive character of our endeavor. First, an inter
pretively adequate social contract theory must explain why the fair

allocation of responsibility for accidental harm among free and
equal persons requires negligence liability in some circumstances
and enterprise liability in others. A fully adequate social contract

theory will do more than this: it will explain why the choice of a
liability regime should be governed by the reciprocity of risk crite

rion in some circumstances and by the principle of burden-benefit
proportionality in others. Second, an adequate theory of enterprise
liability must do justice to the fundamental contrast between enter
prise and negligence liability, and must explain why it is reasonable

for enterprises to impose the non.negligent risks characteristic of
their activities but unreasonable to ask victims to bear the financial
costs of the accidents that issue from those reasonable risks. Third,

a successful account of enterprise liability will illuminate and sup-

200. See supra text accompanying note 91.
201. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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port the logic that drives its delineation of limits and defenses, par
ticularly their indifference to optimal precaution and insurance
concerns. Fourth and finally, a satisfactory social contract theory of
enterprise liability will show why the elements of the enterprise lia
bility rhetoric of fairness identify circumstances in which enterprise
liability is, by social contract criteria, fairer than negligence. Such
an account will throw the weight of social contract theory behind
the prima facie force of the principle of burden-ben efit
proportionality.
With these interpretive constraints in place, we may return to
the questions themselves. Which liability regime reconciles free
dom and security more fairly? Which liability regime strikes a more
favorable balance between these competing forms of liberty?
These questions direct our attention to fundamental features of
negligence liability. A regime of negligence liability confers three
benefits on those who exercise reasonable care when they expose
others to risks of injury and death. First, a negligence regime con
fers on injurers the right to impose certain risks - nonnegligent
ones - without stigma or criticism. Second, it entitles injurers to
save the precaution costs necessary to reduce or eliminate those
risks. Third, negligence frees injurers from bearing the lesser cost
of compensating those injured by their justified risk impositions.
By conferring these benefits on prospective injurers, a negligence
regime imposes corresponding burdens on prospective victims of
nonnegligent accidents. Injurers capture the benefits of these as
pects of negligence, and victims bear the burdens. Indeed, these
asymmetries understate the apparent unfairness of negligence lia
bility. Negligence liability concentrates the costs of nonnegligent
risks on the unlucky few injured by accidents issuing out of those
risks, and leaves the benefits of those accidents in the hands of
those who impose the risks.
This asymmetry gives rise to a demand for justification. Be
cause the exercise of reasonable care does not eliminate all risks,
because negligence liability leaves the benefits of those risks on in
jurers and their burdens on victims, and because that asymmetry
might be changed by imposing strict liability, the decision to insist
only on the exercise of reasonable care requires justification.
A.

Mutuality of Risk and Harm

Social contract theory has traditionally met this burden by in
voking the idea of reciprocal risk imposition: citizens imposing
risks on each other that are equal in probability and magnitude,
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imposed for equally good reason, and imposed for sufficiently good
reason. When risks are imposed for good and sufficient reason,
each citizen gains more from the right to impose risks than she loses
from the exposure to risks legitimately imposed by others.202 When
risks are perfectly reciprocal, each citizen gains an equivalent
amount in the way of freedom, loses an equivalent amount in the
way of security (both for equivalently good reasons), and on bal
ance gains more from her increased freedom than she loses from
her decreased security. Perfect reciprocity of risk thus strikes the
most favorable balance between the competing claims of security
and freedom of action for citizens concerned to pursue their con
ceptions of the good over complete lives, so long as they are pre
pared to do so on fair terms.
These considerations establish that citizens should have the
right to impose certain risks - those that further their liberty more
than they threaten their security. They do not, however, establish
that these risks should be imposed subject to negligence liability
rather than to strict liability. Unless we believe, implausibly, that
the exercise of due care eliminates all risk, the question of responsi
bility for residual risks remains an issue that must be addressed.
Accidental property damage, personal injury, and death are no less
disruptive of human lives just because they are inflicted without
negligence. Victims still have an interest in minimizing these dis
ruptions, and they still have a claim that those who impose and ben
efit from the risks that result in these harms should also be
responsible for minimizing their effects.
Reciprocity theory rebuts the claim of the victims of nonnegli
gent accidents to impose strict liability only by arguing that the im
position of strict liability would disrupt the lives of injurers in an
equally detrimental way, without apportioning the burdens and
benefits of accidental injury any more fairly. In the world of acts,
this argument is sound. Actors in the world of acts are actuarially
small and independent of one another; they impose risk infre
quently, and the incidence of nonnegligent harm issuing from their
activities is unpredictable. In the world of acts, the risk of being
held liable for an unpreventable accident is no more manageable
than the risk of being injured or killed by a unpreventable risk.
Strict liability is therefore as disruptive of freedom as negligence is
- it just disrupts the freedom of action of injurers instead of dis
rupting the security of victims.
202. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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Just as strict liability is no less disruptive of liberty than negli
gence liability, so too, it is no fairer. In the world of acts, the impo
sition of strict liability simply shifts those financial burdens of
nonnegligent accidents from unlucky victims to unlucky injurers.
Fairness calls not for loss shifting, but for distributing the costs of
nonnegligent accidents across those who impose, or benefit from
the imposition of, nonnegligent risks of the kind that issued in the
injury at hand. This distribution requires not only that the inci
dence of nonnegligent harms issuing from particular risks be rea
sonably foreseeable, but also that those who impose risks of the
same kind be linked in such a way that the imposition of strict lia
bility spreads the costs of nonnegligent harms across them as a
class. In the world of acts, nonnegligent accidents are unpredict
able, and actors are small and independent. Strict liability shifts the
costs of nonnegligent harms from particular victims to particular in
jurers, but it does not spread those costs across a class of injurers
who generally benefit from the imposition of that risk.
·

In the world of acts, then, shifting the financial costs of a non
negligent accident to the particular actor who occasioned it is no
fairer than leaving it where it falls. So doing only shifts misfortune
around, and arbitrarily so. In the absence of nonreciprocity of risk
imposition, there is no reason to single out the particular injurer
unlucky enough to have imposed the particular risk that issued in
the victim's harm to bear its financial costs. The only difference
between the injurer and countless others who imposed identical
nonnegligent risks is luck. The only difference between the injurer
and the victim is that the injurer had the misfortune to occasion the
injury, whereas the victim had the misfortune to suffer it. The only
difference between strict liability and negligence is that the former
pins the bad luck on the unlucky injurer, the latter pins the bad luck
on the unlucky victim. Moving the costs of her misery around may
console the victim and discomfort the injurer, but the misery is
equally great, and equally undeserved, in both cases.203

In sum, just as there is no improvement in the balance of secur
ity and liberty when strict liability disrupts the liberty of injurers as
203. Nonreciprocal risks are a different matter. When risks are reciprocal, the preexisting
distribution of risk - as opposed to harm - is fair. When risks are nonreciprocal, the pre
existing distribution of risk is not so fair: prospective victims lose more in the way of security
than they gain in the way of liberty. Nonreciprocal risks impair the security of victims more
than they benefit their liberty, because nonreciprocal risks are ones whose imposition is not
part of a normal life. For most people, then, the value of a right to impose a nonreciprocal
risk is generally less than the disvalue of having to bear exposure to one. The payment of
compensation to the victims of nonnegligent but nonreciprocal risk compensates for this un
derlying asymmetry of benefit and restores mutuality of benefit, so far as practicable.
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much as negligence disrupts the security of victims, so too, there is
no improvement in the fairness with which accident costs are dis
tributed when strict liability merely shifts unpredictable and unde
served misfortune from the victim to the injurer. Fairness in the
distribution of nonnegligent accident costs requires their apportion
ment across the class of those who impose, or benefit from the im
position of, risks of the relevant kind. The lucky, as well as the
unlucky, must pay their share. In the world of acts, strict liability
cannot reach them. Strict liability shifts, but does not spread, the
costs of nonnegligent accidents. It is thus no fairer than negligence.
When we leave the world of acts and enter the world of activi
ties, the character of nonnegligent accidents and the effects of strict
- that is, enterprise - liability change markedly. Nonnegligent
harm is no longer a matter of unpredictable misfortune. It is some
thing foreseen with statistical precision, and inflicted with delibera
tion. Strict liability no longer shifts a concentrated misfortune from
victim to injurer - it spreads that cost across those who benefit
from the activity.
The move from the world of acts to the world of activities thus
shifts the balance of reasons favoring negligence over strict liability.
In the world of acts, when risks are reciprocal, negligence liability is
more reasonable than enterprise liability because the financial costs
of nonnegligent accidental harm cannot be fairly distributed. Strict
liability thus incurs administrative costs without delivering substan
tive benefits. In the world of activities, strict liability distributes the
financial costs of nonnegligent accidents across those who benefit
from the imposition of the risks that inevitably issue in them, and
who therefore deserve to bear them.204 In the world of activities,
strict liability is a more reasonable liability regime than negligence,
even when the burdens and benefits of the underlying risk imposi
tions are themselves fairly distributed, and even when licensing
their imposition strikes a more reasonable balance between the
competing claims of liberty and security than would be achieved by
forbidding them.
Even in the world of activities, natural persons live in the world
of acts. However certain highway fatalities are in the aggregate,
204. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 396408 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (arguing that, in the
automobile accident context, nonfault liability aligns financial responsibility with moral de
sert better than fault liability does, because fault liability concentrates massive losses on
those momentarily careless drivers unfortunate enough to seriously injure someone, whereas
nonfault liability distributes the financial costs of such accidents across all those who create
similar risks).
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and their incidence in each of our lives is highly uncertain. How
ever certain explosions are when tractor trailers haul gasoline, our
individual encounters with such explosions are utterly random.205
However inevitable burst water pipes are, that it happens to any
one of us is anything but inevitable. For victims, accidents are un
predictable and profoundly disruptive events. Both their incidence
and their impact need to be minimized. For enterprises, by con
trast, accidental injury and death are far more predictable and far
less disruptive. Enterprises live in - indeed they constitute - the
world of activities.

Enterprises are therefore able to anticipate

those accidents that issue from their characteristic risks, minimize
their incidence in advance, and disperse their costs after the fact.206
In the world of activities, then, the choice between strict liability
and negligence is no longer a choice between equally grave disrup
tions of security and liberty. In the world of activities, strict liability
does not shatter the freedom of injurers by forcing them to bear the
concentrated costs of accidents whose incidence they cannot antici
pate any more accurately than victims. In the world of activities,
strict liability forces enterprises to bear the eminently foreseeable
costs of their. characteristic risks - costs whose incidence they are
in an excellent position to estimate and minimize
disperse

ex post.

ex ante,

and to

Negligence liability places greater burdens on the

security of victims. It asks them to bear the distinctive risks of
others activities - risks that they either cannot control or cannot
reasonably be asked to control,2°7 risks whose materialization may
well prove devastating, and risks whose incidence is, from their per-

205. For example:
Seventeen-year-old Carol J. House died in the flames of a gasoline explosion when her
car encountered a pool of thousands of gallons of spilled gasoline. She was driving home
from her after-school job in the early evening of November 22, 1967 . . . . [I]t was dark
but dry; her car's headlamps were burning. There was a slight impact with some object,
a muffled explosion, and then searing flames from gasoline pouring out of an overturned
trailer tank engulfed her car.
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1182 (Wash. 1972). The phenomenon emphasized here is
another facet of the disproportion between freedom and security that underlies the social
contract case for the "disproportion test" in negligence law and Charles Fried's rejection of
the standard of individual rationality for interpersonal risks. See FRIED, supra note 15, at
192; Keating, supra note 57, at 352-60.
206. As Justice Traynor noted:
[T]he manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of
others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unpre
pared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring),
207. See infra text following note 238.

March 1997]

Enterprise Liability

1355

spective, largely beyond meaningful prediction. As compensation
for these threats to their security, a regime of negligence liability
offers victims a boon to their freedom of action, namely the liberty
to impose equivalent "characteristic risks" on others without the
duty of redressing any ensuing harm to natural persons or property.
The benefit to freedom here looks plainly less than the burden to
security: few if any of us stand to benefit much from the right to
expose others to the level of drunkenness characteristic of the
Coast Guard's activity; to the risk of pipe breakage characteristic of
the waterworks' activity; or to the risks of fire and explosion charac
teristic of transporting huge quantities of gasoline by tractor trailer.
For victims to benefit in this way, they would have to be engaged in
either the same, or an equivalent, activity.zos

In the world of activities, then, the choice between strict liability
and negligence is a choice between a grave disruption of security
and a more modest disruption of liberty. Activity liability strikes a
more favorable balance between the competing claims of liberty
and security than negligence liability does, because activity liability
disrupts the liberty of injurers less than negligence impairs the se
curity of victims. Enterprise liability thus secures more favorable
conditions than negligence liability for citizens concerned to pursue
their conceptions of the good over complete lives.
Just as enterprise liability strikes a more reasonable balance
than negligence liability between the competing claims of liberty
and security, it also distributes the financial costs of nonnegligent
harms more fairly than negligence liability. In the world of acts, the
choice between negligence and strict liability is a choice between
208. This requirement of participation in the same, or an equivalent, activity is tighter
than Charles Fried's idea of reciprocity over time and across activities through the mecha
nism of a "risk pool." See FRIED, supra note 15, at 187-91.
There are circumstances when injurers and victims participate in the very same activity,
and when they do the logic of enterprise liability may well be altered. Driving may be the
most familiar such circumstance, and "No-Fault" automobile insurance may be the most fa
miliar adaptation of the logic of enterprise liability. "No-Fault" insurance tailors enterprise
liability to accommodate the fact that the prospective victims of the "characteristic risks" of
driving gain a great deal from the freedom to impose the characteristic risks of driving, be
cause those prospective victims are also and equally prospective injurers. "No-Fault" is a
form of enterprise liability because it is a nonfault form of liability that seeks to make the
activity of driving bear its "characteristic" (not just its negligent) costs. It is specially tailored
to accommodate the participation of victims in the very same enterprise as injurers in two
ways. First, and less important, "No-Fault" exploits the administrative efficiencies of first
party insurance. Second, and more important, "No-Fault" pitches damages at a relatively low
level. This pitching acknowledges the fact that victims have more interest in imposing
equivalent risks on injurers than in reducing and redressing injuries inflicted by injurers. I
cannot pursue these matters here, except to note that other nonfault administrative schemes,
such as worker's compensation, may have similar aims and justifications, either in whole or in
part.
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pinning equally grave and equally undeserved misery and misfor
tune on victims and injurers. In the world of activities, the choice
between negligence and enterprise liability is a choice between
leaving a grave and undeserved misfortune on the victim, and in
flicting a far lesser burden on those who deserve to bear the costs.
Because activity liability disperses the financial costs of nonnegli
gent accidents, and distributes them across those who benefit from
the imposition of the underlying risks, it both minimizes the bur
dens of nonnegligent accidents and apportions those burdens fairly.
In short, the argument is this: for social contract theory, the
choice between negligence and strict liability turns on whether strict
liability burdens the freedom of injurers more than it benefits the
security of victims. The point of Fletcher's argument, as I have re
constructed it, is that, in the world of acts, when risks are reciprocal
strict liability disrupts the freedom of injurers as much as negligence
disrupts the security of victims, and it does so without distributing
the financial costs of nonnegligent accidents more fairly. Injurers
are no more able than victims to bear the financial costs of nonneg
ligent accidents, and they are no more able than victims to disperse
the costs of nonnegligent accidents across those who benefit from
the imposition of the risks that issue in such accidents. In the world
of activities, matters are different. Enterprise liability disrupts the
freedom of injurers less than negligence disrupts the security of vic
tims, and distributes the costs of nonnegligent accidents across the
activities that engender them.
B.

The Rhetoric of Intentionality Revisited

This account of the reasonableness of enterprise liability ex
plains and justifies the first two elements of its rhetoric of fairness
- the principle of burden-benefit proportionality and the stress on
the organized nature of enterprise-related risks - but it does not as
obviously account for the third element, the emphasis on the "in
tentional" character of certain enterprise-related accidents. The
"intentionality" characteristic of core cases of enterprise-related
harm also connects with the principle of burden-benefit proportion
ality, but in a different way.
Earlier, I argued that the "intentionality" that attracts the atten
tion of courts and commentators is, in fact, best understood as a
mark of direct control over the circumstances issuing in certain
kinds of harms (for example, manufacturing defect-related acci
dents). That kind of direct control matters, I argued, because the
infliction of harm on other persons or their property requires justifi-
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cation.209 When the harm is inflicted deliberately, and when the
agent inflicting it is directly responsible for doing so, the demand
for justification is all the stronger. When we press the demand for
justification further, we see that the kind of control characteristic of
large, well-organized enterprises is itself a ground of elevated
responsibility.

In

this context, control is power - power over the lives, limbs,

and property of others. When someone exercises heightened power
over the fundamental interests of others, they are, for that reason
alone, a candidate for heightened responsibility.210 When someone
is presumptively entitled to exercise that power over others as she
sees fit, and for her own benefit, issues of fairness arise immedi
ately. This is the circumstance of the Coast Guard in Bushey. Its
broad authority over its sailors gives the Coast Guard a great deal
of room to expose the drydock to risks of damage from drunken
sailors roaming back and forth between their berths and Brooklyn.
Having granted the

Tamaroa's personnel access to her on condition

that they not interfere with Bushey's work or workmen, Ira S.
Bushey & Sons had exhausted its authority over the coming and
going of the sailors. Bushey had no more authority over the sailors
who shuffled back and forth on shore leave, and no more right to
meddle in their superior officers' control of them, than Fletcher had
authority over Rylands's use of his own land. Yet the safety of
Bushey's property depended on the skill with which the Coast
Guard supervised the comings and goings of sometimes drunken
sailors.
Because sailors almost surely lack the assets or insurance neces
sary to be :financially responsible for the wrongful harms that they
may inflict during the course of their "employment,"211 the :finan
cial burdens of their wrongdoing will be borne by the drydock. By
contrast, the benefits of their use of the drydock will be captured by
the Coast Guard. Under a regime of negligence liability, the Coast
Guard will capture the savings that accrue from having to take only
reasonable precautions to prevent wayward sailors from damaging
the drydock. Direct control enables those in possession to reap the

209. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
210. This is one of the lessons of "special relationship" law. See supra note 147-49 and
accompanying text.
211. This point is fundamental to the economic analysis of vicarious liability. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL Sruo. 29, 42-44 (1972) (discussing
respondeat superior); Sykes, supra note 178, at 1241-42, 1244-47, 1254-58 (addressing the
problem of agent insolvency).
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benefits of a course of action and - in the absence of strict liability
- to disclaim its burdens.
The immediate upshot of this is that the rhetoric of intentional
ity signals a different route to the same summit: direct control relia
bly marks circumstances when enterprises are in a position to
capture the benefits of certain kinds of risk impositions without
bearing the burdens unless strict liability is imposed. This interpre
tation is supported by language in

Lubin,

the case most concerned

with emphasizing deliberateness. The court's observation that it is
"neither just nor reasonable that the city engaged in a proprietary
activity can deliberately and intentionally plan to leave a watermain
underground beyond inspection and maintenance until a break oc
curs and escape liability" is quickly followed by the further observa
tion that " [t]he risks from such a method of operation should be
borne by the water supplier who is in a position to spread the cost
among the consumers who are in fact the true beneficiaries of this
practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and maintenance
costs. "212

This explanation tempts us to take the presence of direct control
as simply a different marker of the circumstances when strict liabil
ity can spread the financial costs of accidents among those who ben
efit from the risks that issue in them. In part, the presence of direct
control does accomplish this result. But, in part, control

enables

an

enterprise to capture the benefits of a nonnegligent practice. The
power to fix maintenance practices is what enabled Iowa City to
capture the cost savings generated by leaving water pipes in the
ground until they broke. The adoption of such a practice is there
fore not just a marker of circumstances when burdens can be par
celed out among beneficiaries - it is also a ground for insisting that
injurers take the bitter with the sweet:

If the city accepts the advantages of lower maintenance costs and
other benefits which result from its practice of burying long lasting
cast iron pipe six feet underground beyond any reasonable opportu
nity to inspect and intentionally leaves them there until breaks began
to occur, it should also expect to pay for the damages resulting from
such practice as a cost of its doing business in this manner.213
The applicability of this point is quite general. It was his control
over his own property that enabled Rylands to capture the benefits
of a reservoir on his property, and control over their property is the
power that generally enables landowners to reap the benefits of the

212. Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1964).
213. 131 N.W.2d at 771.
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property's use. So too, it is the master's control over his servants
that generally enables him to reap the benefits of their service.214
The flip side of this control is that the lives, limbs, and property of
prospective victims are subject to risks whose nonnegligent circum
stances they have no power to control. Strict (or enterprise) liabil
ity rectifies this imbalance: it imposes responsibility on injurers
commensurate with their power.21s
VIII.

THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF THE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS

Enterprise liability can be, and has been, justified on three
grounds: the principle of fairness examined and embraced in this
paper, the policy of pinning liability on the party in the best posi
tion to prevent accidents from happening, and the policy of placing
the loss on the party best able to disperse and distribute it.216 These
are the three justifications that Friendly considers in Bushey, and
these are the three justifications that have animated both case law
and commentary. The argument of this paper - that we should
follow Friendly's lead and grant pride of place to the principle of
fairness - does not require us to reject the policies of accident re
duction and insurance as justifications for enterprise liability. What
it requires is that we give priority to the principle of responsibility
for characteristic risk over the policies of accident reduction and
loss dispersion.

Conflicts among these principles are hardly en

demic. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that enter
prises are generally in the best position to control the risks that are
characteristic of their activities, and there is some reason to believe
that they are usually in the best position to insure against those
risks as we1i.217

214. Vicarious liability law could not be more explicit about this. The critical distinction
between "servants" and independent contractors turns on the master's capacity to control the
agent. See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note 53, §§ 69-71, at 499-516; Sykes, supra note
178, at 1261-71.
215. Cf. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) ("[The strict liability test we suggest] requires . . . only a decision
as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make the cost-benefit
analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once
it is made." (emphasis omitted)).
216. See, e.g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1209-15 (3d Cir. 1977) (en
tertaining all three justifications for enterprise liability); see also sources cited supra notes 5
and 7 (generally embracing the latter two justifications for enterprise liability, even when
they reject enterprise liability itself).
217. Strong support for the proposition that enterprises are generally in the best position
to control the characteristic risks of their activities is supplied both by the closing argument
of the preceding section - that control enables enterprises to benefit from the imposition of
certain risks - and by important economic arguments for enterprise liability. See, e.g., Jones,
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Notwithstanding these overlaps among the three principal justi
fications for enterprise liability, resting the case for enterprise liabil
ity primarily on its principle of fairness leads both to a general
argument for enterprise liability and to a particular conception of
enterprise liability. Each of these is simple, and each is controver
sial. The general argument for enterprise liability is the argument
that it is fair to make enterprises pay for the accidental injuries
characteristic of their activities whenever doing so will distribute
the financial burdens of those accidents among those who have
benefitted from the underlying risk impositions. The particular
conception is liability for the distinctive risks of an enterprise those risks it creates that are "different from those attendant on the
activities of the community in general. "218
The fairness argument for enterprise liability is controversial be
cause, on its face, it sweeps broadly and goes against the grain of
much contemporary tort thinking. Its basic thrust is that negligence
liability should be the dominant form of liability in the world of acts
and actors (with strict liability reserved for nonreciprocal risks), and
that strict liability (in the guise of enterprise liability) should be the
dominant form of liability in the world of enterprises and activities.
While this aligns social contract theory with legal realism, and puts
it in sync with the long ascendancy of enterprise liability in the first
eighty-plus years of this century, it puts social contract theory at
odds with the dominant position of the law and economics move
ment, and out of step with an emerging trend in favor of negligence
liability.219 The fairness conception of enterprise liability is controsupra note 46. Support for the proposition that they are often in the best position to insure
against those risks is provided by Calabresi and by Croley and Hanson. See Guido Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-27 (1961);
Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?, supra note 7; Hanson & Logue, supra note 7. But
see Geistfeld, supra note 46; Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 7; Priest, Tort Reform, supra
note 7; Schwartz, supra note 7.
218. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 1968).

219. The normative implications of social contract theory and economic analysis and the
facts of legal history are more ambiguous and complex than this sentence's crude generaliza
tions suggest. But crude generalizations can paint big pictures accurately, and these general
izations do just that. For a summary of, and a citation to, the views of legal realists, see
Geistfeld, supra note 46, at 1. For evidence of the rise of enterprise liability in the twentieth
century, consider worker's compensation statutes, "No-Fault" automobile insurance, early
products liability law, and the expansion of vicarious and abnormally dangerous activity lia
bility. Although both articles overplay their hands (or their fears), Smith's Sequel to Work
men's Compensation Acts and Priest's The Invention ofEnterprise Liability nicely capture the
sense of enterprise liability's ascendance throughout most of the century. See Jeremiah
Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV L. REV. 235, 344 (1917)
(prophesying the triumph of enterprise liability); Priest, supra note 5 (proclaiming the fulfill
ment of Smith's prophesy). For the present consensus of law and economics scholars against
enterprise liability, see Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174,
1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.); Epstein, supra note 7; Geistfeld, supra note 46; Priest, Insur-
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versial because, if it is correct, one of the most familiar and influen
tial criticisms of enterprise liability is simply off the mark.
George Priest's famous and influential piece,

The Invention of

Enterprise Liability,

concludes that all enterprise liability is deeply
flawed because enterprise liability is inherently illimitable.220 If the
argument of this paper is correct, Priest's criticism is simply wrong.
The principle of benefit-burden proportionality leads to a concep
tion of enterprise liability as liability for characteristic risk, and this
conception places a boundary on the liability of enterprises. Con
ceived as a matter of fairness, enterprise liability ceases at the point
when "the activities of the 'enterprise' do not . . . create risks differ
ent from those attendant on the activities of the community in gen
eral. "221 As we have seen,222 this boundary characterizes not only
vicarious liability, at least when fairness is its principal justification,
but also strict liability for wild animals, "vicious" domestic animals,
and abnormally dangerous activities. This boundary defines a form
of liability that is more extensive than negligence liability, but less
extensive than absolute liability.
Notwithstanding Priest's assertions to the contrary, there is no
reason to think that the boundary-drawing exercises to which the
principle of liability for characteristic risk commits courts are inher
ently impossible. Indeed, there is no reason to think that identifyance Crisis, supra note 7; Priest, Tort Reform, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 6; Schwartz,
supra note 7. The works of Croley and Hanson, supra note 7, Hanson and Logue, supra note
7, and Jones, supra note 46, represent a powerful countertendency, but a countertendency

nonetheless. The trend in "the law" is represented by the powerful opinions of Judge Posner
and by the reconceptualization of products liability law around negligence nonns in the Re
statement (Third) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). Gary Schwartz's Prospectus looks likely to continue the trend.
See PROSPECTUS FOR RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: BASIC PRINCIPLES, REPORT TO THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Nov. 7, 1995).
220. This is George Priest's thesis in The Invention ofEnterprise Liability, supra note 5, at
527. Its consideraJ?le influence is shown by the fact that both scholars and courts have
backed away from imposing enterprise liability on insurance grounds. For example, William
Jones, who strongly favors the expansion of enterprise liability, eschews insurance as a justifi
cation for such expansion. See Jones, supra note 46, at 1778 (acknowledging that "the tort
system is an expensive. and generally unsuitable, mode of social insurance" and emphasizing
that enterprise liability is justified on other grounds). For evidence that courts have done so
as well, see Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 791-92 (1992) (claiming that a more prodefendant
attitude has emerged in products liability cases and arguing that the best explanation for the
change is "[t]he combination of dramatic increases in insurance rates, widespread reporting
of the insurance crisis, a multimillion dollar publicity campaign to link the insurance crisis to
products liability rules, and such rules' effects on daily life" (footnote omitted)). Priest's
paper was originally presented at a "Conference on Critical Issues in Tort Law Refonn"
supported by Aetna. See George L. Priest & Richard A. Epstein, Introduction, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 459 (1985).
221. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172.
222. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text
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ing zones of characteristic risk is any more difficult than deciding, as
negligence liability requires, whether certain precautions should
have been taken. On the whole, it seems likely that the boundary
drawing exercises required by enterprise liability are sometimes
easier, and sometimes more difficult, than the judgments of due
care required by negligence liability. Drawing the boundaries re
quired by enterprise liability will be substantially easier than mak
ing the judgments of due care required by negligence liability when
enterprises engaged in abnormally dangerous activities create risks
that differ in kind from the ordinary risks of life. It will be more
difficult when risks arise out of the mingling of multiple activities,
as they do in the case of railroad crossing accidents. When multiple
activities (for example, railroading, driving, designing automobiles,
and regulating the flow of traffic) all contribute to a particular kind
of accident (for example, automobile-train collisions), sorting out
the distinctive contributions of each enterprise becomes exceed
ingly difficult. Proponents of enterprise liability understand this
difficulty well.223

In fact, Priest's argument that enterprise liability is inherently
illimitable speaks neither to the criterion of liability for characteris
tic risk nor to the idea of fairness that justifies that criterion. His
argument concerns an entirely different set of justifications for en
terprise liability, albeit ones that he finds animating the law. Ac
cording to Priest, "the three presuppositions of manufacturer
power, manufacturer insurance, and internalization" irresistibly im
ply "absolute liability,"224 because these three "presuppositions do
not incorporate any conceptual limit to manufacturer liability."225
Whether or not Priest is right about the logic of these presupposi
tions, his argument simply does not speak to the distinctive concep
tion of enterprise liability in which the idea of fairness issues.
The enterprise liability principle of fairness bounds the scope of
liability in another way - it leads to the recognition of ultrasensi
tivity as a defense. As we have already seen,226 abnormal sensitiv
ity is a natural boundary of liability for characteristic risk because
the harm suffered by the abnormally sensitive is characteristic of
their unusual constitution. Consequently, just as enterprise liability
ends when the increased risks characteristic of an activity blend into
223. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 20, at 163; Jones, supra note 46, at 1746, 1750-51, 1754,
1766 & n.308.
224. Priest, supra note 5, at 527.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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the background risks created by the community's ordinary activi
ties, so too enterprise liability ends when the increased risks created
by an enterprise are eclipsed by the even greater risks created by
the abnormal sensitivity of the victim.227 The conceptual logic be
hind this defense is thus clear. The link between this conceptual
logic and the fairness justification for enterprise liability, however,
is not so clear. There is nothing particularly fair, for example, about
counting the costs of a rare skin disorder a cost of the victim's ab
normal sensitivity to an antiperspirant, when the victim . first learns
of her hypersensitivity through an adverse reaction to a novel
antiperspirant.228
This example reinforces the point that liability for characteristic
risk makes sense only when it is linked to benefit and control. It
seems fair to recognize hypersensitivity as a defense to liability only
when the victim is or ought to be aware of her sensitivity, and when
the victim is in a position to control her contact with the activity to
which she is abnormally sensitive without unduly burdening her
right to use her own property as she sees fit, or to lead a normal life
in the world at large. If the victim's hypersensitivity is not a previ
ously unknown allergy to a rare chemical, but a well-recognized al
lergy to a familiar food (strawberries, for instance), then it seems
fair to make the victim bear the costs of her special sensitivity. So
too, if minks who have recently given birth to kittens are easily
frightened, and if blasting is only one of many disturbances that
might prompt them to kill their kittens, then it seems fair to count
the costs of their sensitivity as costs of mink farming. If, on the

227. This argument is put clearly in Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1954).
The court stated that "strict liability should be confined to consequences which lie within the
extraordinary risk whose existence calls for such responsibility," 268 P.2d at 647, and held
that the harm caused when blasting prompted a mother mink to kill her young was attributa
ble to "the plaintiffs extraordinary and unusual use of land" rather than the "risks inherent
in blasting operations," 268 P.2d at 648. The court counted the effects of the blasting as
"relatively moderate" and "no more than a usual incident of the ordinary life of the commu
nity" because the plaintiff was the only landowner injured by the blasting. 268 P.2d at 648.
228. Courts have split on how to handle such cases. One line of cases holds that warnings
of allergic reactions are appropriate only if the manufacturer can foresee a risk of such reac
tions in a substantial number of persons. See Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790 (Ala.
1984); Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (App. Div. 1964), affd., 231
N.E.2d 294 (N.Y. 1967); Morris v. Pathmark Corp., 592 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. a. 1991). This
is a negligence position, and it is adopted by the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995). Another line of cases imposes a duty to warn of any foreseeable allergy that may be
serious and rejects, implicitly or explicitly, the defense of hypersensitivity. See Kehm v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the defense of user's
idiosyncratic reaction as inapplicable to strict liability claim); Wright v. Carter Prods. Inc.,
244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law). This is essentially a strict liability
position.
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other hand, only blasting frightens mink sufficiently to prompt them
to kill their kittens, it seems fair to count the costs of their sensitiv
ity as costs of blasting.
What counts is not how atypical the victim's reaction is, but
whether it is fair to ask the victim to change her way of life by
either avoiding contact with, or bearing the costs of exposure to, the
activity. Whether or not it is fair turns partly on the prominence of
the sensitivity in the victim's life. The more prominent it is, the less
the normal course of her life will be disrupted by being required to
bear the characteristic costs of her ultrasensitivity.229 If the sensitiv
ity is prominent, she will already have adjusted the normal course
of her life to the special risks of her sensitivity. The fairness of
holding victims responsible for the characteristic costs of their hy
persensitivity is, however, not only a matter of how much it will
disrupt the normal course of their lives. Fairness is also a matter of
comparison. We need to measure the disturbance in the victims'
lives effected by counting their injuries a cost of their peculiar con
stitutions against the disturbance in the normal course of the enter
prise's activity effected by holding it strictly liable for the harms
that it inflicts on hypersensitive individuals.
The general upshot of this is simple enough: abnormal sensitiv
ity should be recognized as a defense to liability when bearing the
costs of such sensitivity will disrupt the normal course of the vic
tim's life less than pinning those costs on the enterprise will disrupt
the normal course of its activity. The particular implications are
varied.

In

some contexts, counting the hypersensitive plaintiff's in

juries a cost of the activity might prove enormously burdensome.
Nuisance law may be such a context.230 In other contexts, such as
product liability and abnormally dangerous activity liability, count
ing the rare hypersensitive victim's injuries a cost of the enterprise's
activity is likely to be substantially less burdensome to the enter
prise. In these contexts, the defense should be narrowly construed.
Abnormal sensitivity should absolve the enterprise of responsibility

229. In Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942), another case of a
mother mink reacting to blasting by killing her young, the appellant alleged that "by nature,
habit and disposition all mink, when with and attending their young, are highly excitable and,
when disturbed, will become terrified and kill their young." 125 P.2d at 794. If this assertion
is correct, then the ultrasensitivity of mink is prominent in the pertinent way.
230. See Rogers v. Elliott, 15 N.E. 768, 772 (Mass. 1888) (holding that ringing a church
bell every day was not a nuisance even though it caused convulsions in the plaintiff, who was
recovering from sunstroke, and stating the rule that what constitutes a nuisance must be
determined by the standard of "ordinary people, as it is, in determining . . . negligence"). The
court explained that failing to recognize hypersensitivity as a defense to a claim of nuisance
might burden other activities excessively.
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only when the unusual sensitivity of the victim's activity is central to
her activity - central enough that requiring the victim to regulate
her exposure to the offending product or abnormally dangerous ac
tivity does not interfere substantially with the normal course of her
activities.231 In still other contexts, the defense may have no appli
cability at all; other considerations may settle the victim's duties to
the enterprise. Vicarious liability illustrates this possibility - the
duties of the plaintiff are settled by the substantive law governing
the underlying tort.232
Similar considerations support the recognition of assumption of
the risk as a defense to enterprise liability.233 It seems intuitively
·

wrong to count the deliberate, unburdened encounters of strangers
with enterprises as characteristic costs of the enterprise. The enter
prise derives no benefit from such encounters, and is poorly posi
tioned to control them. By contrast, strangers who freely choose to
encounter the risks of an enterprise presumably do so because they
deem the encounter beneficial, and are in the best position to con
trol their own contacts with the enterprise. Their voluntary en
counters are thus more "characteristic" of their own activities than
they are of the activities of the enterprise.
Once again, the application of the defense will be shaped by
ancillary considerations and particular contexts. For example, the
substantive law governing the underlying tort will determine the ap
plicability of the defense to vicarious liability, just as it determined
the application of the abnormal sensitivity defense. And, like the
abnormal sensitivity defense, assumption of the risk has its clearest
application in the context of wild animals and abnormally danger
ous activities. These enterprises wear their characteristic risks on
their sleeves, and property rights usually fix the boundaries of their
231. Jones argues in connection with "hazardous" activities that the ultrasensitivity de
fense is "sound if narrowly construed." Jones, supra note 46, at 1757-58. His conclusion rests
on the premise that the "unusually vulnerable victim is the 'least cost avoider"' with respect
to her peculiar vulnerabilities because she will be "acutely aware" of those vulnerabilities
whereas injurers will not. Id. The similarity between my argument and Smith's argument
underscores the close affinity between fairness arguments focused on characteristic risk and
risk minimization arguments focused on the capacity to control risk. Victims, like injurers,
are usually the "least cost avoiders" with respect to the "characteristic" risks of their
activities.
232. These variations in the application of the ultrasensitivity defense are another reflec
tion of the shaping influence of subordinate doctrines and particular contexts on generally
applicable grounds of responsibility. See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text (discuss
ing the applicability of the reciprocity of risk criterion).
233. Assumption of the risk has a number of meanings in the law, including "no duty,"
perhaps its most common meaning in modem negligence law. The doctrine that I have in
mind is a true affirmative defense. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E
(1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (1977).
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legitimate activity with considerable clarity. Both of these features
facilitate the application of assumption of the risk doctrine. The
magnitude and distinctiveness of their characteristic risks makes it
reasonable to expect victims to recognize those risks ex ante, and
relatively easy, ex post, to determine if they did recognize those
risks. The presence of property rights facilitates the judgments of
burdensomeness on which the voluntariness aspect of the doctrine
turns.234
The applicability of assumption of the risk to product liability
law is more problematic. Misperception of product risks is one of
the central problems, perhaps the central problem,235 of product lia
bility law, and its pervasiveness frustrates the application of as
sumption of the risk doctrine. Victims are in a poor position to
control their encounters with risks that they do not perceive and
cannot reasonably be expected to perceive. Historically, the de
fense has had its greatest formal recognition in connection with
manufacturing defects, the strictest part of product liability law.236
The pairing of the strict liability rule and the defense confirms the
link between assumption of the risk and strict liability, but the
properties of manufacturing defects severely limit the substantive
significance of the defense. Manufacturing defects are generally la
tent, so opportunities to assume their risks are rare.
These remarks bring us face to face with a more difficult ques
tion: What role, if any, should victim negligence play as a defense
to enterprise liability? Strict liability doctrines have traditionally
limited the role of victim negligence. The provisions in the Restate
ment (Second) of Torts dealing with abnormally dangerous activity,
for example, recognize victim negligence as a defense only in the
form of the victim's "knowingly and unreasonably subjecting him
self to the risk of harm from the activity. "237 Standing close enough
to a caged bear to be mauled through the bars of the cage is an
example of this kind of negligence,238 but inadvertently straying
across the median divider into an oncoming tractor trailer trans234. See, e.g., Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 {Tex. 1974); see also supra notes 51-61
and accompanying text.
235. See SHAVELL, supra note 88, at 54-56; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 822, 827-32;
Schwartz, supra note 100, at 374.
236. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Design defect and warning law have gen
erally been paired with the defense of victim negligence.
237. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 524{2) {1977). Section 524(1) states that this is
the only kind of victim negligence that counts as a defense. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 524(1) (1977).
238. See Heidemann v. Wheaton, 34 N.W.2d 492 (S.D. 1948).
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porting gasoline, in a jurisdiction that counts the transport of gaso
line in this way abnormally dangerous, is not.
The common law origins of enterprise liability are an important
source of its deemphasis of victim negligence as a defense. The two
chief common law sources of modem enterprise liability are vicari
ous liability law and the strict liability for hazardous "escaping
things" emanating out of Rylands v. Fletcher. In both of these cir
cumstances it is unreasonable even to demand victim precautions.
In vicarious liability law, the duties of victims are fixed by the law
governing the agent's wrongdoing. When that law does not de
mand victim precautions, it establishes the victim's prima facie right
not to have to guard against the agent's wrongdoing. If vicarious
liability law were to insist on victim precautions when the underly
ing law did not, it would be taking back the very rights granted by
the underlying law. For example, requiring Ira S. Bushey & Sons to
take precautions against unauthorized invasions of its drydock by
Seaman Lane and his fellow sailors involves denying that they have
the right to be free of such trespasses in the first place. That they
do have that right is precisely what the pertinent tort law
establishes.
Nothing in the doctrine or justification of vicarious liability sug
gests that it should alter the duties of victims by imposing duties of
precaution when the underlying tort law does not do so. If vicari
ous liability law were to impose such duties, it would be in the
anomalous position of discriminating against those who happened
to be victimized by the servants of others, rather than by persons
acting on their own behalf. Discriminating in this way would not
only be puzzling, and apparently absurd, on its face. It would also
be contrary to the entire thrust of respondeat superior. Vicarious
liability exists to enforce the rights of those victimized by the agents
of other principals, not to diminish their rights. No justification is
more fundamental to the institution than the argument that ser
vants will usually lack the financial resources or the insurance nec
essary for them to compensate the victims of their tortious acts.239
The law of vicarious liability therefore does not spawn any in
dependent duties of victim precaution.
The logic of Rylands v. Fletcher also minimizes the role of victim
precautions, but for somewhat different reasons. Rylands supposes
that people are free to do as they please with and on their own
property. Their freedom comes to an end when they injure the per239. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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sons or property of others - when the dangerous things that they
bring onto their property escape beyond its boundaries and cause
harm. Victim negligence has no place in this framework. By virtue
of the special freedoms conferred by the ownership of real prop
erty, injurers are free to impose risks that might otherwise be
deemed unreasonable, but they must pay for this special freedom
by compensating those injured when their unusually dangerous ac
tivities go awry. Victims must bear risks that might othenvise be
deemed unreasonable, but they are compensated for this special
burden not only by being assured of compensation if these risks
issue in injury to them, but also by being relieved of the duty to
adjust their lives, and their use of their property, in ways that mini
mize the harm that they might suffer at the hands of these unusual
risks. Duties of victim precaution would unfairly burden both the
freedom and property rights of victims. The reconciliation of com
peting rights effected by Rylands thus leaves duties of victim pre
caution out of its calculus.
This hereditary bias of enterprise liability law against defenses
of victim negligence is bolstered by the difficulties of constructing
attribution rules for circumstances when risks are the joint product
of multiple activities, and by the administrative complexities intro
duced by combining defenses of victim negligence with enterprise
liability. The case for negligence liability is most compelling when
multiple parties are in a position to affect the level of the relevant
risk, and can all be reasonably asked to guard against it.240 These
are precisely the circumstances when it is difficult to devise worka
ble tests for identifying the characteristic risks of each of the differ
ent activities. Enterprise liability regimes have thus been hard to
fashion in those situations when defenses of victim negligence seem
most urgent. This fact has hindered the development of doctrines
that combine enterprise liability with defenses of victim negligence.
The administrative complexities introduced by combining victim
negligence with enterprise liability compound the problem. When
adequate attribution rules can be devised, legal economists have ar
gued persuasively that enterprise liability is easier to administer
than negligence. Deciding who should make the choice between
preventing an accident and letting it happen - whose risk it is that
has occasioned an injury - is simpler and therefore cheaper than
deciding not only whose risk it is, but also whether or not that risk
240. Recall an earlier example: railroads, traffic agencies, and drivers can all affect the
risks of railroad crossing accidents and can all be asked to take steps to reduce those risks.
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should have been eliminated.241 Combining a defense of victim
negligence with strict (enterprise) liability not only partially com
promises this administrative advantage by requiring a fuller inquiry
into the victim's conduct, it also runs the risk of compromising this
administrative advantage entirely. In at least some circumstances, it
may not be possible to determine what precautions victims should
take without first deciding what precautions injurers should take.
For example, we may not be able to decide just what precau
tions drivers should take to minimize the risks of harm threatened
by car crashes without first deciding what precautions manufactur
ers should have taken. Whether drivers should wear seat belts,
what kinds of seat belts they should wear, whether their passengers
should use or avoid air bags, and whether they should lock their
doors to minimize the risk of the doors popping open during colli
sions, or leave them unlocked to minimize the risk of being trapped
in their cars after accidents, are all questions that cannot be an
swered independently of inquiries into correct car design and what
it can accomplish in the way of risk reduction. When the content of
duties of victim negligence is dependent in this way on the content
of injurer duties of due care, the introduction of a defense of victim
negligence will compromise the administrative advantages of a
strict liability regime. To decide what precautions the victim should
have taken for her own protection, we will first have to decide what
precautions the injurer should have taken, and that is the very ques
tion that enterprise liability is supposed to enable us to ignore.242
For better or worse, the practical difficulties surrounding the in
tegration of victim negligence as a defense do not render the de
fense irrelevant in principle. The issue of principle turns on
241. This is perhaps the most fundamental insight of Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note
215. It has been widely accepted in the economic literature. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note
88, at 264; Geistfeld, supra note 46, at 11-12; Jones, supra note 46, at 1759. In this area,

economics has confirmed and sharpened preexisting intuition.
242. Legal economists have made this point powerfully. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note
46, at 12. The problem is pervasive given the economic understanding of negligence. As
Geistfeld explains, "[t]he negligence-contributory negligence approach, defined in marginal
Hand Formula terms, yields optimal results so long as the law applies the Hand Formula to
each party on the assumption that the otherparty is exercising due care." Geistfeld, supra note
46, at 88 (quoting WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 88 (1987)). Under this approach, contributory negligence should not be recog
nized as a defense whenever the victim fails to take cost-justified precautions, but only when
the victim fails to take precautions that she might have taken more cheaply than the injurer.
See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 215, at 1058. I am not persuaded that all victim negli
gence fits this conceptualization of its structural relation to primary negligence. For example,
the right of ways specified by traffic codes do not seem to fit this model. Some instances of
victim negligence - for example, passenger precautions against increased injuries in car
crashes - probably do fit this model. The fact that automobile manufacturers are not "injur
ers" in the standard sense of the term is irrelevant for our purposes.
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whether insisting on victim precautions is incompatible with proper
respect for the victim's autonomy. Rylands v. Fletcher and respon
deat superior identify circumstances when this is indeed the case.
Insisting on duties of victim precaution in Rylands is incompatible
with the right of victims to use their property as they see fit so long
as they do not injure others. Insisting on special precautions by
persons unfortunate enough to be injured by the servants of others
is incompatible with the right of those victims to normal lives - to
the same freedom from harm that they would have if they were
injured by persons acting on their own behalf.
Other circumstances when the victim's right to a normal life is
inconsistent with a duty to guard herself against the negligence of
others can easily be imagined. Persons should be free to walk the
public sidewalks without the burden of being on guard against stray
cricket balls or snow cascading off adjacent rooftops. So too, per
sons should be free to stand in the doorways of their houses without
bracing themselves against possible concussions from explosives
stored at nearby mines, and should be free to live near a cricket
field without being condemned to a lifetime of dodging cricket balls
at their own peril.243
Nonetheless, the imposition of duties of victim negligence is not

always inconsistent with proper respect for the victim's autonomy
- her right to the free use of her property, or to a normal life. It is
quite reasonable to ask that people exercise due care to keep them
selves beyond the reach of caged bears, and equally fair to insist
that they owe to those transporting huge quantities of gasoline by
tractor trailer the same duties of due care that they owe to other
drivers.244 In principle, primary norms of enterprise liability are
perfectly compatible with the defense of victim negligence. The
chief justification for imposing enterprise liability - the ability of
enterprises to spread the financial costs of their characteristic acci
dents across those who benefit from the creation of the risks that
issue in those accidents - simply does not speak to the desirability
243. These examples track the facts of Bolton v. Stone, [1951] App. Cas. 850 {addressing a
claim brought by a plaintiff who was struck by cricket ball that escaped from a nearby cricket
field while he was walking on the street); Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 106 Mass. 194, 199
{1870) (addressing a claim brought by a plaintiff who walked on a public sidewalk and was
struck by falling ice and snow that had accumulated on defendant's peaked roof); and Tuck·
ashinsky v. Lehigh & Wilkesbarre Coal Co., 49 A. 308 (Pa. 1901) {addressing a claim brought
by a plaintiff who was standing in the doorway of her father's house, 700 feet from defend
ant's mine, and was harmed by the concussion from a blast caused when lightning ignited
explosives stored at the mine). The defendants in Bolton and Tuckashinsky were not held
liable. My view here is in accord with Jones, supra note 46, at 1756-57.
244. See Seigler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
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of victiin negligence as a defense to enterprise-related risks. The
appropriateness of asking victims to guard against the costs of the
activities of others turns, rather, on whether the imposition of such
a duty would wrongly diminish their autonomy. The answer to that
question depends primarily on the contours of the normal life to
which victims are presumptively entitled, and on the presence or
absence of property rights incompatible with duties of victim
negligence.
The upshot of all this is that what is desirable in principle, and
what is possible in practice, may not align as well as one might
hope.

In some circumstances when enterprise liability is fairer than

negligence liability, duties of victim negligence will be appropriate
in principle, but difficult to administer in practice. Whether enter
prise liability can be extended as far as the principle of fairness
pushes it may depend on whether this practical difficulty can be
overcome. It may be, for instance, that a regime of strict liability
for "escaping things" can be widely and effectively extended from
the world of Rylands

v. Fletcher to the world

of Siegler

v. Kuhlman

only if duties of victim precaution can be successfully combined
with enterprise liability. The doctrine arising out of Rylands is tai
lored to a static sphere of landed uses, stationary enterprises, and
sharp boundaries between the spheres of injurer and victim free
dom. For enterprise liability to :flourish as fully as the idea of fair
ness suggests that it should, it must be adapted to a more dynamic
sphere of interpenetrating activities and fluid boundaries. Whether
this can be done cannot be told in advance; it can only be told by
testing practical ingenuity in the crucible of particular problems.
This exploration of the defenses and limits to enterprise liability
put us in a position to consider the tide of sentiment currently op
posing it. We have already argued that some of the arguments on
which this sentiment rests are plainly wrong. Fault is not an obvi
ously fairer principle of responsibility than strict liability, and enter
prise liability is manifestly not absolute liability. Convictions to the
contrary, however, are not the primary force behind the tide of sen
timent against enterprise liability. Alan Schwartz's animus against
strict liability does not depend in any important way on the argu
ment that strict liability slides unavoidably down the slippery slope
to absolute liability. The preferences for negligence liability ex
pressed by Richard Posner and Gary Schwartz are no more depen
dent on that controversial piece of Priest's thesis.
First and foremost, the tide of sentiment running against strict
liability is driven by the gravitational pull of prescriptive economic
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analysis. Alan Schwartz, Gary Schwartz, George Priest, Richard
Posner, Mark Geistfeld and other critics of enterprise liability are
bound together by the conviction that victim precautions matter in
myriad ways that enterprise liability ignores.245 Efficiency can be
achieved only if victims are encouraged to take appropriate precau
tions against injury at the hands of others, to adjust their activity
levels in light of prospective injury, and to insure themselves against
any harms that they might eventually suffer. In his discussion of
Bolton v. Stone, for example, Gary Schwartz suggests that the negli
gence liability is appropriate because the victim should be expected
to adjust both her use of the sidewalk and her choice of residential
neighborhood in light of the risks imposed by cricket fields.246
Writing with William Landes, Judge Posner similarly insists that vic
tims are not presumptively entitled to stand in the doorways of
their father's houses without guarding against the concussive effects
of explosive blasts on nearby properties: people "do not have to
live 700 feet from a mine shaft. "247 Individuals should be expected
to adjust their housing choices - their activity levels as victims in light of the risks presented by nearby properties.248
245. See supra Part III.
246. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15
GA. L. REv. 963, 993 n.156 (1981) (noting that the plaintiff helped to cause her own injury at
the hand of the stray cricket ball because she "chose to live in a neighborhood near a pre
existing cricket field and chose to walk on a street adjacent to that field while a cricket match
was in progress"). This objection to imposing liability on the cricket club must be distin
guished from another, more plausible, objection. One might argue that the risk is so remote
that it should be counted a background risk of living. I am not considering that objection
here.
In a recent piece, Professor Schwartz makes a similar objection to Friendly's "characteris
tic risk" criterion and fairness justification for vicarious liability. See Gary T. Schwartz, The
Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739,
1750 (1996). Schwartz writes: "[I]n many cases, the accident's etiology also involves contri·
butions by various third parties (including the plaintiff)." Id. at 1750. Schwartz's focus on
"cause" misses the pertinent justification for ignoring victim contributions. Insisting on vic
tim precautions above and beyond those required by the underlying tort law is inconsistent
with the victim's entitlement to the same legal rights as everyone else. To insist that victims
must waive their normal rights whenever the exercise of those rights would impede the pur
suit of efficiency is to deny that they have any rights. This view implicitly asserts that victims
are merely the keepers of their own lives and property, holding them in trust for the common
good (conceived of as the maximization of wealth). This denies individual autonomy in an
elemental, extreme, and unconvincing way.
247. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 242, at 117.
248. See id. at 117-18. Jones puts the case against the views of Schwartz and Posner very
lucidly:
These arguments are similar to those made in connection with the railway spark cases,
suggesting that farmers plant fire-resistant crops or allow some of their land to lie fallow
to form a buffer zone adjacent to the railway tracks. All such arguments are unsound.
The plaintiff in Tuckashinsky was standing in her home; the plaintiff in Bolton was stand·
ing on a public street. . . . To argue that they should not have been in this particular
building or on this particular street is to give the defendants control over adjacent pri
vate and public properties to which they hold no entitlement. If the owner of the mine
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Once the general superiority of first-party insurance over third
party insurance is added to the picture, the legitimate sphere of
strict liability shrinks still further. As Mark Geistfeld explains, in a
world where individuals perfectly comply with the negligence norm
there will be no unjustified injuries:

Instead, all injuries [will be] "unavoidable" in the sense that they
[will] occur despite the exercise of reasonable care by the injurer and
victim. Victims will therefore be financially responsible for their own
injuries and will self-insure or purchase first-party insurance to pro
vide compensation in the event of injury. Strict liability would shift
the injury cost to injurers, but due to the higher costs of third-party
insurance, negligence is more desirable except for "extraordinary"
cases in which strict liability significantly reduces the amount of risk
taking activity within the community.249
Thus, even in the nonideal world in which we live, the only legiti
mate role of strict liability is to reduce the intensity with which cer
tain risks are imposed. Not surprisingly, the alleged superiority of
first-party insurance is fundamental to Alan Schwartz's case against
strict liability and for a contract regime in products liability, and to
George Priest's case against enterprise liability and for a negligence
regime in the same area.25o
The obvious and strong tendency of emphasizing these three
forms of victim precaution is to shrink the proper sphere of enter
prise liability relative both to negligence liability and to contract.
Less obvious, but perhaps more telling, is the fact that this concep
tion of the relative roles of negligence and strict (or enterprise) lia
bility makes no place at all for the idea of conditional fault. Strict
liability is justified, when it is justified, by the fact that the advan
tages of inducing correct injurer care and activity levels outweigh
the disadvantages of discouraging correct victim activity levels and
supplying too much insurance against nonnegligent injuries. Con
ceptually speaking, these are all "precaution" concerns. The point
or the cricket field felt that a buffer zone was needed to provide greater safety, the
owner should have acquired, and paid for, additional land or additional rights in adja
cent land.
Jones, supra note 46, at 1757 (footnote omitted). To this, I would add only that these bound
aries protect autonomy - persons' control over their lives and property - in vital ways.
249. See Geistfeld, supra note 46, at 46. Geistfeld emphasizes that the proper scope of
strict liability is this narrow only when we make "unrealistic" assumptions about the deter
rent efficacy of negligence law. Still, the main point of Geistfeld's article is that even if we
relax that unrealistic assumption, once we take account of the superiority of first-party insur
ance against nonnegligent harms, we will not embrace the "strict liability for hazardous busi
ness enterprises" proposed by Jones. See Jones, supra note 46. Thus, the proper sphere of
strict liability expands under more realistic assumptions, but only so much. Geistfeld's argu
ment starts from Professor Shavell's analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
250. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 7. Croley and Han
son challenge the alleged superiority of first-party insurance. See sources cited supra note 7.
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of strict liability is to get the optimal level of injurer precaution and
activity - the level that would be achieved under a perfectly ad
ministered negligence standard. Strict liability is thus explained and
justified without ever acknowledging that it expresses a competing
principle of responsibility, namely the "conditional fault" principle
that the legitimate conduct of an activity sometimes requires paying
compensation to those injured by its nonnegligent risks.
Put differently, the claim of contemporary critics of enterprise
liability is this: the imposition of strict liability implies that the de
fendant's conduct is reasonably careful, but unreasonably intense.
Viewed through the lens of this conception of strict liability, the
point of Rylands is that, although there was nothing unreasonable
about Fletcher's selection of the contractor who constructed his res
ervoir, and nothing unreasonable about the way that he maintained
and operated that reservoir, there was something unreasonable
about his decision to construct a reservoir in the first place. That
use of water was "unreasonably intense." Applied to Bushey, this
conception of strict liability implies that there was nothing unrea
sonable about the care that the Coast Guard took in supervising its
sailors on shore leave, but something unreasonably intense about its
unleashing of sailors on the unsuspecting borough of Brooklyn in
the first place.
Kantian social contract theory holds that this account of strict
liability is subtly, but fundamentally, mistaken. Although strict lia
bility often realizes the aims of negligence liability more effectively
than does negligence liability itself, these different forms of liability
express different principles of responsibility. The unreasonableness
of the conduct subject to strict (or enterprise) liability lies not in the
imposition of the risk, but in the refusal to accept financial responsi
bility for the harms issuing from that risk. Fletcher is presumptively
free to put his own property to whatever use he desires, and the
Coast Guard is presumptively free to schedule its sailors' shore
leaves as it sees fit. There is, in fact, something a bit unreasonable
- a bit officious or meddlesome - in our presuming to determine
how Fletcher should use his property, or how the Coast Guard
should run its own affairs. What is wrong with Fletcher's conduct is
not that he has made an unreasonable choice of activity, but that it
is unreasonable for him to expect others to bear the costs of his
unusually dangerous activity.
What is true about Rylands v. Fletcher is also true about abnor
mally dangerous activity law in general. The law of abnormally
dangerous activities does not condemn the use of explosives as un-
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but rather holds those who use explosives liable for

their miscarriage. What it condemns as unreasonable is the imposi
tion of the characteristic costs of unusually dangerous activities on
victims who are not parties to the abnormally dangerous activities
themselves. And what is true of abnormally dangerous activity lia
bility in general is also true of vicarious liability in general. niat
body of law does not condemn the daily decisions of employers to
put their employees in positions where they may commit torts. It
holds employers financially responsible for the torts that their em
ployees commit. What it criticizes is not the decision to impose the
risk, but the imposition of the costs of that decision on others.

If this interpretation of the character of enterprise liability is
correct -

if

enterprise liability is a kind of "conditional fault" -

then the economic case against enterprise liability is suspect simply
because it fails to recognize the distinctive principle of responsibil
ity that enterprise liability embodies. But the flaws in the economic
case against enterprise liability are not merely interpretive, they are
also normative. By placing so much weight on the superiority of
first-party insurance, the economic critique betrays once more its
implausible belief that victims must always and everywhere take
precautions against injury at the hands of others. Not only must
victims always exercise care in the conduct of their lives (for exam
ple, always be on guard against stray golf balls in the street or stun
ning concussions in their doorways) and in their choice of activities
(for example, always adjust their lives in light of nearby cricket
fields or mines), they must also always insure themselves against
accidental injury and death at the hands of others. If they do not,
society will not maximize total wealth.
Kantian social contract theory is unconvinced. We have no gen
eral duty to maximize total social wealth, and we therefore have no
general duty to insure ourselves against the wrongdoing of others.
Demanding that victims must insure themselves against accidental
injury and death at the hands of others adds "institutional insult to
personal injury."251 The imposition of strict (enterprise) liability
expresses the conclusion that it is wrong for an enterprise to impose
nonnegligent risks unless it compensates those whose lives, limbs,
and property are injured by accidents issuing from those risks. Re251. I owe this expression and a more general debt to Jules L. Coleman, Adding Institu
tional Insult to Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 223, 230 (1990); see also COLEMAN, supra
note 94, at 427-28, 437-39; JuLES L. COLEMAN, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, in
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 28, 49 (1988). I am also indebted to JUDITH J. THOMSON,
Remarks on Causation and Liability, in RIGms, RESTITIJTION AND RISK 192, 199 (1986).
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quiring victims to insure against such injuries denies what the liabil
ity regime asserts - that the injurer's conduct is legitimate only if
she fully compensates all those that she injures. The case for full
compensation rests on two simple premises. The first is that injur
ers have a duty to repair the damage that they cause. The second is
that people do not forfeit a share of their authority over their own
lives and property simply because they suffer the misfortune of hav
ing those lives and that property violated by accidental injury. By
compensating the plaintiff for all of the harm that she has suffered,
the award of traditional tort damages expresses an appropriate re
spect for the plaintiff's authority over her own life and property. In
insisting that victims should insure themselves against wrongful vio
lations of their own lives, limbs, and property, economics denies
that persons really are the legal masters of their own lives and the
owners of their own property. Economics asserts, and liberalism
denies, that persons hold their lives, limbs and property in trust
from society, and on condition that they use both resources in ways
that maximize overall social welfare. The assault on enterprise lia
bility is an expression of that fundamental, and unconvincing,
premise.252
The prevailing hostility to strict liability is thus ill-founded. In
some circumstances, negligence liability will reconcile the freedom
of injurers and the security of victims more fairly than enterprise
liability. In other circumstances, the reverse will be true. In still
other circumstances (product liability comes to mind), some hybrid
regime will be most appropriate. Tue most that can be said in
dependent of a particular context is that our world both favors and
undercuts the spread of enterprise liability. It favors the spread of
enterprise liability by generating social circumstances that enable
enterprises to distribute the costs of nonnegligent accidents among
those whose activities engender them, thereby triggering the appli
cation of the enterprise liability principle of fairness. It undercuts
the spread of enterprise liability by pressing more and more activi
ties into contact with one another, thereby blurring the boundaries
252. I do not mean to suggest that enterprise liability regimes must always award normal
tort damages or compromise autonomy. Nonfault administrative schemes, such as worker's
compensation, for example, award lesser damages, and they are important instances of enter
prise liability. These schemes, however, apply to participants in enterprises. The imposition
of the relevant risks therefore furthers the autonomy of victims. The same is not true when
the victims are strangers, which is usually the case in vicarious liability or abnormally danger
ous activity liability cases. I believe that this difference in the relationship between victim
and enterprise accounts for and legitimates the basic difference in damage measures, but I
cannot pursue the matter here.
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between them and making it difficult to sort out the distinctive risks
of different activities.
IX.

THE PRIORITY OF FAIRNESS

At the outset of Part VII, I argued that an interpretively ade
quate Kantian justification for the enterprise liability principle of
fairness would meet a number of constraints. Some of those con
straints are :fixed by Kantian social contract theory, others are :fixed
by the characteristics of enterprise liability law. In closing I wish to
show both how the view presented in Parts VII and VIII meets
those constraints, and that it vindicates and generalizes Judge
Friendly's claim for the priority of fairness over efficiency. That pri
ority is a local expression of the general priority, within our moral
sensibility, of considerations of justice over those of utility.
A satisfactory social contract justification for enterprise liability
must show why it reconciles the competing claims of liberty and
security more reasonably than negligence.

In

doing so, it should

also explain the force of the reciprocity of risk criterion that has for
so long dominated social contract theory's account of the proper
division of labor between negligence and strict liability. The de
fense of the enterprise liability principle of fairness offered in Part

VII meets both of these constraints.
The defense shows that in the "world of activities" enterprise
liability reconciles the competing claims of liberty and security
more fairly and more favorably than negligence liability. Enter
prise liability aligns the financial burdens and benefits of nonnegli
gent accidents, thereby satisfying the principle of benefit-burden
proportionality with respect to the distribution of the financial costs
of accidents, as well as the burdens and benefits of the underlying
risks. Even when risks are reciprocal, negligence fairly apportions
only the burdens and benefits of the underlying risks. Enterprise
liability is thus fairer than negligence liability. Because harm is
more threatening than risk is to persons' capacity to pursue their
conceptions of the good over complete lives, other things being
equal, a liability regime that diminishes the incidence of nonnegli
gent harm, and minimizes its impact on victims, reconciles the com
peting demands of freedom and security more favorably than a
regime that only succeeds in apportioning the burdens and benefits
of risk fairly. Because enterprise liability is capable of diminishing
the disruptions of victim security occasioned by nonnegligent harms
without imposing a correspondingly great disruption on the free-
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dom of action of injurers, it succeeds in reconciling freedom and
security more favorably than negligence does.
By drawing upon Holmes' implicit distinction between the
"world of acts" and the "world of activities," the preceding defense
of enterprise liability also captures the force of the "reciprocity of
risk" criterion, and reconciles it with the principle of burden-benefit
proportionality, with which it appears to compete. When the finan
cial burdens of nonnegligent harms

cannot

be fairly apportioned,

the "reciprocity of risk" criterion reconciles the competing claims of
liberty and security as fairly as practicable. This is the general situa
tion in the "world of acts." When those burdens

can

be fairly ap

p ortioned, the principle of benefit-burden proportionality
reconciles the competing claims of liberty and security more fairly.
This is the general situation in the "world of activities."
The account of enterprise liability proposed in Part VII also
meets the interpretive constraints fixed by the features of enterprise
liability doctrine. Enterprise liability requires injurers to bear the
financial burdens of risks whose prevention it would be unreason
able to demand.253 The payment of damages in enterprise liability
is thus a condition for the legitimate conduct of an activity, whereas
the payment of damages under negligence liability is redress for the
wrongful infringement of the property and physical integrity of
others. On the social contract view developed in this article, these
differences are readily comprehended and readily justified. The
conduct subject to negligence liability is unreasonable because the
injurer's imposition of the underlying risk is wrongful. The conduct
subject to strict liability is unreasonable because the injurer's failure
to compensate the victim is wrongful. When an enterprise is in a
position to minimize the financial impact of an accident characteris
tic of the enterprise's activities on the accident victim, and able to
distribute the accident cost across the activity that engendered it by
the same stroke, it is only reasonable that the enterprise do so. So
doing reconciles the competing claims of freedom and security
more favorably and more fairly than negligence liability does. This
is the central constructive argument of the paper, and it justifies the
imposition of financial responsibility on enterprises for harms that
they should not have prevented.
Part VIII shows that the social contract account of the grounds
of enterprise liability also "fits and justifies" enterprise liability doc
trine's relative indifference to optimal precaution and insurance

253. See text accompanying supra notes 119-20.
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concerns. The imposition of duties of victim precaution is fre
quently inconsistent with the demands of equal freedom, fairly
specified. Persons are presumptively entitled to lead normal lives,
and to use their property as they see fit. Property rights and the
eclectic conventions specifying the contours of a normal life are the
concrete (if imperfect) incarnations of individual freedom. The im
position of duties of victim precaution and insurance is often incon
sistent with adequate respect for those facets of freedom. When
this is the case, the law of accidents rightly rejects duties of victim
precaution and insurance. While persons are free to maximize their
own wealth, and to take precautions for their own benefit, when the
demand that they do so runs contrary to the claims of justice, the
claims of justice override that demand.
This priority returns us to Judge Friendly, whose celebrated
opinion in

Bushey

eloquently and precisely framed the conflict be

tween fairness and efficiency with which this paper began, and to
which it must now return. In his generous tribute to Friendly, Judge
Posner calls him "the greatest federal appellate judge of his time in analytic power, memory, and application perhaps of any time."254
The tribute that we have paid here is of a different kind, but, I
hope, no less generous. This paper tries to provide the theoretical
underpinning for Judge Friendly's claim that the institution of vica
rious liability "even within its traditional limits, rests not so much
on policy grounds consistent with the governing principles of tort
law as in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise can
not justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be
said to be characteristic of its activities. "255
That "deeply rooted sentiment" is the conviction that "[e]ach
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. "256 The priority of
fairness over efficiency that Judge Friendly discerned is nothing less
than the priority of justice over utility - the acknowledgment that
"the loss of freedom for some is [not] made right by a greater good
shared by others."257 If "the concept and language of justice [are]
the test . . . by which any area of law must be judged,"258 then
254. Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1724
(1986).
255. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968).
256. RAWLS A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 3.
257. Id. at 3-4.
258. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 69, 70 (1975).
,
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within the law of enterprise liability, the principle of fairness must
have priority over the policy of wealth-maximization.

